PSQ

# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Effective National Security Advising

Fred I. Greenstein
Richard H. Immerman — Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. — A Most Dubious Precedent

Terrence Guay — Local Government and Global Politics: The Implications of Massachusetts' "Burma Law"

Anna Greenberg — The Church and the Revitalization of Politics and Community

Peter J. Schraeder — Cold War to Cold Peace: U.S.–French Competition in Francophone Africa

Aviezer Tucker, Karel Jakeš
Marian Kišš, Ivana Kupcová
Ivo Losman, David Ondračka
Jan Outlý, Věra Stýskalíková — From Republican Virtue to Technology of Political Power: Three Episodes of Czech Nonpolitical Politics

Book Reviews

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

# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS


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## *From the Editor:*

### *In this issue . . .*

FRED I. GREENSTEIN and RICHARD H. IMMERMAN provide an account of the impressively rigorous process of national security policy planning in the Eisenhower presidency. They commend it as a model for the next administration.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. argues that the Eisenhower heavily-layered national security apparatus did not produce a coherent foreign policy and did not save the administration from gross errors. He believes that future presidents would benefit from a more flexible approach—such as those of FDR and JFK—to the conduct of foreign affairs.

TERRENCE GUAY examines Massachusetts' sanctions legislation and underscores the growing involvement of local government in global politics. He explains how Massachusetts' "Burma Law" was entangled with the interactions between domestic and international politics, ethics and foreign policy, the U.S. role in the post-cold war world, the impact of NGOs in world affairs, the changing nature of federalism, and the relative influence of business and government.

ANNA GREENBERG examines the role religious institutions play in their local communities as agents of political mobilization and as intermediaries between the individual and the state. She argues that religious institutions serve as an important source of political information, resources, and incentives to engage the political process.

PETER J. SCHRAEDER examines the rise and evolution of U.S.–French competition in francophone Africa. He concludes that this case is indicative of the emergence of a cold peace in which the great powers struggle for economic supremacy in the highly competitive economic environment of the post-cold war.

AVIEZER TUCKER, KAREL JAKEŠ, MARIAN KIŠŠ, IVANA KUPCOVÁ, IVO LOSMAN, DAVID ONDRAČKA, JAN OUTLÝ, and VĚRA STÝSKALÍKOVÁ examine three episodes of Czech experimentation with "nonpolitical politics." They determine that nonpolitical politics is a useful doctrine for dissident movements that do not intend to govern, but not a feasible approach to governing in a modern representative democracy.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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# Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy

FRED I. GREENSTEIN
RICHARD H. IMMERMAN

As the new president and his national security team ready themselves to address the global demands of a new century, they have two broad options. They can follow the precedent of the Clinton administration and take it for granted that the post-cold war international environment does not lend itself to overall planning, responding to international contingencies as they arise. Or they can conclude that precisely because international affairs are no longer defined by the extended confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is crucial to establish priorities and minimize the danger of being caught flat-footed by emerging developments.

To the extent that it opts for the latter, the new administration would be advised to take note of a national security advisory system that was devised and operated by a chief executive who had devoted much of his adult life to the organization of collective endeavors—Dwight D. Eisenhower, the architect of the Normandy invasion and the Allied campaign in Europe in World War II. During his time in the White House, Eisenhower was beloved by the American people, but widely perceived by political cognoscenti to have been a mere presidential figurehead. We now know, however, that the former supreme commander was an astute and informed political leader who advanced his purposes

FRED I. GREENSTEIN is professor of politics at Princeton University. His most recent book is *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton*. RICHARD H. IMMERMAN is professor and chair of history at Temple University. His most recent books are *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*, co-written with Robert Bowie, and *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Power, and Pragmatism in U.S. Foreign Policy*.



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by playing down the political side of his leadership and playing up his role as a head of state whose public appeal transcended partisan divisions.[1]

This article is an exercise in the recovery of institutional memory. By outlining the features of the highly systematic Eisenhower national security policy process and analyzing its performance, we seek to enhance the ability of the new administration to structure its operations in a productive manner. The procedures that lead to the selection of American presidents place no premium on choosing candidates with organization competence, particularly in the period since winning the presidential nomination has been a function of a candidate's ability to vie successfully in a marathon of state primary elections. For this reason it is vital that new presidents and their advisers make themselves aware of the rich array of positive and negative models available in the record of the modern presidency. The Eisenhower system has distinctly positive implications for the future of national security policy advising.

## A Discarded Legacy

Just as Eisenhower's contemporary critics belittled his political skills, they also deprecated the organizational machinery he instituted for making national security policy. In the aftermath of the Soviet success in launching of a pair of Earth satellites in October 1957, there was an eruption of criticism of the Eisenhower administration for its apparent failure to keep up with the Soviets in intercontinental ballistic missile development.[2] Rather than attack the immensely popular Ike over what they perceived to be a missile gap, many of his critics leveled their fire on the organization of his presidency. They argued that Eisenhower was a misplaced military man who relied on a hierarchy of subordinates, cutting himself off from the diversity of advice and information necessary for a president to engage in effective leadership. One of their principal targets was the institutional machinery he employed to systematize his administration's national security deliberations. Eisenhower's National Security Council (NSC), his critics maintained, was an excessively bureaucratized body out of which emerged "least-common-denominator" policies. Eisenhower's reliance on formal organization, the critique continued, had contributed to unimaginative policies that failed to meet the challenge of global competition with the Soviet Union and its allies.[3]

[1] Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and most recently, Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (New York: Free Press, 2000), esp. chap. 4. See also Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Summer 1990): 319–342.

[2] Peter Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

[3] This critique was reflected throughout the hearings conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations' Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. The hearings began in 1959 under the chairmanship of Senator Henry M. Jackson (D–WA). See Henry M. Jackson, ed., *The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

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Upon taking office, John F. Kennedy unceremoniously jettisoned the staff arrangements of the Eisenhower presidency, substituting for it his own famously ad hoc operating methods. Since 1961, there has been an alternating pattern of highly informal and somewhat more formal national security advising, concluding with the notoriously disorganized Clinton advisory process. Meanwhile, the most comprehensively structured of all presidential national security advisory systems—that of Eisenhower—has receded from institutional memory, without receiving an adequate assessment.

Before laying out the principal features of that system, a strong caveat is in order. What we are about to outline is a policy-planning process, not a decision-making process. Eisenhower made the operational decisions of his presidency in informal meetings with small groups of advisers in the Oval Office, not in the NSC. Nevertheless, the formal and informal national security processes of the Eisenhower presidency complemented one another. Moreover, the formal process was as important for informing Eisenhower's principal national security aides and welding them into a cohesive team as for the written enunciations of national security policy that were its formal product.

Eisenhower's national security system had the following elements, each of which requires elaboration:[4]

- A chief executive with a keen interest in national security policy and the process by which it is made.
- A presidential assistant for national security who was a process manager and not a policy advocate.
- A mechanism for framing the debates of the National Security Council by presenting the participants with draft statements of administration policy and highlighting the points of disagreement among the entities represented in the council.
- Regular NSC meetings in which the policy proposals drafted by the agenda-setting committee were vigorously debated in the presence of the president, who then personally established his administration's policies, providing the council with written reports of his conclusions.
- A body that attended to implementing the policies thus established.

## A Policy-Oriented, Organization-Minded President

Dwight Eisenhower entered the presidency with extensive experience in the realms of national security policy and its organization. Before World War II, he had served in responsible staff positions in the War Department and the Philippines, beginning in the late 1920s. Within days after Pearl Harbor, Eisenhower was summoned to the Pentagon to become the army's top strategic plan-

[4] On the organization and fundamental components of Eisenhower's national security process, see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), esp. chap. 5.

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ner. In less than a half year later, his base of operations moved to England, where as supreme commander of the Allied military campaign in Europe, he was a significant actor on the international scene, a status that continued in the postwar years.[5]

Eisenhower served as chief of staff of the army from 1945 to 1948. He then retired from active duty to become president of Columbia University, but he regularly commuted to Washington to serve as an unofficial national security adviser to President Harry S. Truman. In 1950, Truman called on Eisenhower as the first military commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance Organization, a capacity in which he played a key part in forging the alliance that waged the cold war. It was only when he reached the conclusion that the almost certain Republican nominee, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, was unprepared to commit the United States to take an active part in the Western alliance that Eisenhower entered the 1952 presidential race. Upon being elected, he embarked on a dual effort to frame an enduring national security strategy and create sound procedures for carrying it out.

No president had a stronger commitment to the effective organization of policy making than Eisenhower. "Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent" or "make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action," he commented in his memoirs. However, "disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster."[6] On another occasion Eisenhower observed that the president has a particular need for a "well-developed staff organization" in the sphere of national security, because the international area is fraught with "situations of actual or probable conflict," and "the weaponry of modern military establishments increase their destructiveness" with "bewildering speed."[7]

## A Neutral Process Manager

The position that has since been occupied by such high profile policy entrepreneurs as McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brezinski was created by Eisenhower, who stipulated that its incumbent was to be a process manager, not a policy advocate. The importance Eisenhower assigned to that position is evinced by the priority he gave to introducing the first occupant of that role to his colleagues at a 12 January 1953, preinauguration meeting he convened with the future members of his administration. The meeting opened

[5] Biographies of Eisenhower are numerous. For an explicit discussion of Eisenhower's pre-presidential career as preparation for his management of security after 1953, see Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*, esp. chap. 2.

[6] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 114.

[7] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Central Role of the President in the Conduct of Security Affairs" in Amos A. Jordon, ed., *Issues of National Security in the 1970s: Essays Presented to Colonel George A. Lincoln on his Sixtieth Birthday* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 207.

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with a review of Inauguration Day events, following which Eisenhower introduced the man he was appointing to the new position of assistant to the president for national security affairs. He was Robert Cutler, a Boston banker who had been a wartime aide to General George C. Marshall and a foreign policy aide in the Truman administration. Noting that Cutler's position was one of several he had filled with men who were equal in stature to members of the Cabinet, Eisenhower indicated that he planned to transform the NSC into a body that would wrestle constructively with issues bearing on the nation's security.

Cutler then took the floor and outlined his responsibilities. Stressing that he would be exercising his responsibilities with a "passion for anonymity," Cutler remarked that the meetings of the NSC in the Truman administration had been "rather pro-forma."[8] Things would be different in the system he had been instructed by Eisenhower to design. Over the next two months, Cutler consulted with such veteran national security figures as Ferdinand Eberstadt, Robert Lovett, and General George C. Marshall. Marshall set the tone, commenting that Truman's NSC was too "evanescent." The Truman administration NSC meetings were "of busy men who had no time to pay to the business before them, and not being prepared, therefore took refuge in nonparticipation or in protecting their own departments." Marshall identified an additional pair of shortcomings in the Truman NSC: its policy papers "never presented alternatives to decide upon," and Truman himself was not "a force at the table to bring out discussion."[9]

The old hands consulted by Cutler also stressed the need for better coordination of military, diplomatic, and domestic policy; urged that there be greater attention to the financial implications of national security policy; and emphasized the desirability of providing the NSC with a backup staff. Drawing on such advice, Cutler devised a scheme for systematizing the national security advisory process, which Eisenhower instituted by executive order in March 1953.

## Framing NSC Deliberation

The most distinctive component of the newly constituted national security advisory process was the body that set the agenda of the NSC and prepared the documents that framed its debates—the Planning Board. The board consisted of the assistant secretaries for planning of each of the governmental bodies represented in the NSC, officials who because of their high positions in their de-

[8] Proceedings of the Cabinet Meetings, 12–13 January 1953, "Cabinet Meeting January 12–13, 1953," Cabinet series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KA (hereafter cited as AWF).

[9] George Marshall testimony, NSC Study, 19 February 1953, "NSC—Organization and Functions [1949–1953] (5)," NSC series, Administrative subseries, Records of the White House Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library.

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partments had full access to their chiefs and could draw on all of the expertise available in their agencies.[10]

The importance of the Planning Board was highlighted by Eisenhower in an early NSC meeting, when he remarked to the council members that they themselves simply did not have the time to think out "the best decisions regarding the national security. Someone must therefore do much of this thinking for you." So that the planning process received the undivided attention of its participants, Eisenhower instructed the board members to avoid accompanying their principals on trips out of the country, remaining on the job in order to "supply a continuity of planning and thought."[11]

The Planning Board, which normally met twice a week, was charged with flushing out the policy views of each of the NSC's member bodies on major national security issues. The board subjected those positions to what Cutler called an "acid bath," sharply delineating them and identifying and specifying points of disagreement. The board was strictly instructed not to water down disagreements or cover them up. Instead, "policy splits" were to be spelled out (often in parallel columns) so that they might be debated in the NSC and resolved by the president.[12]

Before the documents hammered out by the Planning Board were discussed by the NSC, the board members briefed their chiefs on them, explaining their own positions and reviewing the splits. Cutler himself briefed Eisenhower. The superiors of the Planning Board members were not obliged to support the policy recommendations of their department's representatives on the board. Instead, Eisenhower instructed everyone involved in the national security process to view himself as a general presidential adviser rather than a departmental delegate. The Planning Board was the engine of the Eisenhower national security process. While Eisenhower's critics dismissed it as a mere "paper mill," they did so without direct knowledge of its workings. Those who did observe it told a very different story. As one prominent outside observer of the process put it, "Never have I seen a group of men keener, more sensitive in their instinct

[10] Unlike the cabinet, the NSC has a statutory basis. It was instituted in the National Security Act of 1947. During the period of the Eisenhower presidency, its statutory members were the president, vice president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, and director of the office of defense mobilization. Because of the importance of economic solvency in his national security policy, Eisenhower added the secretary of the Treasury and the director of the Bureau of Budget to this group. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended NSC meetings in an advisory capacity. Critics of the process had the mistaken impression that the Eisenhower NSC was a huge and unwieldy body, an impression that may have been fostered by the attendance when appropriate of a variety of staff aides, who sat along the wall but did not take part in the discussions.

[11] Memorandum of NSC meeting, March 19, 1953, "137th meeting of the NSC," NSC series, AWF; Brief Notes on Planning Board Meeting, May 6, 1953, CJCS 334 (NSC) 1953, U.S. Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

[12] Greenstein, *Hidden-Hand Presidency*, 128–29.

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to understand what was said, more sympathetic to a presentation, or more penetrating in their questions."[13]

## The NSC as a Forum for Rigorous Debate

The NSC met 366 times over the eight years of the Eisenhower presidency, an average of forty-four meetings a year. It had a regular meeting time (Thursday mornings) and meeting place (the Cabinet room). Eisenhower presided over 329 of these sessions; the others were held with the vice president or secretary of state in the chair.[14] The council met at a table just large enough to seat the NSC members and a handful of special attendees. Eisenhower sat at the head, flanked by the secretaries of state and defense. Cutler and the men who followed him in his position (Dillon Anderson and Gordon Gray) sat at the foot of the table, presenting the agenda topics and summarizing the points of disagreement in the discussion papers.

Normally the meetings began with an intelligence summary by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Eisenhower then typically turned to the secretary of state to open the discussion. Other vocal participants included the secretary of defense, the secretary of the Treasury, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the vice president. Eisenhower took an active part in the discussions, injecting comments, asking questions, and sometimes taking a devil's advocate stance to probe the implication of a proposal or bring out policy options. In order to make certain that his comments were not mistaken for decisions, Eisenhower and the assistant for national security prepared a record of action after the meeting and distributed it to the council.

Excellent, though not verbatim, records exist of the Eisenhower NSC meetings. These have been extensively studied by historians and political scientists, but largely in analyses of particular episodes, such as the 1954 Indochina crisis and the 1956 Suez crisis. The NSC itself awaits comprehensive examination, but a number of its characteristics are clearly evident. The meetings were notable for their sharpness of focus, which derived from discussion of policy papers prepared by the Planning Board. They were marked by genuine debate, mainly over policies but also over the more general aspects of current operational issues. Early in the 1954 Indochina crisis, for example, there was a pointed disagreement between Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Arthur W. Radford and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey. Radford favored the use of American air power to relieve the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, but Humphrey warned against squandering the nation's resources on military conflicts

[13] Entry for 1 March 1954, Clarence Randall Journals, volume 1, "Washington After the Commission," Princeton University, Clarence Randall Papers, Princeton, New Jersey.

[14] Gordon Gray to Eisenhower, 13 January 1961, "Gray, Gordon," Name Series, AWF.

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in peripheral areas of the world. The final decision, which was made by Eisenhower outside of the NSC, was not to launch an air strike.[15]

Despite the intensity of many of the exchanges, the meetings were conspicuous for their good-humored camaraderie. They also were striking for the openness of the debate. The participants expressed themselves freely, not hesitating to express disagreement with Eisenhower, although it was always evident that he was the ultimate decision maker. The assistant for national security affairs played an active, but largely procedural part in the deliberations. He kept the debate on track, directed the council's attention to disagreements and ambiguities, and watched for signs of policy slippage. Thus on an occasion during the Indochina crisis when Eisenhower remarked that if American troops were deployed in the jungles of Southeast Asia they should be provided with a particular weapon, Cutler pointed out that existing policies made no provision for the use of American troops in Indochina.[16]

Eisenhower never intended the statements of policy produced by the NSC to serve as blueprints for specific operations. When the NSC members did discuss ongoing episodes, they did so in terms of their general implications. In one meeting during the 1956 Suez crisis, for example, Eisenhower redirected a discussion when it strayed into operational matters, reminding the members that they were there to discuss general policy issues. Still, the NSC process informed his operational decisions. Eisenhower stated his view of the relationship between planning and operations in a 1967 volume on national security problems: "To my mind." he wrote, "the secret of a sound, satisfactory decision made on an emergency basis has always been that the responsible official has been 'living with the problem' before it becomes acute." For this reason, he advised President-elect John Kennedy that the NSC was "the most important weekly meeting of the government," an assertion Kennedy did not take to heart.[17]

## Implementing NSC Action

Even before Eisenhower adopted the new process of policy formulation, work had begun on improving the procedure for implementing NSC actions. What emerged was a body called the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Like the Planning Board, the OCB was a product of Cutler's consultations with veterans of the postwar national security process. One group of consultants ad-

[15] John P. Burke, Fred I. Greenstein, with the collaboration of Larry Berman and Richard Immerman, *How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965* (New York: Russell Sage, 1989), 72–73.

[16] Cutler's statement may seem to have been an expression of opposition to American military involvement in Indochina, but on other occasions he warned against departures from the existing policy that would have increased the likelihood of a communist victory in Indochina.

[17] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Central Role of the President in the Conduct of Security Affairs" in Jordon, ed., *Issues in National Security in the 1970s*, 214; entry for December 6, 1960, in Robert F. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: Norton, 1981), 379–80.

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vised Cutler that "there exists a serious gap between the formulation of general objectives and the detailed actions required to give effect to them." The consultants recommended that there be created "within the National Security Council structure, a group capable of assuring the coordinated execution of national security policies"—an organ like the Planning Board that represented the agencies and departments with input into foreign policy. Eisenhower swiftly endorsed the recommendation.[18]

Like the Planning Board, the OCB consisted of top second-level officials in the agencies responsible for national security. It was chaired by the undersecretary of state, and its members included such officials as the deputy secretaries of defense and mutual security. Its executive officer also attended Planning Board meetings. Just as the Planning Board drafted the policy papers deliberated on by the NSC, the OCB made plans for carrying out the policies that emerged from the NSC process. To that end, the OCB transmitted regular reports to the NSC, summarizing the actions it had taken to execute policies, and evaluated the policies' "effectiveness, timeliness, and applicability."[19] Cutler and his successors included discussions of these reports on the NSC agenda. The performance of the OCB never achieved Eisenhower's expectations. Still, he and his associates never doubted that it made an important contribution to America's national security, if only because it fostered regular give and take on the part of officials who needed to cooperate with one another in order to execute the nation's foreign and national security policies.

## A Bottom Line

Eisenhower's NSC system was depicted by its critics as a bureaucratic machine that spewed piles of useless paper. That is a caricature of its operation. It did produce numerous policy documents, but a high proportion of them proved to be of enduring value in the nation's foreign policy. It also had major informal consequences. The NSC meetings and the processes leading up to them made for a well-informed, rigorously analytical national security team, which contributed to the coherence of the administration's policies. Eisenhower's aides knew where he stood on particular issues and what his overall policies were. Aware that they had had their say, Eisenhower's associates displayed impressive public cohesion. There was a general absence of the public and semipublic feuds and cleavages that have marked a number of later presidencies, as well as of the tension that existed in many later presidencies between the secretary of state and the national security adviser. Eisenhower's national security process

[18] Report to the President by The President's Committee on Informational Activities [Jackson Committee], 30 June 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–54*, 2:1854–55.

[19] Informal note of Jackson Committee meeting, 28 March 1953, "Special Assistant (Cutler) memoranda, 1953 (1)," Executive Secretary's subject file series, Papers of the White House Office of the National Security Council Staff, Eisenhower Library.

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was also unlike that of a number of later presidents in that it made full use of the expertise of the departments and agencies represented in the NSC.

Because Eisenhower was a national security professional with long-established and well-grounded views of national security, he was better equipped than most chief executives have been to operate without an elaborate foreign affairs advisory system. He nevertheless held that the NSC enhanced and enriched his thinking. Even when he chose to take a different course of action from that favored by his subordinates, he once wrote, "the NSC debates never failed to give me a deeper understanding of questions. In several instances, I might add, such deliberations persuaded me to reverse some of my preconceived notions."[20]

The spirit of Eisenhower's national security advisory process anticipated one of the most thoughtful proposals that has been offered for improving national security advising—the Stanford University political scientist Alexander L. George's 1972 proposal for an organizational arrangement in which the president is exposed to vigorous multiple advocacy of a wide range of policies in a process that is supervised by an assistant for national security who is a "custodian-manager" rather than a policy advocate.[21] In an oral history interview that preceded George's proposal by a number of years, Eisenhower presaged that proposal with the following observation about his philosophy of decision making, which is applicable both to the policy planning process he instituted and to his operational decisions:

> I have been forced to make decisions, many of them of a critical character, for a good many years, and I know of only one way in which you can be sure you have done your best to make a wise decision. That is to get all of the [responsible policy makers] with their different viewpoints in front of you, and listen to them debate. I do not believe in bringing them in one at a time, and therefore being more impressed by the most recent one you hear than the earlier ones. You must get courageous men of strong views, and let them debate and argue with each other. You listen, and see if there's anything been brought up, any idea, that changes your own view, or enriches your view or adds to it. Then you start studying. Sometimes the case becomes so simple that you can make a decision right then. Or you might wait if time is not of the essence. But you make it.[22]

Eisenhower's NSC process did not guarantee the success of his administration's national security actions. However, it increased the likelihood that those

[20] "As early as 1954," he went on to say, "I had concluded that the American contingent in NATO should immediately be substantially reduced. After long discussions with the state and defense departments and the CIA, however, I had to change my mind." Eisenhower, "The Central Role of the President in the Conduct of Security Affairs," 215.

[21] George L. Alexander, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 66 (September 1972): 751–85.

[22] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Columbia Oral History Interview, 20 July 1967. Our citation comes from the original draft transcript of the oral history that is available at the Eisenhower Library. The transcript released to the public omits the passage that we quote.

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actions would be grounded in sound information and rigorous analysis. Eisenhower's two terms were notable for the absence of the kinds of flawed consultations that led to such fiascoes as Kennedy's abortive effort to land anti-Castro guerrillas at Cuba's Bay of Pigs in 1961 and Jimmy Carter's failed hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1980.[23]

One size does not fit all in presidential organization: advisory processes must be tailored to the individual they serve. Still, even if the next and future presidents do not adopt the Eisenhower system in toto, they may want to adapt features of it to their own needs. Whatever they chose to do, they would be wise to emulate Eisenhower in melding policy planning with political operations.

[23] The greatest contretemps of the Eisenhower presidency was the Soviets' downing of a U.S. U-2 plane in the spring of 1960, an event that doomed a planned summit conference between Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev. The plane in question was overflying the Soviet Union as part of a highly classified program that had not been brought to the attention of the NSC.

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


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# Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

Presidents seek administrative structures in which they feel comfortable, and presidential comfort derives from past experience and expectations as well as from present needs. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was a military man, accustomed to a relatively rigid, orderly, hierarchical structure with firm assignments and obligatory channels, all ruled by detailed organization charts. President John F. Kennedy was a political man, accustomed to a far more flexible, informal, and untidy system, hoping thereby to stop others from defining his choices and enabling him to question information and recommendations rising upward through the ordained channels.

JFK did not act lightly in dismantling Ike's heavily-layered national security advisory apparatus. The incoming president had been much impressed by the thoughtful review of the Eisenhower national security procedures conducted in 1960 by Senator Henry M. Jackson's Subcommittee for National Security Staffing and Operations and published in a series of Senate reports. So far as governmental organization goes, Jackson had found a kindred soul in the political scientist Richard Neustadt, and in September 1960 he asked Neustadt to prepare a memorandum on the administrative problems that would confront Kennedy if elected.

Kennedy read Neustadt's "Organizing the Transition" with admiration and delight, appreciating especially its emphasis on the virtues of flexibility. He invited Neustadt to elaborate his points in further memoranda. Neustadt said, "How do you want me to relate to Clark Clifford?" Clifford had also been asked by Kennedy to submit his thoughts about the transition. Kennedy replied

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quickly, "I don't want you to relate to Clark Clifford. I can't afford to commit myself to one set of advisers. If I did that, *I* would be on *their* leading strings."

Kennedy, a political man, was returning quite consciously to the administrative methods of Franklin D. Roosevelt. FDR, as his budget director Harold Smith once said, was an "artist in administration," seeking what he needed without great regard for bureaucratic tidiness. Neustadt's classic work *Presidential Power* had appeared the previous April, and his analysis greatly attracted Kennedy. FDR's methods, Neustadt pointed out,

> were almost literally the opposite of those employed by Eisenhower's Presidency. Eisenhower often was reported in the press to have transformed the White House into an Army headquarters. That he did not do—nobody could—but he did manage to impart more superficial symmetry and order to his flow of information and of choices than was ever done before. Thereby, he became typically the last man in his office to know tangible details and the last to come to grips with acts of choice. His one-time chief assistant in the White House, Sherman Adams, is reported to have told a close associate: "I count the day lost when I have not found some new way of lightening the President's load." This but suggests the spirit of the "staff system," so called, in Eisenhower's time. The aims of that system were of the best. Within its limits it was reasonably well-designed and rather more than reasonably effective. In Eisenhower's instance there is no disputing that it may have been essential to his health and peace of mind. But its workings often were disastrous for his hold on personal power.[1]

The concept of a chief of staff was very much in the military tradition and not at all (at least then) in the political tradition. After the election, Neustadt said to Kennedy, "You would be your own 'chief of staff.'" Clark Clifford similarly advised Kennedy, "A vigorous President in the Democratic tradition of the Presidency will probably find it best to act as his own chief of staff, and to have no highly visible major domo standing between him and his staff."[2]

JFK can hardly be blamed for making FDR rather than Ike his model. Harry Truman, too, though he had a more orderly approach to administration than FDR, had been his own chief of staff and had especially ignored the National Security Council as a rather pointless bureaucratic appendage.

For all their indifference to formal administrative structures, Roosevelt and Truman have gone down in history as able, creative, and effective foreign policy presidents. Indeed, history rates their initiatives considerably higher than those of the Eisenhower administration. That comparison would seem equally true for Kennedy, who accomplished more of note in foreign affairs (the Cuban missile crisis, the test-ban treaty, the Trade Expansion Act, the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress) in a thousand days than the Eisenhower model produced in two-thousand nine-hundred and twenty days.

My friends Fred Greenstein and Richard Immerman make an oddly abstract case for the Eisenhower model. Their argument is based on the logic of

[1] Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John C. Wiley, 1976), 226–227.
[2] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 123–124.

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organization charts, not on the practicality of results. Forgetting the biblical injunction: "By their fruits, ye shall know them," they fail to cite a single concrete example as a triumph of Eisenhower's national security machinery. They even admit (sort of) that Ike's Operations Coordinating Board was a flop ("The performance of the OCB never achieved Eisenhower's expectations").

What seems particularly unbelievable to the historian is their claim that the dismantlement of the Eisenhower machinery "led to such fiascoes as Kennedy's abortive effort to land anti-Castro guerrillas at Cuba's Bay of Pigs in 1961." Actually, Eisenhower himself, reluctant to use conventional armed force, had from the beginning of his administration turned routinely to the CIA as the instrument of American intervention abroad. Under Ike, covert-action operatives overthrew governments considered pro-communist in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), failed to do so in Indonesia (1957), helped impose supposedly pro-western governments in Egypt (1954) and Laos (1959), and plotted the overthrow and murder of Fidel Castro in 1960.

Where in all this global commotion was the wonderful Eisenhower national security advisory machinery? In January 1956, Eisenhower created a Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities composed of former government officials experienced in foreign affairs. In the fall of 1956, two of its most distinguished members, Robert Lovett and David Bruce, submitted a report to the Board on CIA covert operations. "Although these extremely sensitive, costly operations are justifiable only insofar as they are in support of US military and foreign policies," Lovett and Bruce told the Board, "the responsible long-range planning and sustained guidance for these, which should be forthcoming from the Defense and State Departments, appears too often to be lacking. . . . Once having been conceived, the final approval given to any project (at informal lunch meetings of the OCB inner group) can, at best, be described as *pro forma*. . . . A corollary to this is the exclusion of responsible American officials from knowledge they should have to properly discharge their obligations."

Lovett and Bruce went on to ask:

> Should not someone, somewhere, in an authoritative position in our government, on a continuing basis, be counting the immediate costs of disappointments (Jordan, Syria, Egypt, et al.), calculating the impacts on our international position, and keeping in mind the long-range wisdom of activities which have entailed our virtual abandonment of the international 'golden rule,' and which, if successful to the degree claimed for them, are responsible, in a great measure, for stirring up the turmoil and raising the doubts about us that exist in many countries of the world today? . . . Where will we be tomorrow?[3]

Where indeed? The full Board adopted the Lovett-Bruce report and on 20 December 1956 expressed in person its dismay to Eisenhower about the confu-

[3] David Bruce and Robert Lovett, "Covert Operations," Report to President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities 1956, Robert F. Kennedy's Papers; see also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 455–456.

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sion in his foreign policy created by the absence of planning and supervision of CIA projects. "We are concerned about the extremely informal and somewhat exclusive methods used in their present handling. *We urge that present practices be regularized to insure that in all appropriate instances these clandestine projects receive the benefit of proper joint staffing and formalized approval and that both the State and Defense Departments be kept abreast of the developments of these projects.*"[4]

The Board continued to warn Eisenhower about his free-wheeling CIA and its destructive impact on the overall conduct of foreign affairs. February 1957: "All too often the Department of State knows little or nothing of what the Deputy Director of Plans (covert action) is doing. In some quarters this leads to situations which are almost unbelievable because the operations being carried out by the DD/P are sometimes in direct conflict with the normal operations carried out by the Department of State." December 1958: "There are no present provisions for any regular external review of Clandestine Cold War programs and no formal accounting of them. . . . The Indonesian operation was at no time considered formally by the OCB Special Group. . . . On different occasions it was considered by the President, by the National Security Council, and by assorted ad hoc groups for various purposes. There was no proper estimate of the situation nor proper prior planning on the part of anyone." November 1960: the Board "extensively examined the covert action program for Cuba and . . . expressed considerable reservations thereon, including reservations as to the manner in which the planning and programming of the operation was being administered." And January 1961: "We have been unable to conclude that, on balance, all of the covert action programs undertaken by CIA up to this time have been worth the risk or the great expenditure of manpower, money and other resources involved."[5]

The president brushed off his own Board's warnings and recommendations. His national security machinery quite failed to bring planning and coherence into his conduct of foreign affairs. And it does seem a little much for Greenstein and Immerman to blame Kennedy's dismantling of the Eisenhower national security advisory system for the Bay of Pigs. It was, after all, the Eisenhower administration that conceived the Cuban adventure in the first place—and also hired members of the mob to murder Castro. This harebrained scheme passed unscathed through the allegedly exemplary Eisenhower system. And Eisenhower's own recommendation to Kennedy on the day before the inauguration in January 1961 was full speed ahead.

[4] President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 20 December 1956. (Emphasis in original.)

[5] President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities to the Special Assistant for National Security, 12 February 1957; and President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities to Eisenhower, 5 January 1961, Robert F. Kennedy's Papers; Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, 457–458.

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Allen Dulles, the CIA director, subsequently told Kennedy that he was much more confident this time about success than he had been about the CIA overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala seven years earlier. When Dulles detected inadequate enthusiasm on Kennedy's part, he called attention to what he delicately called "the disposal problem."[6] If Kennedy did not go ahead with Eisenhower's Cuban project, what would happen to the 1,200 Cubans the CIA had been training for months in Central America? They would, Dulles said, wander about the hemisphere, saying that the great United States, after preparing an expedition to overthrow Castro, had lost its nerve under the new president. This would maximize Castro's standing and influence throughout Latin America.

JFK well understood that Dulles was also tacitly warning that there would be a political explosion in the United States if a former naval lieutenant j.g. dared veto an operation organized and recommended by the supreme commander of the greatest amphibious landing in history. Kennedy was trapped. But, if the Eisenhower system had lived up to the Greenstein-Immerman billing, he would never have been presented with the operation.

Is the layered Eisenhower machinery really "a precedent for effective national security advising"? On the record, surely not. It is wrong too in theory. Organization charts are less important than people. As James Bryce wisely wrote in *The American Commonwealth*, "The student of institutions, as well as the lawyer, is apt to overrate the effect of mechanical contrivances in politics."[7]

Moreover, the hierarchical Eisenhower model is all the more wrong now that we are rushing irreversibly into the digital age. As one corporation after another has discovered, the computer has a levelling effect on traditional administrative structures. The vertical arrangements of the past are being replaced by increasingly horizontal arrangements—which is the way that presidents like FDR and JFK operated instinctively.

Message to the next president: do pass by this particular "recovery of institutional memory."

[6] Quoted in Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 242.

[7] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, vol. i (New York: Macmillan, 1888), 349.

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# Local Government and Global Politics: The Implications of Massachusetts' "Burma Law"

TERRENCE GUAY

Compared to other nonstate actors such as transnational enterprises (TNEs), international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the influence of local (sometimes referred to as noncentral or subnational) government on global politics receives little attention in international relations (IR) or political economy. This is puzzling, because recent local government forays into the foreign policy realm have important implications for both the IR theorist and the public policy maker. This article will use the state of Massachusetts' adoption of a selective purchasing law to highlight the multifaceted roles that local governments in the United States have come to play in global politics. When the bill was signed into law in June 1996, the economic impact of the legislation was expected to be modest, with not much more than $1 million in state contracts affected.[1] However, the international and domestic political impact has been enormous, with the subject now representing a major point of controversy in transatlantic relations, being defended by opponents of globalization and international trade agreements, and pushing the constitutional envelope for local government involvement in foreign policy.

From a normative perspective, the growth of international activity at the local level is subject to differing interpretations.[2] For some it represents a highly desirable democratization of the foreign policy process, traditionally the do-

[1] Frank Phillips, "Mass. Poised to Act on Burma," *Boston Globe*, 11 June 1996.

[2] Brian Hocking, *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

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main of the executive branch of the national government. Further, such actions could be an opportunity to restructure the international order toward the pursuit of more ethical goals, such as democratization and respect for human rights. For others, localization is a dangerous derogation from national governments' power to conduct a coherent foreign policy, providing the opportunity for other local governments and nonstate actors (not to mention other countries) to profit from internal divisions.

As will be described in more detail later in this article, Massachusetts' "Burma Law" is at the nexus of several important theoretical debates within IR. These include the relationships between domestic and international politics; the weight that moral issues such as human rights should be given in foreign policy making; the role that the United States should play in post-cold war global politics; the extent to which economic issues have superseded military and defense concerns in foreign policy; the influence of grassroots movements and NGOs in world affairs; the actor and level of analysis quandary; and the relative power of TNEs and government. The impact of Massachusetts' Burma Law is no less daunting and raises the following questions: Does the U.S. Constitution allow state and local governments any role in the international arena? Are economic sanctions an appropriate foreign policy tool to encourage democratization or to improve the human rights situation in other countries? Can unilateral foreign policies be effective? What effect will this law have on transatlantic relations? Should international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) have the power to prohibit the procurement policies of local governments? The subject of local government involvement in world politics, which overlaps so many important theoretical and policy concerns, is certainly more worthy of discussion than has been the case in the literature to date. After summarizing the origination and intent of the Massachusetts legislation, the article turns to its implications for the role of local government in IR theory and policy making.

## Massachusetts' Burma Law

The Massachusetts law was devised as a response to developments within Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) over the past decade. Myanmar's ruling military junta came to power in 1988 after repressing a pro-democracy movement with a crackdown that took the lives of hundreds of people. Two years later, the government (more commonly known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC) annulled an election won by the National League for Democracy. Aung San Suu Kyi, the party's leader and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, was kept under house arrest until July 1995. In addition to political repression, the Myanmar government is accused of being a major trafficker in opium, with drug profits used by the SLORC to foster economic growth. Economically, the country has never lived up to expectations that it would become another Asian "tiger." Most Western investment is in the oil sector, with American companies Unocal and Texaco and the French Total most heavily engaged. The United States is the fourth largest foreign investor in Myanmar, behind the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Thailand, and ahead of France.

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The Massachusetts law, which was three years in the making, effectively bans all state agencies from signing contracts with companies doing business in Myanmar.[3] The law applies to both U.S. and foreign corporations. A list of companies doing business in Myanmar, which is updated quarterly, is based on information provided by the United Nations, Investor Responsibility Research Center, and the Associates to Develop Democratic Burma. Although Massachusetts enacted selective purchasing legislation aimed at South Africa in the 1980s, the state's Burma Law is a large step forward for two reasons. First, the anti-apartheid legislation was done by an executive order signed by then Governor Michael Dukakis, because the sanctions bill never got to the floor of the state Senate. However, the Burma Law was passed by both of the state's legislative chambers, and signed by Governor William Weld. Second, the Burma selective purchasing legislation covers all quasi-government organizations (for example, Port Authority, Turnpike Authority, etc.), while the 1980s executive order on South Africa did not. Significantly, Myanmar's Suu Kyi supports the Massachusetts legislation, just as the African National Congress (ANC), Nelson Mandela, and Bishop Desmond Tutu supported sanctions against their home country of South Africa back in the 1980s.

Since the passage of the Massachusetts legislation, such major companies as Apple Computer, Eastman Kodak, Philips Electronics, and Hewlett-Packard have withdrawn from Myanmar, moves attributed in significant part to the Massachusetts law and the possibility that other states and cities would adopt similar legislation.[4] But many other companies, including Caterpillar, Mobil, Siemens, Unilever, Mitsubishi, and Toyota remain on Massachusetts' black list. In March 1997, the restricted purchase list named 48 U.S. companies and 205 non-U.S. companies that could not do business with the state of Massachusetts.

The Burma Law ran into trouble, however, in November 1998 when a U.S. federal judge ruled it unconstitutional. The circumstances surrounding the lawsuit filed by the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) and the ruling's implications will be discussed further below.

## Theoretical and Policy Implications

### *Interactions between Domestic and International Politics*

When the level of analysis framework[5] is applied to the development of the Burma Law, we find that the international system does not offer much help

[3] It is not a total ban, because there are exceptions if: the procurement is essential and compliance with the law would eliminate the only bid or offer, or result in inadequate competition; or other bids are more than 10 percent higher than those submitted by a restricted company. Nonetheless, because of the competitive nature of the public procurement tendering process, the bill's sponsor, Representative Byron Rushing, felt that it was unlikely that either of these exceptions would be invoked.

[4] "Sanctioning Burma, Sanctioning the USA," *Multinational Monitor*, April 1997, 26.

[5] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

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in explaining the legislation's origination. One reason is that local government politics has become more internationalized.[6] As trade, technology, and information have become more international, local governments have found reasons to make policies with international implications. In the economic realm these include courting foreign firms in the hopes that they will set up operations within their state and municipal borders, thereby providing jobs for local residents and contributing to economic growth. At the same time, many states and cities have developed international trade expertise to help local businesses increase exports.

The passage of the Burma Law in Massachusetts was directly influenced by the state's other involvements in international affairs. While it had little difficulty making its way through the state's legislative chambers (it passed on a voice vote in both the Senate and House), it was uncertain whether Republican Governor Weld would support it. He had made it clear that he did not like this kind of legislation. He warned the legislature that he would not sign the Burma bill unless legislation on Northern Ireland was amended. The legislature found this offer unacceptable, because the amendments to the Northern Ireland legislation would have significantly reduced its impact. He had also vetoed legislation (later overridden) on China that asked Massachusetts businesses operating in China to report to the state government on human rights violations they had experienced in their investments there. When the Burma Law came up, conservative members of the Massachusetts state senate wanted a signal from the governor that he would sign it. Many of them supported the bill but did not want to be in a position where their votes would be needed by senate Democrats for an override.

Surprisingly, Weld jumped on the anti-Myanmar bandwagon. There are several explanations for this turn-around. First, Weld led a trade mission to South Africa and was greeted by ANC officials with gratitude for the role that Massachusetts played in leading U.S. sanctions policy in the 1980s. Second, the Burma Law was presented to Weld for signing during the middle of his 1996 campaign against Democrat John Kerry for a seat in the U.S. Senate. Kerry had long been opposed to such measures, and Weld may have thought that he could use the Burma Law to his advantage in the campaign. Third, the governor was lobbied intensively by some Massachusetts citizens, as well as by other people and groups outside of the state, to sign the legislation. Finally, there was very little lobbying by international business interests against the bill before it became law. This combination of factors, each with international dimensions, influenced Weld's decision to sign the bill and illustrates the ways that global issues help to shape some local government legislation.

[6] Earl H. Fry, *The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998); Heidi Hobbs, *City Hall Goes Abroad: The Foreign Policy of Local Politics* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994); John M. Kline, *State Government Influence in U.S. International Economic Policy* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1983); Hocking, *Localizing Foreign Policy.*

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TABLE 1

*Status of State and Local Government Sanctions Legislation, March 2000*

| *Status* | *Location** |
|---|---|
| **Law** | **States:** Massachusetts; California (2); Vermont; Washington<br>**Municipalities:** Alameda County (2), Berkeley (3), Los Angeles, Oakland (2), Palo Alto, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Santa Monica, and West Hollywood, CA; Boulder, CO; Dade County, FL; Takoma Park, MD; Amherst, Brookline, Cambridge (3), Newton, Quincy, and Somerville, MA; Ann Arbor, MI; New York, NY; Carrboro and Chapel Hill, NC; North Olmstead, OH; Portland, OR; Philadelphia, PA; Madison, WI |
| **Inactive/Failed** | **States:** California; Connecticut; Maine; Maryland; New York (2); North Carolina; Rhode Island (3); Texas (2); Vermont<br>**Municipalities:** Davis, CA; Minneapolis, MN; Seattle, WA |
| **Pending** | **States:** Massachusetts (3); New York<br>**Municipalities:** New York, NY |

* Figures in parentheses indicate more than one proposed or enacted sanctions law for that state or municipality.

*Source:* USAEngage, "State and Local Sanctions Watch List" (http://www.usaengage.org/news/status.html), March 2000 [16 June 2000].

## *Ethical Issues and Foreign Policy*

The long-standing debate on the extent to which ethical considerations can and should influence foreign policy is at the core of the Burma Law. Proponents of the legislation argue that the promotion of democratization and respect for human rights in totalitarian countries is a moral foreign policy objective. Many other local governments and their constituents seem to agree. Since the enactment of the Massachusetts law, sanctions legislation has proliferated among local governments. (See Table 1.) By March 2000, thirty-seven sanctions laws (mostly selective purchasing, but also some selective investment) had been enacted by four states and twenty-six municipalities. The most significant legislation is New York City's Burma Law, since the city has the fourth largest government budget in the United States after the federal government and the states of California and New York. Four selective purchasing and investment laws are pending in Massachusetts, New York, and New York City and are directed at Burma, Indonesia, and Sudan.

Local government sanctions legislation has also expanded in scope and is now being aimed at countries other than Myanmar. Of the thirty-seven current sanctions laws, twenty-four are aimed at Burma, five at Nigeria, and four laws target Indonesia, Northern Ireland, Cuba, and Tibet. Another law is aimed at countries where sweatshop labor is employed, and three laws target insurance companies linked to Holocaust victims. The Massachusetts state assembly began working on one bill designed to penalize Indonesia for its repression of East Timor, another targeting the use of forced labor in China, and a third on the preservation of tropical rainforests. The Indonesia bill would bar state contracts with firms doing business in Indonesia and require pension funds to divest

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of stock in such corporations. In 1997, California and New York City stopped doing business with Swiss banks until they would agree to fully disclose their holdings of assets belonging to Holocaust victims. In March 1998, New York City and New York state officials decided to delay sanctions against three Swiss banks after the banks agreed to negotiate a global settlement with Holocaust victims over gold stolen by the Nazis. According to one estimate, local boycott laws proposed in 1997 could affect as much as $93.9 billion in U.S. exports bound for countries deemed to be violators of nuclear proliferation treaties, environmental standards, and international labor codes, in addition to human rights.[7] Business groups have picked up on the economic cost of local sanctions laws and are using this argument to persuade other state and local governments to avoid similar legislation.

Not all proponents of an ethical foreign policy favor legislation like the Burma Law. One line of criticism is that sanctions hurt the most vulnerable people in the targeted countries. While Burmese citizens may lose jobs, access to basic goods and services, and international contacts as foreign firms succumb to the pressure to leave the country, the Burmese leaders remain largely unaffected. In other words, while the ends of the Burma Law may be ethical, the means by which Massachusetts and other local governments seek to attain such ends is itself immoral.

A second critical approach would be along the lines presented by Stanley Hoffmann.[8] He argues that in the promotion of human rights, the preconditions for a successful foreign policy require modesty in purpose, a multilateral approach, and attention to problems of assessment of a human rights problem in a given country. The Burma Law probably fails the first two, since forcing Myanmar's military government to recognize election results is a more ambitious goal than the provision of basic life and health rights, and most world governments at all levels have not joined Massachusetts in its endeavor. Hoffmann's approach might also question the means by which Massachusetts is seeking change in Myanmar, not on the ethical terms just discussed, but on whether the imposition of sanctions is really the most effective policy tool to achieve the desired results. Businesses have embraced this last ethical argument and have used it to try to convince local governments that sanctions are less effective than other foreign policy tools such as constructive engagement.

## *The United States in the Post-Cold War World*

The internationalists' fear that the United States would retreat to isolationism after the end of the cold war appears unfounded. While U.S. willingness to pursue a new world order may have been short-lived, the real debate is between

[7] Theo Emery, "State with Foreign Policy Roils Trade Beyond Seas," *Boston Sunday Globe*, 21 September 1997.

[8] Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

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unilateralism and multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. This has been a particularly serious problem in political and economic relations with Europe. Both sides of the Atlantic experienced difficulty in reaching agreement on how or whether to end the war in Bosnia and on policies toward rogue countries like Cuba, Iran, and Iraq. While the United States and the European Union (EU) were able to reach agreement on the creation of the WTO in 1994, trade disputes ranging from bananas to beef continue to drive a wedge in transatlantic cooperation. Transatlantic disagreements on approaches to international political and economic issues are intertwined on the subject of Massachusetts' Burma Law.

U.S. trading partners have strongly opposed the Burma Law. The EU and Japan have complained that the law violates a WTO agreement (the Government Procurement Agreement, or GPA) committing Massachusetts and thirty-six other U.S. states to open up public procurement to international competition. Under the GPA, which went into effect in 1996, states promised to award contracts based solely on economic, not political, considerations. Significantly, city sanctions laws cannot be challenged in the WTO because they are not signatories to the procurement code.[9] According to Representative Byron Rushing, Massachusetts legislators and the governor did not realize that the selective purchasing law was in violation of WTO rules. Because the GPA (or WTO for that matter) did not exist in the 1980s, the subject never came up when selective purchasing targeted South Africa. It was only with the completion of the Uruguay Round of trade talks in 1994, which created the WTO, that some local governments were bound by the trade rules governing public procurement. The EU and Japan argue that neither the United States nor its fifty states have a right to apply national or state laws to foreign companies.

In February 1997, the entire Massachusetts House delegation in the U.S. Congress sent a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, warning that it was not "appropriate" for Japan to involve itself in the internal affairs of Massachusetts.[10] In the summer of 1997, the EU and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) filed a complaint against the United States at the WTO charging the Massachusetts law violated the GPA. The EU and Japan went the next step in September 1998, when they asked the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO to set up a panel to look into their complaint that the Burma Law violated WTO rules. This was the first time since the WTO's founding in 1994 that a state law was challenged.

It is far from certain that a WTO ruling would go against the Massachusetts law. Unlike with most of the WTO agreements, individual U.S. states are not bound by the GPA unless they specifically signed on. The only Massachusetts commitment appears to be a December 1993 letter from Governor Weld to then-U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, in which Weld said Massachu-

[9] Nancy Dunne, "Massachusetts' Burma Law Row Flares," *Financial Times*, 14 June 1997.

[10] Nancy Dunne, "Congressmen Call for Indonesia Sanctions," *Financial Times*, 11 February 1997.

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setts "has no present intention" of not adhering to the agreement.[11] This appears unlikely to be sufficient to bind the state nor to persuade the state legislature to rescind the law. It would also be awkward for the WTO to rule that only the thirty-seven states that actually signed the GPA are subject to its terms, while the remaining thirteen states that did not sign remain free to enact selective purchasing legislation.

The WTO has not made a final ruling on the issue. The EU and Japan agreed to put the case on hold pending the outcome of the legal challenges to the Burma Law in the U.S. courts. Yet the WTO case could force Washington to defend a state law that it does not support. If the United States lost a WTO case on this issue, the federal government would have three options: force Massachusetts to change its law; allow the Europeans to level trade sanctions against the United States (which could be aimed at Massachusetts businesses); or pay fines assessed by the WTO. The Clinton administration is caught between alienating the Europeans, whose help it seeks in advancing new international trade initiatives, and the state of Massachusetts, which delivered a larger percentage of votes than any other state in Clinton's presidential campaigns. Consequently, the administration is caught in a two-level game with its major international allies and U.S. states.

Until early 2000, the administration was reluctant to apply much pressure on Massachusetts to reverse its Burma policy. In addition to the electoral considerations, one reason may be that any curb on state sanctions legislation could simply lead to a switch to other controversial measures not prohibited by the WTO, such as state bans on investments in companies with business links to targeted countries.[12] Another reason for not challenging the Massachusetts law may be that, as the Clinton administration asks Congress for wider authority to shape new trade agreements (such as fast-track negotiating authority) and investment rules (the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, or MAI), the last thing the president wants is confirmation that the WTO impinges on local sovereignty.[13] U.S. trade officials have begun to work closely with states considering sanctions laws to make them consistent with WTO rules. Massachusetts legislators working on a sanctions bill against Indonesia were persuaded by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to produce a bill containing an exception for procurement covered by the WTO code. The bill's sponsors agreed to exclude purchase contracts over $500,000 and construction contracts over $7 million.[14] State Department and trade officials have visited other states around the country to try to head off similar legislation targeted at a variety of countries.

[11] "Sanctioning Burma, Sanctioning the USA," *Multinational Monitor.*

[12] Guy De Jonquières, "Push to Head Off Clash on Burma Trade Curbs," *Financial Times*, 24 April 1997.

[13] Fred Hiatt, "Boston's Stand on Human Rights," *Washington Post*, 25 August 1997.

[14] Frank Phillips, "State's Trade Sanctions Win Notice," *Boston Globe*, 15 June 1997.

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However, in April 1997, the Clinton administration added to the confusion of a uniform U.S. position on sanctions by invoking congressional legislation that imposes federal sanctions on Myanmar. In the post-cold war era, a foreign policy based on the rhetoric of human rights has become popular, and the imposition of sanctions is perceived by many policy makers and much of the public as less costly than other foreign policy levers such as military intervention. U.S. states' actions have thus helped to mold national foreign policy, as well as attract media attention and shape public opinion.

Not only did Massachusetts' Burma Law prod the federal government to apply sanctions on Burma, but it may also have had some effect on Europe. In March 1997, the EU withdrew Myanmar's eligibility for trade benefits on agricultural and industrial products after investigating complaints by international and European NGOs that the Asian country was using forced labor to boost its exports.[15] The European Parliament has also approved a nonbinding sanctions resolution against Myanmar. In June 1997, the European Parliament passed a unanimous declaration (B4-0485/97) urging the Commission of the EU to retreat from its challenge of the Massachusetts law. Human rights activists in the United States have been working with European groups and trade unions to get anti-Burma sanctions passed in European cities.[16] U.S. trade officials were upset in the summer of 1997, when Portugal was encouraging adoption of its own sanctions aimed at Indonesia at a time when the EU was threatening a case against Massachusetts. In April 2000, even the United Kingdom's Foreign Office requested that British companies pull out of Burma as a means to increase pressure on the military regime. While other factors may also be influencing European policy toward Burma (such as pressure from labor and human rights groups and ongoing efforts by the European Parliament to strengthen its role within the EU's institutional structure), the Massachusetts law has brought international publicity to the situation in Myanmar. However, for U.S. national policy makers, the Burma Law represents a foreign policy embarrassment over which they have little control and yet another obstacle to the improvement of transatlantic relations.

## *NGOs and Global Politics*

One of the most interesting phenomena of the post-cold war era has been the rise in number and influence of NGOs. The Union of International Associations counted 40,306 international NGOs in 1997, which is more than double the 20,063 of 1989.[17] Along with TNEs and international organizations, NGOs are the entities most frequently discussed as significant actors and a potential

[15] "EU to Hit Burma Trade," *Financial Times*, 22 March 1997, 2.

[16] Dunne, "Massachusetts' Burma Law Row Flares."

[17] Cited in Maryann K. Cusimano, Mark Hensman, and Leslie Rodrigues, "Private-Sector Transsovereign Actors—MNCs and NGOs" in Maryann K. Cusimano, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda* (Boston: Bedford Press, 2000), 257.

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threat to the dominance of nation-states in global affairs.[18] Using their network of members and contacts, NGOs play an important role in collecting and disseminating information. Technological advances have enabled them to operate transnationally, exposing human rights or environmental problems in remote locations and transmitting this information via the Internet and fax machines to recipients around the world. NGOs also play an important role in mobilizing their supporters to lobby politicians, stage protests, and take other actions to raise public awareness of certain issues. By forming "transnational advocacy networks," as in the case of Massachusetts' Burma Law, NGOs are "simultaneously domestic and international actors."[19]

NGOs played a very influential role in the origination of the Burma Law. The Massachusetts Burma Roundtable, an NGO dedicated to raising consciousness in the United States about the situation in Myanmar, first approached Representative Rushing in 1993. Familiar with Rushing's work on South African sanctions legislation in the 1980s, the Massachusetts Burma Roundtable sought the representative's advice on an appropriate strategy to attract attention to the problems in Myanmar. Rushing suggested that, while passing a set of resolutions in the Massachusetts legislature could be done rather quickly, an approach with more teeth would be a selective purchase bill.

In reality, NGOs were using a multipronged approach to influence U.S. policy toward Myanmar. NGOs interested in Myanmar had been lobbying members of Congress and the State Department, but they made little progress in Washington. However, they were also working with legislators in Massachusetts and other states and cities in an effort to bring attention to the issue at the local level. The NGOs were instrumental in creating uniformity among the various Burma Laws passed throughout the United States. Using their network of contacts around the country, NGOs circulated the Massachusetts bill to legislators in other states and cities. Consequently, most of the other Burma Laws on the books in other localities (and most of those that failed to get passed) are nearly identical in wording. Once Massachusetts and a number of cities passed selective purchasing laws, and other states and cities put similar bills on their legislative agendas, NGOs were able to return to Washington flush with their success. By October 1996, enough pressure had been put on Congress that it passed and the president signed a law prohibiting new investments in Myanmar. Thus, NGOs were able to leverage their success in Massachusetts into a national policy.

[18] Ibid., 255–282; Brannon P. Denning and Jack H. McCall, "States' Rights and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January 2000): 9–14; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (January 1997): 50–66; Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

[19] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 6.

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There are three important characteristics of the NGOs that helped to initiate the Burma Law. The first is that the more precise term for these NGOs is transnational social movement organizations, which are essentially international NGOs "that seek to bring about a change in the status quo" by, for example, "work[ing] for progressive change in the areas of the environment, human rights, and development."[20] The Massachusetts Burma Roundtable is part of the Free Burma Coalition, which is "an umbrella group of organizations around the world working for freedom and democracy in Burma."[21] Many other NGOs urging adoption of the Burma Law were also affiliated with the Free Burma Coalition. The second characteristic is that the groups were very technologically savvy. Not only was this important from an organizational perspective, but it also played an important role in lobbying elected officials in Massachusetts. While Massachusetts-based NGOs did most of the work in mobilizing residents to contact their state representative and senators, NGOs from around the country and world lobbied Governor Weld to sign the bill. According to Rushing, many legislators viewed the bill as a fairly uncontroversial piece of legislation that would please a small constituency, whereas the fact that Weld was running for the U.S. Senate at the time probably made him more inclined to listen to non-Massachusetts interest groups.[22] The third characteristic is that the enactment of the Burma Law and the raising of a political consciousness about the situation in Myanmar have been accomplished without a significant Burmese-American ethnic group in the United States. Most NGOs interested in this issue, such as Citizens for Participation in Political Action and the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, are not dominated by Burmese-Americans, and only a small part of their memberships could be considered ethnic Burmese. Consequently, one of the remarkable effects of these NGOs has been to get American citizens and politicians interested in the internal situation of another country, despite the lack of a significant constituency or demographic group identified with the issue.

These last two characteristics are in marked contrast to grassroots movements that worked in the 1980s to shape U.S. policy toward South Africa. Anti-apartheid groups were far less sophisticated in the use of technology, since the mass public did not use the Internet, email, and websites at that time. Also, the anti-apartheid movement was largely seen as a concern of the African-American community, which comprised about 10 percent of the U.S. population. Members of Burma-focused NGOs, in contrast, tend to be comprised of a wide range of ethnic groups. As Representative Rushing put it:

> One thing that is unique about Burma, and what I think is probably the thing that the people who are opposed to this now are most concerned about, is that we

[20] Louis Kriesberg, "Social Movements and Global Transformation" in Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*, 12.

[21] http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/. [Accessed 2 February 2000]

[22] Author's interviews with Representative Byron Rushing, 17 October 1997 and 26 January 2000.

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> Americans have . . . taken this position when there hasn't been a hyphenated constituency in the United States. . . . What it means is that there are people in the United States who are willing to take this kind of position, to engage in this kind of activity on human rights and democracy restoration grounds alone, without having any kind of emotional connection to the country.[23]

It is clear that NGOs, working in tandem with local governments, pose a serious challenge to the autonomy of national governments in the foreign policy arena. As two scholars critical of Massachusetts' Burma Law note, NGOs "have succeeded in replacing the classical view of international relations and international law as high-level affairs conducted among elite policymakers with one in which grassroots organizations now reach millions worldwide through the Internet and the fax machine."[24]

### *The Burma Law and U.S. Federalism*

Massachusetts' Burma Law and similar legislation passed by other states and cities raise the federalism question: do states have the legal authority, as established in the U.S. Constitution, to make such laws? The Constitution forbids local governments from assembling their own armies or navies, declaring war, entering into treaties, violating national treaty commitments, and levying duties on imports or exports.[25] However, the current foreign policy activities of local governments do not fit neatly into these categories.

Business groups opposed to selective purchasing laws, sanctions, and related state and city legislation raise three points.[26] First, state and local sanctions would change U.S. foreign policy, which the Constitution says can only be conducted by the executive branch. The sanctions imposed or proposed to date have already affected U.S. foreign policy by prompting the EU to take the dispute to the WTO and (in the case of Nazi gold) straining relations with Switzerland. The second argument is preemption: state actions, specifically the Massachusetts sanctions, preempt a federal action. In October 1996, President Clinton signed a bill that would allow him to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar in the event of "large-scale repression" by the military. Six months later the president invoked the law's provisions. The Constitution and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have prohibited such preemption by the states. Businesses argue that the president could have imposed a secondary boycott but chose not to, and thus the Massachusetts action preempts his decision. The

[23] Ibid., 17 October 1997.

[24] Denning and McCall, "States' Rights and Foreign Policy," 11.

[25] Michael H. Shuman, "Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies," *Foreign Policy* 65 (Winter 1986–1987): 154–74.

[26] John Maggs, "Businesses Battle State Sanctions," *Journal of Commerce*, 28 August 1997, 1A; David Schmahmann and James Finch, "The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar)," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 30 (March 1997): 175–207.

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third argument is that state and local actions usurp the federal government's responsibility for regulating foreign commerce. Like a tariff, the Massachusetts law has the effect of restricting and even halting commerce with a particular company.

Local governments who have passed sanctions legislation defend their actions with several arguments. One justification is to claim that a state's decision to boycott companies with business in Burma is a form of constitutionally protected speech.[27] Peter Vallone, New York City Council Speaker and proponent of legislation that punishes countries that restrict religious freedoms, says that, "No one can tell me or any other individual in this city how we can and should invest our money."[28] A second reason is that local governments have a responsibility to respond to the concerns of their constituents. Marc Pacheco, a Massachusetts state senator and cosponsor of a sanctions bill against Indonesia, argues that, "[w]e have the right and ability to use state-level restrictions to respond to legitimate public concerns."[29] A third explanation is that such laws are in fact constitutional and consistent with international law. Tom Barnico, Massachusetts' assistant attorney general, argues that "[t]he state's position is that the Burma law is consistent with GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and [is] a constitutional exercise of the state's authority to decide with whom they will do business."[30] Yet another argument is that local governments have legitimate concerns about the ethical aspects of global politics, including human rights. As Robert Stumberg, a Georgetown University law professor explains it, "[s]tate and local governments are aware that the world economy is much more integrated than it was. Their consumer choices will either help or hurt the interests of democracy, and the economic or moral interests of state taxpayers."[31] A fifth explanation, presented by Rushing, contends that selective purchasing is not even "real" foreign policy. "Influencing the national government is part of an age-old function of state legislatures. And that's what we are doing. We *don't* believe that what we are doing is foreign policy. Foreign policy would be *us* cutting a deal with some country. That's foreign policy. We can't do that. But we can certainly influence; we can use our sovereignty and our capacity to raise and spend money to influence the foreign policy of this country. And that's what we are doing."[32]

Of course, state governments do not necessarily need to enact sanctions legislation to raise awareness of international political issues. Less controversial measures are available. However, state legislators have found that less controversial measures are also less effective. In June 1997, U.S. Ambassador to Indo-

[27] Gordon Fairclough, "Massachusetts Trade Law is Challenged," *Wall Street Journal*, 25 July 1997.

[28] Lynette Holloway, "Vallone Seeks Sanctions on Nations Persecuting Christians," *New York Times*, 15 June 1997.

[29] De Jonquières, "Push to Head Off Clash on Burma Trade Curbs."

[30] Emery, "State with Foreign Policy Roils Trade Beyond Seas."

[31] Theo Emery, "Trade Group to Challenge Mass. Law in Burma," *Boston Globe*, 24 February 1998.

[32] Interview with Rushing, 17 October 1997, Boston (Italics represent emphasis in his words.)

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nesia J. Stapleton Roy visited the Massachusetts State House to meet with legislators advocating a bill to impose sanctions on Indonesia. When the ambassador asked why the legislators did not just pass resolutions instead of laws on the subject, Representative Rushing responded that, "for years we passed resolutions on a lot of international issues, and we never even once got a letter back from the State Department. That's why we pass selective purchase bills, because that gets your attention."[33] For other local governments, though, nonbinding resolutions are the preferred option, because they make a moral statement and ease consciences without requiring additional administrative work and antagonizing companies and foreign governments.

Yet not all local government officials welcome ventures by their colleagues into the foreign policy arena. Quincy, Massachusetts Councilor at Large Tim Cahill, the only councilor who voted against that city's Burma Law, argues that, "[i]t's a feel-good measure. It's not what I was elected to do. When small city governments start to act like they know better than the president or the State Department, people laugh at that."[34] Given that most state and local governments have not passed sanctions legislation, it is plausible that the majority of local politicians in the United States may share Cahill's views. However, it is the minority of local legislators, mayors, and governors who have successfully enacted sanctions that have brought the issue of local governments as international actors into the spotlight.

Over the past two decades, various state governments have passed laws that among other things: discriminate against foreign suppliers in government procurement; prohibit state pension funds from being invested in companies doing business in South Africa; exclude foreigners from owning certain types of businesses; and mandate that state liquor houses refrain from selling Russian spirits (in response to the downing of a Korean Airlines plane in 1983). While such actions have affected U.S. foreign policy, "because of unofficial sentiment favoring such decisions, the limited policy implications of such actions, or the lack of political will to force changes in these policies, Washington has basically gone along with the state interference in these foreign policy-related areas."[35]

This tolerance for municipal foreign policies may have three important underlying rationales.[36] First, Washington may be recognizing that international affairs, like many domestic issues, have become too complicated to run effectively as a monopoly through the nation's capitol. The federal government may also believe that ultimately these policies are unstoppable, since, even if the federal government cut off every unilateral and bilateral initiative, local governments would still have constitutionally protected consciousness-raising

[33] Phillips, "State's Trade Sanctions Win Notice."

[34] Theo Emery, "Quincy Takes a World View," *Boston Globe*, 18 October 1997.

[35] Earl H. Fry, "The United States of America" in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos, eds., *Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990): 276–298.

[36] Shuman, "Dateline Main Street."

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powers. But the most important reason for federal tolerance may be the unwillingness of most presidents, members of Congress, and judges to subordinate American core political values to the needs of foreign policy.

The Clinton administration, by not legally challenging the Burma Law, seemed to be following this path. However, in February 2000, with pressure from the EU and TNEs increasing, and the passage of local sanctions legislation showing few signs of abating nationwide, the Clinton administration filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court urging the Court to find Massachusetts' Burma Law unconstitutional.

### *Local Government and Transnational Enterprises*

The relative power of governments and TNEs has been the most contentious issue in political economy since the end of the cold war. U.S. policy makers are discovering that global economic issues such as the Asian financial crisis, the negotiation of trade agreements, and the protection of intellectual property rights are consuming a greater portion of their attention than traditional military and defense issues. At the same time, globalization is focusing the attention of some scholars on the role of TNEs in international politics. On one hand are those who argue that international mergers and acquisitions, massive quantities of foreign investment, and the increasing mobility of capital have made TNEs entities that are no longer restricted by territorial borders.[37] In fact, the global nature of TNEs may allow them to play governments off against each other, using the threats of closing facilities or laying off workers to obtain favorable tax treatment or less intrusive labor or environmental regulations. Governments are trapped in a race to the bottom in regulatory policies if they are to have any hope of maintaining, let alone attracting new investment. Consequently, the disproportionate influence of TNEs in policy making is regarded as a threat to democratic principles and institutions.

An opposing view challenges the TNE threat as a myth, since the core strategic behavior of TNEs varies widely and is heavily influenced by distinctive national histories and cultures.[38] At the same time, governments do have some powerful policy tools that can be employed against TNEs, such as granting access to markets (particularly less liberalized ones, such as China), merger approval, and public support for TNE activities (such as research and development subsidies and export promotion). As with the other international

[37] Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996); William Greider, *One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, *The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Democracy and Prosperity* (New York: Zed Books, 1997).

[38] Paul N. Doremus, William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, and Simon Reich, *The Myth of the Global Corporation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Linda Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

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relations themes mentioned above, Massachusetts' Burma Law is at the center of the TNE-government debate.

The effect that the Burma Law is having on Burma and the companies that do business there is not clear. U.S. companies signed $339 million worth of investment deals with Myanmar in February 1997, which was more than in all the previous eight years.[39] This investment was in anticipation of the invocation of the 1996 federal law allowing the president to ban new investment, although prior investments are not affected and there are no limitations on federal government purchases. On the other hand, major consumer product companies such as PepsiCo, Heineken, Levi Strauss, and Walt Disney have pulled out of Myanmar. By the fall of 1997, thirteen companies ended operations in Myanmar, several of them (including the computer company Apple) specifically citing the Massachusetts law as a factor.[40] For some companies, such as clothing makers that can easily transfer operations from country to country, the decision to pull out of Myanmar was based on political, economic, and public relations considerations. While investment by U.S. companies in Myanmar is small compared to most other countries, businesses are concerned that local governments will adopt sanctions legislation targeted at more significant countries, such as Indonesia, Nigeria, and China. Corporate opposition may then become much fiercer than it was against the Burma bills. Thus, some observers believe Massachusetts legislators will have a hard time passing sanctions against Indonesia.[41] Too many big local firms, such as Raytheon and Gillette, have substantial operations in that country.

But local governments, too, can be hamstrung by their own sanctions legislation. In July 1997, Berkeley, California passed a selective-purchasing law against companies doing business in Nigeria, whose government has been criticized for cracking down on the democratic opposition and a number of human rights abuses.[42] Since Berkeley already had a law on Myanmar, the city faced the possibility that it would not be able to buy gasoline from any of the major oil companies. The city subsequently found one company, British Petroleum, which did not appear to be doing business in either country. However, local governments are unlikely to find themselves in a situation where there are no companies to do business with. Most of the selective purchasing laws allow exemptions when it would be too expensive or difficult to find an alternative. Berkeley, for example, made an exception for Motorola, which operates in Burma, because it depends on the company for its communications system.

Foreign policy making has become more complex for business interests, because they now have to monitor and lobby both national and local governments. Not surprisingly, business has amassed several arguments against sanc-

[39] Ted Bardacke, "United States Companies Rush to Beat Sanctions Against Burma," *Financial Times*, 25 April 1997.

[40] Emery, "State with Foreign Policy Roils Trade Beyond Seas."

[41] Nigel Holloway, "Boycott Brigade," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 August 1997, 45.

[42] Ibid.

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tions legislation, including the detrimental effects on U.S. exporters, futility in forcing change in targeted countries, risk of international economic retaliation, and possibility of discouraging the inward foreign investment on which many U.S. state economies depend.[43] Such arguments may be having some effect. California deferred consideration of a Burma sanctions bill, and the sponsors of Massachusetts sanctions legislation against Indonesia plan to rework the bill to bring it into line with WTO rules. In March 1998, Maryland was considering a selective purchasing law targeting Nigeria. However, business lobbying and Clinton administration warnings that the state law would violate international trade treaties led to the bill's defeat.

It is likely to be the courts that will decide the extent to which local governments can develop foreign policies. On 30 April 1998, the NFTC, which represents about 550 companies (although they are not publicly named for fear of consumer boycotts) filed suit against Massachusetts' Burma Law. Frank Kittredge, president of the council, said that "[w]e regard this lawsuit to be an important test case . . . concerning the constitutionality of state and local sanctions."[44] Contrary to much of the political economy literature that suggests that TNEs seek to diminish the influence of the nation-state, the NFTC was in fact trying to strengthen Washington's position, even if it involved the imposition of national-level sanctions. The EU asked the court to be allowed to join the NFTC action along with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In July, the EU filed a brief claiming that the Massachusetts law was hindering foreign policy cooperation between the United States and the EU. On the other side of the case is a coalition of environmental, human rights, labor, and citizen groups urging state attorney generals to monitor the case and argue for states' rights.

Court hearings began in September 1998 with the NFTC's argument resting on three points. The first was that the U.S. Constitution gives only the federal government the right to make foreign policy. The second was that Massachusetts' Burma Law violates the commerce clause of the Constitution, which gives Congress exclusive powers over interstate commerce. The third was that federal law imposing sanctions on Myanmar preempts the Massachusetts law. The Commonwealth contended that: the Constitution explicitly lists the activities in which states may not engage, but that economic sanctions is not one of them; the Burma Law does not establish direct contact between Massachusetts and Myanmar; important state interests embodied in the First and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution justify the law; and since the foreign affairs doctrine is vague, the court should leave to the legislative branch the issue of whether to invalidate the law. The federal judge concluded that the Massachusetts law "unconstitutionally impinges on the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs,"[45] since the objective of the legislation was to change

[43] Richard Haass, "Sanctioning Madness," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (November/December 1997): 74–85; De Jonquières, "Push to Head Off Clash on Burma Trade Curbs."

[44] "Business Group Sues Over Mass. 'Burma Law,'" *Boston Globe*, 1 May 1998.

[45] *National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker*, 26 F. Supp. 2d, 287 (D. Mass., 1998).

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Myanmar's domestic policies. However, the judge was less supportive of the NFTC's second and third arguments. An appeals court affirmed the lower court ruling in June 1999, but also found that the statute discriminated against foreign commerce and conflicted with the sanctions law passed by Congress.

Finally, on 19 June 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Massachusetts' Burma Law was unconstitutional on the grounds that the law was preempted by the 1996 federal statute imposing sanctions on Burma.[46] The Court declined to comment on the First Circuit's rulings addressing the foreign affairs power or the Foreign Commerce Clause. Because the decision was narrowly drawn, the limitations on local government involvement in foreign affairs remain imprecise. Local sanctions may stay intact for cases in which Congress has not acted. The ruling also does not prohibit other measures, such as boycotts, shareholder resolutions, or divestment by state pension funds in firms doing business in Burma. Nor does the ruling settle the issue of whether international trade agreements signed by the federal government supersede local laws on the environment or safety, as well as those imposing human-rights sanctions.[47]

## Policy-making Issues

While this article hopes to contribute to the existing literature on the roles of local government in international relations,[48] it also seeks to show that local government involvement in global politics has implications for general IR themes, such as sovereignty and the condition of the nation-state. As local governments, grassroots activist groups, and businesses vie for influence against international organizations such as the EU and WTO, the nation-state's influence over local government foreign policies declines significantly. In the Massachusetts case, Washington was reluctant to press the case in the courts, as business groups and the EU had proposed, but at the same time committed the United States to international agreements that resulted in confrontations between actors other than nation-states. The nation-state is being pressed from both sides into a "territorial trap."[49]

It seems clear that to understand international policy toward Myanmar, we must go beyond national foreign policies. The realist emphasis on the structure of the international system does not help us to understand why local U.S. governments are developing their own foreign policies. We must look at the second

[46] *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S.___, (2000); 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4153.

[47] "The Supreme Court: Burma Shave," *Economist*, 24 June 2000, 33–34.

[48] Douglas M. Brown and Earl H. Fry, eds., *States and Provinces in the International Economy* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, Berkeley, 1993); Fry, *The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs*; Hocking, *Localizing Foreign Policy*; Kline, *State Government Influence in U.S. International Economic Policy.*

[49] John Agnew, "The Territorial Trap," *Review of International Political Economy* 1 (Spring 1994): 53–80.

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layer—the structure of nation states and their societies. One of the reasons why local governments have been at the forefront of using sanctions policy to achieve changes in other countries' human rights records may be a perceived failure on the part of national governments to do so. Since foreign policy has traditionally been made at the national level, the businesses, NGOs, and other actors who seek to shape foreign policy have concentrated their lobbying efforts in Washington. Massachusetts encountered very little business opposition to its Burma Law until the legislation was passed, signed, and implemented. NGOs, on the other hand, refocused their attention at the local level after their inability to influence U.S. foreign policy via the Congress or State Department.

The more immediate objective of this article has been to heighten the awareness of local governments as serious actors in global politics. Admittedly, state and local government involvement in sanctions policy is not new. In the mid-1970s several states set up complicated regulations prohibiting business practices that might be viewed as supporting the Arab boycott provisions aimed at Israel.[50] The current selective purchasing laws are modeled on bills adopted by eighty cities and twenty-three states in the mid-1980s, which targeted South Africa's government and apartheid system. While several of these laws were challenged in the 1980s, federal courts have never definitively ruled on the constitutionality of such laws. Part of the reason is that the Reagan administration, like the Clinton administration, never used the federal courts to challenge state and local sanctions targeting firms involved with South Africa. In three cases, state courts have judged whether state and local sanctions related to South Africa abrogated federal foreign policy making, and have struck down the sanctions in two of the three.[51] In the 1980s, most corporations were reluctant to challenge local government sanctions against South Africa, lest they appear to support the apartheid regime. But now many businesses are concerned that the spread of local sanctions could have a more far-reaching effect on their overseas operations. The result is the suit filed by the NFTC in the spring of 1998 to bring an end to these measures.

While the rise of international activism by local governments cannot simply be explained as a post-cold war phenomenon, changes in the international system over the past two decades have played critical roles. Earl Fry presents six reasons for the increased international activities of state governments in the 1980s and 1990s, which can be applied to cities and local governments as well.[52] First, states are becoming increasingly aware of the effects of economic globalization and interdependence. Many governors and state legislatures are convinced that they must keep abreast of international activities and try to maximize and protect state interests in a rapidly changing environment. Second,

[50] Earl H. Fry, "Trans-Sovereign Relations of the American States" in Ivo D. Duchacek, Daniel Latouche, and Garth Stevenson, eds., *Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 53–67.

[51] Maggs, "Businesses Battle State Sanctions."

[52] Fry, "The United States of America."

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the growing dependence of the United States on the global economy has forced state governments to look abroad for new marketing and investment opportunities. Third, electoral factors have convinced state leaders to become more actively involved abroad, particularly in attracting foreign investment and expanding trade opportunities and tourism, which will diversify their economic bases, expand tax revenues, and generate jobs. Fourth, state governments are learning to be more entrepreneurial in generating economic growth in response to the decrease in transfer payments from Washington. Fifth, advances in communications and transportation and a growing trend toward the internationalization of production have combined to bring the world closer together and to facilitate the interaction of state governments with both governmental and nongovernmental actors abroad. Sixth, a constitutional ambiguity in the limits to state actions in the foreign policy area has facilitated the growth in state activities overseas.

The third, fifth, and sixth factors are the most important in explaining Massachusetts' Burma Law. Economic sanctions, be they divestment or selective purchasing laws, appeal to important constituencies that want to see some global political action taken on their behalf. Advances in international communications make it very easy for NGOs, politicians, and the media to portray the nasty aspects of far-off military juntas and human rights abuses to a wide U.S. audience. Because Washington has been reluctant to confront states on these issues, such laws have become rather widespread at the state and local level. To these factors could be added a seventh: many local officials and citizens believe they have a duty to fulfill international norms and laws.[53] Through selective purchasing laws, local governments assert that they are willing to pay more for goods and services if it means that this will eventually bring justice or improve human rights in a particular country. Since these moral dimensions are frequently raised by local racial, ethnic, and religious groups with close ties to oppressed groups abroad, the number of global issues that might ultimately surface in municipal forums throughout the U.S. melting pot seems practically limitless. The recent proliferation of local government sanctions seems to support this. To some, selective purchasing laws are a concrete maxim for the oft-heard phrase "think globally, act locally."

Susan Strange has argued that the focus of world politics on state-state relations must make room for state-firm and firm-firm diplomacy.[54] Her argument could be amended to include the local government dimension as well. U.S. foreign economic policy, especially toward the EU, must now take account of local government sanctions legislation. The United States and the European Union have long discussed reducing trade barriers, and in March 1998 the EU proposed a New Transatlantic Marketplace. Significantly, one objective of the plan is to negotiate a single comprehensive agreement that binds U.S. states as well

[53] Shuman, "Dateline Main Street."

[54] Susan Strange, "States, Firms and Diplomacy," *International Affairs* 68 (January 1992): 1–15.

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as the federal government to a commitment to liberalize public procurement, as the EU has long been infuriated by national and local Buy American laws in the United States. The EU has also strongly protested U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba (particularly the Helms-Burton Act), which penalize European companies doing business there, and other unilateral actions, such as the D'Amato Act targeted at Iran and Libya. Initiatives by local governments, particularly Massachusetts' Burma Law, are a further thorn in the side of transatlantic relations.

Perhaps the most important question for policy makers is why economic sanctions have been such a popular choice for local governments to exhibit their foreign policy interests. One explanation is that sanctions are a low-cost foreign policy favored by isolationists, since they do not require U.S. military involvement in distant lands. This is not completely convincing, since many proponents of sanctions laws actually want the United States to exercise its political and economic influence on a wider international scale, albeit for less traditional foreign policy goals.

A second reason, offered by business groups such as USA Engage, is that the business community failed to see the rise in popularity of such legislation. As a result, companies entered the debate late in the game and are only now beginning to emphasize the cost of sanctions in terms of lost exports and jobs. It follows that just as some observers see globalization leading to a harmonization of national economic, trade, procurement, intellectual property, and investment policies and regulations, the proliferation of sanctions at the local level is presenting business with the headache of keeping track of which of the 50 states and over 7,000 municipalities have sanctions and against whom. It is not surprising that the NFTC sought court action to end such legislation. Yet court action against local governments (particularly if supported by the federal government) could lead to further disenchantment at the local level with globalization in general and international trade agreements in particular. The grievances of the protesters at the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle were not lost on U.S. policy makers.

A third explanation for the support of sanctions generally may be the influence of ethnic groups in pushing such legislation. In February 1997, U.S. Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) introduced a bill restricting U.S. companies doing business in Indonesia because of the country's human rights record in East Timor. Not coincidentally, 10 percent of the voters in Rhode Island are of Portuguese descent. Smaller jurisdictions are generally more responsive to pressures from organized interest groups, meaning that challenges to status quo policies can often succeed with targeted local or even state governments well before sufficient national consensus develops to alter existing policy positions.[55]

[55] John Kline, "United States' Federalism and Foreign Policy" in Brown and Fry, eds., *States and Provinces in the International Economy*, 201–31.

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As the Rhode Island case shows, a narrow geographic interest can even influence sanctions policy at the national level. A rise in social activism coupled with an increase in the international capacity of local governments now jockeys with national policy makers for foreign policy influence.[56] Representative Rushing notes that there was never any serious objection among Massachusetts citizens to the state's selective purchasing policy against companies doing business in South Africa. Daniel O'Flaherty, vice president of USA Engage's parent organization, the NFTC, complains that state and local sanctions "represents a kind of grass-roots guerrilla warfare, based on very narrow political constituencies."[57] However, in the case of Massachusetts' Burma Law, the "grass-roots guerrilla warfare" was not being waged primarily by Burmese-Americans or ethnic Burmese, but by human rights groups and other broad-based NGOs. Some advocates of states' rights contend that "[a] large number of voices on foreign policy helps democratize the process [thereby adding] creativity and diversity."[58] Thus, the growing international interest of local governments as described in this article is simply part of what Brian Hocking identifies as a broader process whereby foreign policy is becoming localized.[59]

If local governments are to become more involved in global politics, more research is needed to understand how they balance foreign policy issues. Making a stand on Myanmar has hurt Massachusetts' relationship with Japan. Japan is the state's second largest export market (importing $1.5 billion from the state), and 126 Japanese companies have operations in the state, employing 13,000 people.[60] The EU includes Massachusetts' third, fourth, and fifth most important trading partners, and the EU's fifteen members buy $6 billion in Massachusetts goods.[61] There is certainly the potential of a sizable economic loss to the state if the Japanese and Europeans carry through on their threats. It is not clear how or whether such foreign policy costs are considered in local government sanctions policies.

From a domestic politics perspective, Massachusetts' Burma Law illustrates some of the shifting alliances within and among U.S. political parties. While the substance and objectives of selective purchasing and other sanctions-oriented legislation often (but not always) originate on the far left of the political spectrum, the principle that states have the right to pass such laws is supported by the far Right. The far Right is ever conscious of infringements on state and national sovereignty by international organizations, and it is opposed to State

[56] Hocking, *Localizing Foreign Policy.*

[57] Emery, "State with Foreign Policy Roils Trade Beyond Seas."

[58] Michael Shuman, Institute for Policy Studies, quoted in Fred Hiatt, "Boston's Stand on Human Rights," *Washington Post*, 25 August 1997.

[59] Hocking, *Localizing Foreign Policy.*

[60] Michael Grunwald, "Mass. Law Targeting Burmese Junta Could Spark Trade War with Japan," *Boston Globe*, 31 January 1997.

[61] Michael Grunwald, "Trade Tiff Widens over State 'Burma Law,'" *Boston Globe*, 1 February 1997.

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Department and trade officials caving in to economic competitors. As *The Economist* put it, "[t]he spectacle of Europe, Japan and the WTO all ganging up on an American state could, bizarrely, bring right-wing nationalists rushing to protect preachy Bay State lefties."[62]

Finally, Massachusetts' Burma Law helped to shape the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy. By jumping on the sanctions bandwagon in 1996 and using the subject as a major election issue in his campaign for the Senate, Governor Weld forced his opponent, Senator John Kerry, to abandon his long opposition to sanctions against Myanmar. The state's 1996 law also hastened debate on a sanctions bill by the Congress later that same year. When President Clinton decided in April 1997 to ban new investments by U.S. companies in Myanmar, Massachusetts legislators felt vindicated. As Representative Rushing put it, "[s]uddenly, putting pressure on companies to get out of Burma is not a harebrained idea. It is an idea that has been discussed seriously by people doing foreign policy on the federal level. They have agreed with Massachusetts that this makes sense."[63] This parallels the influence that states and cities had in the 1980s over U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa. The government, following the lead of local governments, abandoned its policy of constructive engagement and made economic sanctions the national foreign policy.

The argument can be made that Washington has permitted—even encouraged—local government involvement in foreign economic policy. Massachusetts officials believe that Congress implicitly accepted that some state action would affect foreign policy when it subjected state laws to review at the WTO.[64] In other words, Congress has virtually assured that the states will have contact with foreign governments that seek the amendment or repeal of such laws. At the same time, through the 1994 GATT-implementing legislation, Congress established express protections for state laws against claims in U.S. courts brought under the WTO by private persons or foreign countries. Thus, one could conclude that Congress foresaw the potential for conflict between local government and international trade agreements, and the foreign policy dilemmas this would create, but chose not to clearly demarcate the reach of local government in global politics.

Despite the Supreme Court's decision to strike down Massachusetts' Burma Law, it is undeniable that the influence of local governments in global politics is increasing. The mere spectacle of a February 1998 meeting in a Massachusetts State House conference room that included a senior EU official, a diplomat from the British embassy in Washington, Her Majesty's consul general in Boston, and a State Department official is enough to confirm that local

[62] "The Mass that Roared," *Economist*, 8 February 1997, 32.

[63] Frank Phillips, "State Was in Lead on Burma," *Boston Globe*, 23 April 1997.

[64] I would like to thank Tom Barnico, assistant attorney general for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for this insight.

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governments cannot be dismissed in the international arena.[65] How local governments use this influence, including the ends they seek and the means they use to attain them, will continue to attract the attention of world policy makers, TNEs, NGOs, and international institutions. As state and local governments become more involved willfully or unwittingly in international affairs, there will undoubtedly be more court cases seeking constitutional answers to two interrelated questions: Where does domestic policy end and foreign policy begin; and in an increasingly globalized world, can the division of powers between federal and state governments be clearly distinguished?*

[65] Robert S. Greenberger, "States, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling Business Groups and U.S. Partners," *Wall Street Journal*, 1 April 1998.

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# The Church and the Revitalization of Politics and Community

ANNA GREENBERG

One typical Sunday morning, Father Jackson, the rector of a mainline African-American church, ended his sermon by making the weekly announcements. After reviewing the upcoming events, he asked his congregation for donations to fund scholarships for neighborhood children to participate in summer camp, noting simultaneously that the federal government had cut appropriations for poor teenagers. He then called attention to an announcement in the bulletin, asking members to "witness" for a living wage at a rally at City Hall. In this short interlude, Father Jackson simultaneously provided political information about the federal government's activities, engaged in institution building in a poor neighborhood, and provided his worshipers with an opportunity to make demands on local authorities. He demonstrated that the church can serve as an important political institution, generating ways to engage the political process and simultaneously providing social services through ministry in the face of declining government investment in poor neighborhoods.

Asserting the importance of the church in the polity rests upon claims that locally-based institutions are important to connecting people to the political process.[1] One can imagine institutions, like churches, making these connections in two ways. First, institutional participation builds "social capital," or "the features of social life—networks, norms and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives."[2] These norms underlie

[1] Margaret Weir and Marshall Ganz, "Reconnecting People and Politics" in Stanley B. Greenberg and Theda Skocpol, eds., *The New Majority: Toward a Popular Progressive Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

[2] Robert D. Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28 (December 1995): 664–665; also see Nancy Tatom Ammerman, *Congregation and Community* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997).

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civic engagement and a strong polity. Second, local groups frequently function as part of broader institutional networks, which mobilize people into public life through the provision of political information and participatory resources. As Theda Skocpol and her co-authors note, in the nineteenth century, the local associations that so impressed Alexis de Tocqueville were frequently part of translocal networks that "connected people across places and linked localities to civic affairs in states and in the nation as a whole."[3]

This article explores the role of religious institutions in generating civic engagement and their potential to connect people and political life through their networks of communal and political involvement. I argue that religious institutions have the potential to act as agents of political mobilization and as intermediaries between the individual and the state. Churches occupy this position because they are political institutions, serving as sources of political information, opportunities, resources, and incentives to engage the political process. At the same time, religious institutions are connected in important ways to the local community and the state, which makes them important locations of political empowerment. Churches create shared space for community groups and provide services for the disadvantaged, reaching beyond the immediate needs of the congregation. They bolster these services through partnerships with state agencies, which in turn both creates opportunities to influence public policy and to make demands upon the state.

I confront, however, the limitations on the optimistic claims about the role of religious institutions in political life. I argue that despite certain characteristics of religious institutions, which make them amenable to fostering political connection and engagement, there are demographic, political, and normative constraints on their capacities as political actors. To explore these possibilities and limitations of religious institutions, I use data collected during extensive field research in Protestant churches in Chicago, Illinois. These data are based on in-depth interviews and observation from participation in a variety of worship services and activities at eight churches across racial and theological traditions.[4] The sample includes two white evangelical churches, three black evangelical churches, two white mainline churches, and one black mainline church.

[3] Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz, Michele Swers, and Ziad Munson, "Casting Wide Nets: Extensive Voluntary Associations in U.S. Federal Democracy" (Harvard University, 1997, photocopy), 42.

[4] I spent time in black and white Protestant churches in two middle class Chicago neighborhoods. The neighborhoods were chosen from indicators in the 1990 U.S. Census, including average family income, level of home ownership, and occupational status. The black neighborhood is located on the south side of Chicago. The white neighborhood is located on the northwest side of Chicago. While these neighborhoods and their churches appear fairly comparable on class measures, the southside neighborhood is experiencing increasing problems with gangs and crime. The northwest neighborhood is more economically stable, bolstered by a large population of city workers, such as police officers and firefighters. The findings are derived from in-depth, in-person interviews with religious women and ministers conducted from August 1995 through March 1997. A total of 40 women and 9 clergymen were interviewed for this project, including 19 African-American and 21 white women.

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All respondents are Protestant women.[5] I use these data to talk about the microprocesses at work in religious institutions that socialize and mobilize people in politics, but also the way religious institutions make connections to politics and community through network ties, service provision, and partnerships with the state.

## Churches as Political Institutions

Churches have been important actors in political life throughout American history. Quakers played a central role in abolition, evangelical churches fueled temperance efforts and moral reform, mainline Protestant churches were foundational to the antiwar movement of the 1960s, and the black church generated important resources in the Civil Rights movement.[6] But the successful grassroots mobilization of religious conservatives around the range of family values issues, like school curriculum reform and opposition to abortion, has brought renewed attention to the political role of religious institutions in American politics.[7] This attention emphasizes their activities as independent political actors

[5] "Evangelical" generally refers to a variant of conservative Protestant Christianity defined by certain doctrinal beliefs, like the belief in the inerrant Bible and having a born-again experience. See Clyde Wilcox, *God's Warriors: The Christian Right in the Twentieth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). There is a debate in the literature over the definitional and political differences between fundamentalists and evangelicals. See Clyde Wilcox, Ted G. Jelen, and David C. Leege, "Religious Group Identifications: Toward A Cognitive Theory of Religious Mobilization" in David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, eds., *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). Generally, fundamentalists tend to be both theologically and politically more conservative than evangelicals. In this research, however, I will use the term "evangelical" for heuristic purposes to refer to both groups. A majority of African Americans can be defined as evangelical on theological basis, but they behave very differently politically from white evangelicals. Mainline Protestants tend to regard the Bible as containing "deep truths" and understand Jesus Christ as a "prophet of social justice" rather than a personal savior. See Kenneth D. Wald, *Religion and Politics in the United States* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997). Mainline Protestants, like evangelicals, are not a monolithic bloc. Liberal (Episcopalians) and moderate (Lutherans) Protestants demonstrate the sorts of political and religious differences one would expect, with moderate Protestants holding more traditional views toward the Bible and more conservative political viewpoints. See Wade Roof and William McKinney, *American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

[6] Ruth Bordin, *Women and Temperance: The Quest for Power and Liberty, 1873–1890* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "Beauty, the Beast, and the Militant Woman: A Case Study in Sex Roles and Social Stress in Jacksonian American" in Nancy F. Cott and Elizabeth H. Pleck, eds., *A Heritage of Her Own: Toward a New Social History of American Women* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979); Robert Booth Fowler and Allen D. Hertzke, *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, Strategic Choices* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); and Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[7] See Wilcox, *God's Warriors*; and José Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

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and their influence on individual political preferences and behavior.[8] Religious institutions can take on these roles because they stand at the intersection of public and private life, serving simultaneously as arbiters of social relations and purveyors of private values. They are intermediary institutions between the state and the individual and serve as an arena to generate criticism of the state or dominant cultural discourse.[9] In this capacity, religious institutions frequently serve as a safe or "free space,"[10] from where groups can deliberate and generate the foundations of collective action.

Religious institutions are part of the network of associations that bolster democratic governance, as well as generate challenges to dominant groups and discourses. As Robert Putnam argues, "networks of civic engagement" foster an interest in the collective good, which has positive consequences such as improving the performance of "representative government."[11] Conversely, these same associations serve as a source of challenge to authority, just as the black church fueled the battle against racism and for civil rights legislation. The challenge is to discern the ways that religious institutions translate this social capital into concrete political and social action.

At the individual level, churches influence political behavior as they serve as a source of political information and opinion leadership. As many scholars note, understanding political reasoning and decision making requires consideration of an individual's social context, namely the kinds of information people are exposed to in the course of daily life and the influence of discussion networks.[12] The church serves as a source of this proximate influence, as religious involvement is linked to political attitudes (issues of sexuality and morality) and civic engagement (voting) as well as other forms of political participation. Studies show a strong link between church attendance and voter turnout, poli-

[8] On the role of religious lobbies, see Allen D. Hertzke, *Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988). Also see, Leege and Kellstedt, *Rediscovering The Religious Factor in American Politics.*

[9] Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, *To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977).

[10] Sara Evans and Harry C. Boyte, *Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).

[11] Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy 6* (January 1995): 66.

[12] See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study in Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1957); Robert Huckfeldt, *Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflict in Urban Neighborhoods* (New York: Agathon Press, Inc., 1986); David Knoke, "Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction," *Social Forces* 68 (1990): 1041–1063; and Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

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tics in church and political knowledge, and among African Americans, church involvement and collective action.[13]

Religious institutions exercise this influence because they are sites of frequent and regular social interaction, where leaders and congregational members exert considerable pressure to conform to behavioral and social norms.[14] These sorts of efforts were evident in the field research in this study. In the course of sermons and informal social interaction, clerical and lay leaders spend an enormous amount of time attempting to inculcate members with the requirements of living a proper Christian life.[15] For instance, in sermons, religious leaders often preach "love thy neighbor," "don't be a bench member," or "reach out to people in need." This exhortation is bolstered in other forums, like Bible Study class, where leaders and lay members explore the implications of religious teaching for daily life.

Religious instruction takes on political significance when leaders make linkages between living a Christian life and political goals. The field research suggests that religious leaders make connections between faith and political goals by impressing members with a sense that they should participate in politics as part of the criteria of living "like a Christian." They argue that Christian voices need to be heard in politics, given that current political debate is corrupt and driven by secular values. Leaders bolster this message with political information and participatory opportunities, linking norms of civic engagement with the chance to act politically. These instances of political communication, therefore, underlie political action as they provide both incentives[16] to become active in public life and information to enable efficacious participation in politics.

[13] Lester Milbrath and M. L. Goel, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally Publication Co., 1977); Theodore F. Macaluso and John Wanat, "Voting Turnout and Religiosity" *Polity* 12 (Fall 1979): 158–69; James G. Hougland and James A. Christenson, "Religion and Politics: The Relationship of Religious Participation to Political Efficacy and Involvement," *Sociology and Social Research* 67 (July 1983): 405–420; Oscar B. Martison and E.A. Wilkening, "Religious Participation and Involvement in Local Politics throughout the Life Cycle," *Sociological Forces* 20 (October 1987): 309–18; Kenneth D. Wald, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and David C. Leege, "Church Involvement and Political Behavior," in Leege and Kellstedt, eds., *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*; and Frederick C. Harris, "Something Within: Religion as a Mobilizer of African-American Political Activism" *Journal of Politics* 56 (February 1994): 42–68.

[14] Richard H. White, "Toward a Theory of Religious Influence" in Phillip E. Hammond and Benton Johnson, eds., *American Mosaic: Social Patterns of Religion in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1970).

[15] Of course, while religious leaders would hope for assimilation of theological teachings, in practice, adherents often understand these precepts only imperfectly. See Ted Jelen, "Political Christianity: A Contextual Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (August 1992): 692–714.

[16] As many scholars note, the paradox of political participation is its seeming irrationality under assumptions about the primacy of self-interest in decision making. See Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). One "solution" to this paradox is to explore the sorts of incentives offered by institutions to encourage or coerce participation in collective activity. See Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1993); and James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Alternatively, as Jane Mansbridge notes, one can understand deliberation in social groups as a mechanism to create investment in the collective good or, in

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In general, political communication and recruitment in church are quite widespread, particularly given that the church is ostensibly a nonpolitical institution. Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady note in their important survey of citizen participation that people are somewhat more likely to hear political appeals and encouragement in church than on the job or in other nonpolitical organizations. Thirty-four percent of their sample reports being asked to vote or take other political action in church, compared with 19 percent on the job and 9 percent in other nonpolitical associations. Twenty-five percent of their sample reports frequently or sometimes hearing about political issues from the pulpit.[17] This political information and exhortation clearly lead to greater engagement with and participation in politics and are reflected in ministerial attitudes and behavior.

Political communication in church takes on two dimensions—promoting and facilitating civic engagement and community outreach. Leaders frame the performance of civic duty as part of the obligation of being a Christian, because they believe it is important for Christian voices to be heard in public life. This civic encouragement involves urging people to participate in politics, mainly voting or contacting government officials. In more activist churches, leaders encourage more demanding activity, either by sponsoring political action or in coalition with other political organizations, like local party committees, community organizations, or even transdenominational organizations such as the Concerned Women for America.

Encouraging community outreach is an important component of clerical communication, and in some churches, like the black church, is inseparable from political action. Clerical leaders argue that the Christian mission requires caring for the less fortunate, fueling communal involvement or active participation in social welfare ministries. These activities frequently have a political component, even if the activities are seemingly apolitical in nature. They take on political significance because ministries expose people to social and economic problems and solutions that often require interaction with agencies of the state and engaging in social action. This exposure can have a feedback effect that increases political engagement and imbues congregants with a sense of having a stake in the policy-making process.

## Building Civic Engagement and Connection to Community

### *Ministerial Communication*

The ministers in this study strongly believe in the importance of providing political information to their congregations, because in their view Christians have

other words, alternatives to self-interest. See Mansbridge, "Self-Interest and Political Transformation" in George E. Marcus and Russell L. Hanson, eds., *Reconsidering the Democratic Public* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993).

[17] Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

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an important perspective to bring to political life. The ministers are disgusted with the state of political life, and for evangelicals in particular there is a strong belief in the embattled status of Christians in the public sphere. To rectify this situation, expressing a political voice is framed as part of the responsibilities of religious leaders and part of the requirements of living a Christian life. As one white evangelical pastor puts it: "That's where we are as a church. I see our responsibility to be information givers. But mainly [we] have to be a motivator to get individuals to play their role in society nationally." A black mainline rector expresses this perspective as well: "I do have political sermons from time to time, and what I mean by that is I never encourage anyone to vote for anyone because I feel that's a personal decision. But I will talk about issues and about facts and about the fact that if you do not get out to vote then you are really giving your power over to someone else and you're not becoming part of the political process nor to impact change in your community." A white mainline clergyman, says simply. "But Jesus was executed as a political criminal, so it's hard to deny that political activity has something to do with faith."

These ministers back up these beliefs by including political material in their sermons, giving political groups access to their congregations, and advertising political opportunities. Most frequently, leaders encourage members to perform their civic duty, for instance, by reminding them of impending elections. Political communication often stops here, however, as partisan and ideological politics are deemed inappropriate in the religious setting.

White evangelical leaders, however, circumvent opposition to excessively partisan politics by providing political information indirectly. Both white evangelical churches in the study allow conservative groups to distribute candidate score cards to their congregations during election season, though they stop short of telling people to vote for particular candidates. One evangelical church allowed an anti-abortion activist to conduct a teach-in at Sunday Morning Bible study and post relevant literature in the back of the chapel. The Illinois Citizens for Life organization leaves brochures in the back of the sanctuary that describe opportunities for political action, like letter writing, candidate information, and citizen lobbying trips to Springfield and Washington. Both evangelical churches in the study publicized additional anti-abortion activities, like the Evangelical Day of Life and fundraising walkathons for clinics.

In the black church, the partisan biases are more transparent, as the clergy frequently permit candidates to speak to congregations during services and strongly encourage political and community involvement. Support for political activity in the black church is widespread,[18] usually uncontroversial, and important to Democratic party politics. Three of the four black churches in this sample have important ties to the Democratic party, either informally (candidate

[18] In a study by C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya, 92 percent of black clergy (n=1,842) supported that idea that churches "should express their views on day-to-day social and political questions." See Lincoln and Mamiya, *The Black Church in the African American Experience* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 225.

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visits) or formally (overlapping organizational membership). At one large evangelical church, the co-pastors have strong connections to the Democratic party and were able to marshal every prominent local leader, including the state Attorney General Richard Devine, U.S. Representative Bobby Rush, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson, to their mortgage burning ceremony. They also recruit members to work at the 8th ward Democratic headquarters and at Operation Push. The imperative to engage politics in this church is explicit; the assistant pastor of this church admonishes every Sunday, "everyone in this congregation will give their tithe, will find a job, and will vote." The pastor of another evangelical church ran for alderman (though he lost to the machine) and rallied his congregation in support of a local African-American woman running for judge. Father Jackson, from the opening passage, makes sure all of his congregational members are registered to vote, and he served on the Board of Education.

White mainline churches are less politically engaged, though they certainly encourage performance of civic duty. One mainline church serves as a polling site, and members of both mainline churches in the study freely sign petitions at church to get candidates on the ballot. The Golden Fellowship at the more moderate mainline church hosts candidates during election season, though the pastor would never permit partisan discussion during worship services. But mainline white Protestantism has trouble grappling with political issues in church, in part because the leaders tend to be more ideologically committed and polarized than their members. As one mainline pastor explains: "I have a feeling that over the years, I've kind of watched, and I think there are probably some of the clergy who may be a little more liberal, more aware of some of the social issues than some of the parishioners are." This point is made graphically by some members of the more liberal mainline church, who complain about their pastor's extensive attention during worship services to issues like AIDS and prostitution.

### *Members' Voices*

The attempts to make the linkage between religious and political goals are reflected in church members' orientation toward participation in politics. One white evangelical woman argues that Christian voices need to be heard in the public debate, at least in a "civil way." "We need to take an active part. Speak in that way. I'm not saying, like even the abortionists and the pro-lifers, some of the things they do is too strong, you know burning buildings, that's wrong too. You know, I don't think God intended, but there's things that we can do that need to be part of politics to voice our opinions, not by burning buildings, but do it in a civil way."

She also takes it upon herself to distribute mock letters or petitions against abortion that she finds in religious publications. One of her compatriots sees churches and religious individuals injecting certain sorts of values into political

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decision making: "I don't see how they cannot be involved in some ways, because it's the people making decisions. And if the church is not involved in those decisions, then I think they're not doing their part. I don't think they should get out and picket or, have riots and things when things are not going they way they want them to. But I think they should be involved in politics."

In the black church, community outreach efforts include both political and social action. A lay leader at a black evangelical church understands the ministry of Jesus Christ as fundamentally political and requires his followers to take on the same mission:

> I think that churches should be the light, wherever there is darkness in the community. And that means political, social, educational, I think the church should be there, being the light . . . . *Jesus was political.* And here at our church, we're so political, we expect that we will have politicians come, and we let them sit in our service, they get up and speak in the pulpit. They will sit on the pulpit and people say, OOHH! But we believe that that's what Jesus did. Jesus did it.

Another African-American evangelical woman argues that a religious commitment requires political involvement: "You can't grow [in] Him, if He's going to just say 'Well, I'm going to just concentrate on you. That's it.' And I don't think that's, if Jesus's disciples did that, we wouldn't have Christianity today. And *I think they came into politics* and they came into all kind of areas." The political involvement of churches and religious people, as they understand it, would change the nature of politics. A member of the black mainline church thinks that the church should be an "example," arguing that if religious institutions were involved in politics, there would be fewer "problems." "You can't isolate yourself. You have to know what's going on. And if we had more involvement in the church, of the churches, we probably wouldn't have the problems we're having today. You know, in a positive role. Someone must get into office and get our hands dirty too. You're not an example then."

The disparity between the elite and the laity in mainline white Protestantism, however, is evident as members talk about the role of politics in church. They support community outreach through charity and ministry but object to partisan appeals in church. One member of the liberal mainline church thinks that religious values should influence political beliefs and priorities, but churches should eschew attempts to influence members' decisions:

> I don't like the idea. I'm in full agreement with the separation of church and state. I think they've gone a little bit far in some instances, but I do hold onto that as a tenet. I do believe that the church should have an impact on people's beliefs in political life and the way we are meant to go. That there's morals and ethics, and Lord knows, we all need help. And every political party. We should be striving for personal life, but also life in the community. But I don't believe, and more churches are doing it, they are telling people how to vote.

A member of the moderate mainline church is more emphatic: "[Should churches be involved in politics?] No. Not at all. Because I think everybody has

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their own ideas why they are voting for who and I don't . . . think that the church should get involved in that." On the other hand, these women do not shirk their civic duty; they vote at the same rates as other women in the sample, and they strongly believe in a compassionate orientation toward others through community outreach. The differences between mainline women and African-American women rest in a different conception of politics. Unlike African-American women, mainline women separate community outreach from political action, even if these activities have an implicit political component.

In sum, integration into religious institutions has a strong effect on an individual's propensity to get involved in politics. Leaders want their members to express their political voices, and congregational members believe that their voices can improve the political debate. To this end, leaders provide information and opportunities to engage the political process, even if this encouragement is limited to the fulfillment of civic duty. Empirically, this political exhortation is related to a variety of measures of political engagement and participation. The religiously involved vote at rates higher than the national average, regularly write letters to government officials, frequently belong to political organizations, and less frequently engage in collective action. It is fair to argue that religious participation creates an investment in the political process.

## Church and Community in the Polity

These findings suggest that church involvement enhances individual engagement with the political process, as members acquire political information, resources, and opportunities to participate in politics. In isolation, however, the potential for building social capital and increasing political connectedness remains unrealized. Churches rarely sponsor political activity or direct action against the state. Rather, churches make the strongest connection to political life through the networks that religious institutions are embedded in and that they create through community outreach. Churches are important providers of social services and suppliers of space for community activity.[19] In both of these capacities, religious institutions reach noncongregational members, empower community groups, and interact with state agencies. This activity is important for the political life of the congregation internally, but it also creates opportunities to influence policy making about important social problems.

There are approximately 300,000 congregations in the continental United States. Their most important function, of course, is religious ministry and education. But an overwhelming majority also provides some sort of community service, ranging from food pantries to arts education to health clinics. According to the Independent Sector's national survey of religious institutions, congregations engage in a broad range of activities—human services (87 per-

[19] John McCarthy and Jim Castelli, *Religion-Sponsored Social Service Providers: The Non-So-Independent Sector*, Working Paper Series (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 1998).

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cent, for example, meal services), international outreach (79 percent, refugee programs), public or societal benefit (70 percent, community development), health (68 percent, institutional care), arts (43 percent), culture and education (38 percent), and environmental improvement (27 percent).[20]

These services and activities are made available beyond the church walls. A study of the activities of urban congregations recently released by the Partners for Sacred Places found widespread commitment to providing social services to the larger community. In its survey of 113 urban congregations in older buildings, Partners for Sacred Places found that 91 percent offer community services and that on average each congregation supports or houses at least four programs.[21] A startling 81 percent of beneficiaries of these programs are not members of the congregations. Religious institutions open up space, moreover, to community and neighborhood groups. The Sacred Places study found that 45 percent of urban congregations share their space with other groups, frequently contributing funding and in-kind support (for example, heating). The Independent Sector survey found evidence of even greater support for the larger community, with 60 percent of their sample making space available for use by outside groups one day a week or more and 13 percent making their space available every day of the week.

Churches will play an even greater role in communities as the state institutionalizes its relationships with religious organizations in a number of areas, like housing and welfare. For instance, former Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Henry Cisneros created a program within HUD's Special Actions Office called the Religious Organizations Initiative to "provide extensive outreach to the faith community."[22] In his report, *Higher Ground* (1996), Cisneros argues that not only are faith-based, community organizations central to developing affordable, decent housing, but that they should do so in partnership with government. This relationship, he argues, must be based on local assessment of needs and development of innovative solutions, which the government can then support:

> . . . outsiders condition their support on the community developing an asset-based strategy that it owns and believes in. Outside agencies can then provide support in

[20] The Independent Sector conducted a national survey of religious congregations in conjunction with the Gallup Organization in 1987. Out of a sample of approximately 300,000 congregations, they surveyed 4,205 congregations, with more detailed information from a smaller subsample. See the Independent Sector, *From Belief to Commitment: The Activities and Finances Of Religious Congregations in the United States* (Washington, DC: The Independent Sector, 1988).

[21] Partners for Sacred Places is an organization devoted to the preservation of historically significant religious properties. Their survey is based on in-depth interviews and written questionnaires from 113 randomly selected congregations across the range of religious traditions.. See Diane Cohen and A. Robert Jaeger, *Sacred Places at Risk: New Evidence on How Endangered Older Churches and Synagogues Serve Communities* (Philadelphia: Partners for Sacred Places, 1997).

[22] Andrew Cuomo, Clinton's secretary of housing and urban development, created his own initiative, the Center for Community and Interfaith Partnerships, headed by a Catholic Priest, Father Joseph Hacala.

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> a manner that gives the community considerable latitude in deciding how best that support will be applied. Instead of the old idea of citizen participation in government initiatives, they advocate sensitive and facilitative *government participation in citizen initiatives.*[23]

Cisneros sees churches as creating innovative policy responses to urban problems, rather than merely responding to government initiatives.

Similarly, the Charitable Choice provision embedded in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (or welfare reform), which allows religious organizations to provide welfare services with block grant money from state authorities, involves churches at the front end of policy making. For instance, in Sacramento, pastors and other clergy formed the Interfaith Service Bureau, which works with the Sacramento County Department of Human Assistance, to develop day care and job training programs. As the county's community development manager said, "Government can't do it on its own. There's no way."[24]

This provision also allows churches and other congregations to compete for government contracts, generating incentives for religious initiative in this area. For instance, in Texas, one of the first states to take advantage of the Charitable Choice provisions, Governor George W. Bush has introduced legislation to allow religious organizations to participate in state-funded services. Governor Bush envisions aggressive competition among churches for welfare checks. As he puts it: "I envision a new welfare system, an energized, competitive program where a person who needs help would get a debit card, redeemable not just at a government agency, but at the Salvation Army or a church day-care facility."[25]

Churches in the study did take advantage of state resources to fund outreach efforts, though these efforts are largely restricted to the black churches. One black evangelical church, for instance, built low-income transitional housing for women with children in partnership with HUD, as well as other state and local agencies. Another black church runs a large after-school program for area residents and church members, funded in part by the Board of Education. It is too early, however, to gauge if Charitable Choice will have an impact on the way churches deliver community services or how it will influence their relationships with the state. There is no question, however, that these provisions can change the relationship of churches to public policy making as they bring congregations into consultation with the state about important social and economic problems.

[23] Henry G. Cisneros, *Higher Ground: Faith Communities and Community Building* (Washington, DC: Housing and Urban Development, 1996), 16. (Emphasis added.)

[24] Jan Ferris, "Churches Enlisted in Welfare Reform" *Sacramento Bee*, 4 November 1997.

[25] Jim W. Jones, "Bush Appoints Bedford Minister to Task Force," *The Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, 3 May 1996. Also see Sam Walker, "'Faith-Based' Welfare Reform," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 22 April 1997; and Richard Wolf, "Law Lets States Increase Churches' Welfare Role," *USA Today*, 1 October 1997.

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## Limitations on Religious Influence

These optimistic claims about the role of the church in building social capital and increasing political connection in the community, however, need to be put in the context of certain limitations. There are demographic, political, and normative constraints on the capacity and desirability of religious institutions playing such a central role in political life. First, the fastest growing churches—white evangelical ones—are less likely than other churches to address, either politically or through community services, pressing social and economic problems. Second, the idealization of the capacity of churches to take on social and economic problems may lead to a weakened state and federal commitment to social welfare provision. Public policy makers are asking congregations to take on daunting tasks, just as they face declining resources from the government and their own institutions.

### *Demographic Constraints*

Since the 1970s, theologically conservative churches have been growing at a faster rate than moderate or liberal churches.[26] According to the Independent Sector survey, only 11 percent of religious institutions founded since 1970 describe themselves as liberal and 18 percent as moderate. In contrast, 69 percent call themselves conservative or very conservative. At the same time, at least since the early 1960s, mainline denominations have been losing members or show no growth, while evangelical Protestants have built membership relative to population growth.

This sector of the American religious landscape, white evangelical churches, embraces a particular political agenda, usually centered on family values issues. These churches are extremely effective at grassroots mobilization around issues, like opposition to abortion, but are less likely to understand their mission as encompassing social action or reaching out to other communities. Rather, they concentrate their energy on evangelism or meeting the immediate needs of congregational members. The Independent Sector data show that self-described conservative congregations are much less likely than liberal or moderate congregations to offer any programs or services, except for counseling, recreational activities for children, refugee-related programs, and right-to-life activities. On individual measures, Robert Wuthnow finds that among white evangelical Protestants there is no relationship between church attendance and belonging to civic organizations or volunteering in activities outside of the church. As he puts it: "What has not been sufficiently emphasized is the fact that mainline Protestant churches encourage civic engagement in the wider community, whereas evangelical churches apparently do not."[27]

[26] Roof and McKinney, *American Mainline Religion*.

[27] Robert Wuthnow, "Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of Religious Involvement" (Department of Sociology, Princeton University, 1997, photocopy), 14.

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In keeping with these aggregate trends, white evangelical women in my study emphasize the spiritual side of their Christian obligation, attending to material and physical concerns in the community, as a means to impart the message of the Gospel. Social action is not in conflict with the salvation project, but it certainly is secondary. As one respondent puts it: "If that family is hungry, and you're trying to tell them about salvation, they're not going to hear you. If they're hungry and you supply them with food, they're going to see you as someone they can trust, someone that is willing to help them. So by helping them in their needs at that time, you have a better chance of telling them what their spiritual needs are. And if you don't meet their other needs you're not going to meet their spiritual needs."

Similarly, another white evangelical woman argues that social service can be among the tasks churches take on, but should not take a back seat to spreading the message of the Gospel: "I think [churches] should be primarily in personal salvation, which I think should result in helping the poor and doing things like that. But I think they should steer away from just getting involved in social programs and not preaching salvation." These women's churches do not reach out to the community in any systematic or comprehensive way. Rather they are more concerned with organizational maintenance and bringing in new members. They address the needs of members, for instance, by contributing rent money or groceries, but do not participate in larger outreach efforts.[28]

Conversely, the churches among the most committed to community service and social action—mainline churches and progressive religious institutions—are facing declining membership and denominational resources. While mainline Protestantism still constitutes an important segment of the religious landscape, there has been little or no growth of its membership since the 1960s.[29] Moreover, on average, mainline churches tend to attract smaller and aging membership and therefore struggle with organizational maintenance. Finally, unlike African Americans and white evangelicals, mainline Protestants maintain fairly low levels of institutional commitment, attend church less frequently and participate in fewer activities.[30]

The highpoint of political and community outreach among the mainline churches was in the 1960s and 1970s, when investment in poverty programs under the auspices of the Great Society fueled denominational outreach efforts.[31]

[28] In part, the absence of community outreach and social service is a function of size and neighborhood. One of the white evangelical churches is fairly small, and the white neighborhood is not facing serious social or economic problems. On the other hand, the small mainline churches found ways to get involved in other communities through their denominational infrastructure.

[29] Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, *The Churching of America, 1776–1990* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992).

[30] Rodney Stark and Charles Y. Glock, *American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); also see Roof and McKinny, *American Mainline Religion*.

[31] Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

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Since the late 1970s, facing social welfare cutbacks during the Reagan administration, mainline churches have struggled to maintain a commitment to social welfare.[32] This resource problem is exacerbated by a weak institutional commitment at the congregational level and lack of ideological connection between the leadership and the laity. Robert Fowler and Allen Hertkze argue that this disjuncture stems from the decision-making structure in mainline denominations, where parishioners are rarely consulted on political matters.[33] For instance, in the Episcopal Church, the hierarchical nature of the denomination has meant that efforts to take on urban poverty have flowed from the top down, generating tension as class and racial conflict inhibit suburban churches from participating in urban outreach.

In the mainline churches in my study, community outreach and service provision ministries are divorced from social or political action. These churches do find ways to channel resources into disadvantaged communities through denominational infrastructure or in coalition with other groups. For instance, one white church supports an institution offering transitional housing for recently released female felons (collecting linens, clothing, and food) and a school in a low income neighborhood (volunteer tutoring), both of which are affiliated with the denomination. The moderate mainline church participates in the Crop Walk to raise money to fight world hunger, which is part of a broader ecumenical effort. In mainline churches, volunteer efforts and community outreach are often associated with denominational institutions, for instance, hospitals and nursing homes.[34]

But congregational members exhibit disdain for politics, while simultaneously articulating a strong desire to help the less advantaged. As such, community outreach amounts to individual acts of charity and philanthropy. As one white mainline woman describes the ideal role of the church in the community: "I think [churches] should be there for your needs . . . and I feel like the church, that's what God wanted his disciples to do, is to go out and do good for other people and do what he has told them that they should do. And that's in that respect, I think our little church has been very serviceable. [Should churches be involved in politics?] No. Because I think each person individually has their own feelings and I don't think it should matter."

An active member of the moderate mainline church echoes a similar sentiment: "I think that's the key to everything. Providing food. Helping with finding homes for the homeless. Doing things for people where there is someone hurting. That's where the church belongs. They should be doing something about it. [What about politics?] I'm disturbed when the pastor starts talking politically and yet sometimes I see that . . . I don't know if my thinking is really clear on it. I believe in the total separation of church and state."

[32] Clifford J. Green, *Churches, Cities, and Human Community: Urban Ministry in the United States, 1945–1985* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996).

[33] Fowler and Hertkze, *Religion and Politics in America.*

[34] Green, *Churches, Cities, and Human Community.*

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The problem, as Gregory Pierce describes it, is that faith-based direct service involves neither systematic analysis of problems nor solutions like community organizing or collective action. As such, "No one would denigrate the good will such direct service programs entail or the real comfort they provide, but it can be said that congregations that adopt exclusively this mode of activism have doomed themselves to a constant attempt to bandage hurts that will never be cured."[35] The divorce of community outreach and social service from political action makes it difficult to conceive of these religious institutions as part of larger political mobilization.

## *The Black and Catholic Churches*

Both the Catholic Church and the black church maintain a strong commitment to service provision combined with social action. The black church has a strong tradition of outreach, particularly as it responded to the needs generated by the great migration of blacks from rural to urban areas and from the southern to northern cities. Moreover, its social gospel tradition and participation in civil rights activism[36] means that the black church makes strong connections between prophetic Christianity[37] and a political agenda concerned with economic welfare and social justice issues. C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamyia report that support for community outreach is widespread, with 68 percent of black churches reporting that they "cooperated with social service agencies and other nonchurch programs in dealing with community problems." This commitment is particularly strong in urban black churches, especially on problems such as housing and welfare, police and community relations, and "local community crisis events."[38] John McCarthy and Jim Castelli confirm these findings, noting that black congregations are significantly more likely than white congregations to provide support for the disadvantaged.[39]

This sort of community outreach and service provision figures prominently in the activities of black churches in my study. For instance, one evangelical church opened a community center where it offers after-school programs like tutoring and adult education. The church that supports transitional housing also feeds the homeless and holds special services Wednesday morning for the local homeless population. The pastor of this church runs a prison ministry, an

[35] Gregory F. Augustine Pierce, *Activism that Makes Sense: Congregations and Community Organization* (Chicago: ACTA Publications, 1984), 10.

[36] See McAdam, *Political Process*; and Aldon Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change* (New York: The Free Press, 1984).

[37] Cornel West, *Prophesy Deliverance* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983).

[38] There are differences between black churches. Theologically conservative churches tend to be less politicized in their outreach efforts. Moreover, churches committed to black consciousness are also more likely to engage in community outreach. See Lincoln and Mamyia, *The Black Church in the African American Experience*, 151.

[39] McCarthy and Castelli, *Religion-Sponsored Social Service Providers*.

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activity that he couples during sermons and Bible Study classes with economic analysis of the connection between black male joblessness and crime. He also organizes petition drives against the death penalty, which he sees as part of a racist justice system. Father Jackson's church has fewer resources than these other institutions, but "adopts" local children, feeding them on Saturday mornings and providing recreational activities in the summer. Father Jackson connects these efforts with declining federal commitment to poor communities.

Similarly, the Catholic Church has a traditional commitment to social welfare ministry, particularly in urban areas. In cities, the Catholic Church historically has provided services for immigrants, built institutions like hospitals and orphanages, and worked with the labor movement.[40] After World War II, when white ethnic Catholics fled to the suburbs, Catholic parishes remained in cities, in part due to the requirements of the parish structure.[41] In the 1960s, the Catholic Church reacted to growing racial tensions and poverty in cities with a multitude of new initiatives.[42] Current initiatives range from service provision to community organizing to political and social action to interracial and ecumenical efforts and occur through the efforts of local parishes, lay leaders (for example, Dorothy Day's Catholic Worker), dioceses authorities, in coalition with groups like the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) and initiatives through the National Council of Catholic Bishops and the United States Catholic Conference.[43] For instance, in Boston, Catholic churches provide the backbone of the Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO), a grassroots ecumenical effort sponsored by the IAF to tackle important urban problems, like education, housing, and welfare.

Any discussion of the role of religious institutions in empowering citizens and tackling thorny social and economic issues, therefore, must recognize that some of the churches most effective at building social capital and civic engagement are not connected to the communities facing social and economic problems. Moreover, some of the churches most committed to community outreach and service do not link these ministries to political or social action. The promise of religious institutions in revitalizing politics and community really rests upon

[40] See David J. O'Brien, *Public Catholicism* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996); and Frederick J. Parella, Jr., "Roman Catholic Approaches to Urban Ministry, 1945–85" in Green, ed., *Churches, Cities, and Human Community*.

[41] John T. McGreevy, *Parish Boundaries: The Catholic Encounter with Race in Twentieth-Century Urban North* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[42] O'Brien, *Public Catholicism*.

[43] See Parella, "Roman Catholic Approaches to Urban Ministry, 1945–85." While this commitment exists in the leadership, it is not clear that the Catholic Church is as effective at building social capital as Protestant churches. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady show that Catholics are less likely than Protestants to have opportunities to exercise "politically relevant skills" in church, which they ascribe to the governance structure of the Catholic Church. See *Voice and Equality*, 322. Moreover, Wuthnow finds that Catholics are marginally less likely than Protestants to do volunteer work at their church and embrace a narrower range of activities. See Wuthnow, "Mobilizing Civic Engagement"; and Wuthnow, *God and Mammon in America* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

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the ongoing commitment of African-American and Catholic churches that both confront the problems of urban life and have the infrastructure to support social service and community efforts in ways connected with political action.

## Conclusion

It is clear that religious institutions hold the potential to reconnect people to politics in ways that parties or unions did in the past. They provide political information and participatory opportunities to the religious citizenry. They make demands upon the state in the course of social service provision and through their ties with political organizations, like grassroots organizations. Moreover, religious institutions engage in community building through the generation of shared space and drawing community members into congregational activities. As such, churches represent an important site—politically, socially, and economically—for reinvigorating political and community life.

But churches cannot take on this daunting task alone; nor have they historically engaged in social service and community building in isolation. While many faith-based initiatives begin with local clerical leadership, they often develop in partnership with the government or other institutions.[44] For instance, much of the faith-based community outreach and social activity noted earlier was taken on in conjunction with the War on Poverty, when the federal government targeted resources to urban areas. Religious institutions reacted to these initiatives by building urban ministries to respond to poverty and social isolation. Since the 1980s, there have been serious cutbacks in federal funding for cities[45] and simultaneously a decline in resources for urban ministry, as foundation funding dried up and declining membership required attention to organizational maintenance.

Therefore, policy makers are calling on churches to take on major social and economic welfare responsibilities as they face an eroding resource base and federal and state government disinvestment. Catholic Charities, the "nation's largest private network of social service organizations," opposed the Charitable Choice provision precisely because welfare reform provided no new resources to fight poverty.[46] Given that both white evangelical churches are unlikely to take on these sorts of problems and white mainline churches are less likely to connect community outreach to social action, the promise of faith-based revitalization of politics and community at the moment remains a promise.*

[44] McCarthy and Castelli, *Religion-Sponsored Social Service Providers*.

[45] See Margaret Weir, "Poverty, Social Rights, and the Politics of Place in the United States" in Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, eds., *European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); and Karen Paget, "Can Cities Escape Political Isolation?" *The American Prospect* 36 (January/February 1998): 54–62.

[46] Catholic Charities, "Issue Brief" (Catholic Charities, Alexandria, VA, 1998, photocopy).

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# Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.–French Competition in Francophone Africa

PETER J. SCHRAEDER

Three watershed events dramatically influenced the evolution of African international relations during the twentieth century. First, the extended global conflict of World War II (1935–1945) heralded the decline of Europe as the most powerful region of the world and the emergence of African nationalist movements intent on achieving independence from colonial rule. The outbreak and intensification of the cold war (1947–1989) subsequently transformed the newly independent African countries into proxy battlefields between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the two unparalleled superpowers of the post-World War II era. African conflicts often having little, if anything, to do with the ideological concerns of communism or capitalism threatened to become East-West flashpoints in the face of U.S.–Soviet involvement. The third watershed event—the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989—signaled the end of the cold war but not the end of international rivalry in Africa. As deftly noted by Jeffrey E. Garten, former under secretary of commerce for international trade in the Clinton administration, the ideologically-based cold war between the United States and the former Soviet Union has been replaced by a cold peace in which the Great Powers struggle for economic supremacy in the highly competitive economic environment of the new millennium.[1] This article explores the origins and evolution of this cold peace by focusing on rising

[1] Jeffrey E. Garten, *A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1993). See also Alpo M. Rusi, *Dangerous Peace: New Rivalry in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998); and Robert A. Pastor, ed., *A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

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U.S.–French competition and tensions in francophone Africa—those former colonies and protectorates where French constitutes one of the national languages.

The case of francophone Africa is particularly illuminating for two reasons. First, as witnessed by extremely acrimonious exchanges between diplomats from the U.S. State Department and the French Ministry of Cooperation (which as of 1998 became part of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs), francophone Africa has emerged as the most publicly contested arena of Great Power competition on the African continent. Journalists have delighted in reporting on the tendency of French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine to refer to the United States as a *hyper-puissance* (hyper-power) that, "although lacking a worthy international opponent truly capable of challenging its power, remains incapable of implementing a viable Africa strategy—in essence conjuring up the much-acclaimed image in *Gulliver's Travels* of the giant Gulliver finding himself hamstrung by hundreds of ropes tied by six-inch Lilliputians."[2] This less than flattering characterization (the classic, French-language terminology, of course, would be that of a *super-puissance* or superpower) is not only deliberate but captures the perception of French policy makers and analysts who are wary of America's increasingly powerful and dominant role in the post-cold war era. Not surprisingly, the hyper-power reference has led to countercharges within the U.S. policy-making establishment that such statements in the extreme reflect the ill-founded paranoid beliefs of French policy makers who have found it difficult to accept changes in France's special role in francophone Africa.[3]

Not to be outdone, French diplomats in turn bristle at accusations of being paranoid about Washington's true intentions, citing highly publicized diplomatic statements, such as that by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher in October 1996, which underscore that "the time has passed when Africa could be carved into spheres of influence, or when outside powers could view whole groups of states as their private domain"—a clear reference to France's previously privileged role in francophone Africa.[4] The net result of what one observer has referred to as the emergence of a highly public "duel"[5] between Paris and Washington in francophone Africa is that source material, particularly media accounts of official government statements, is in great supply, offering decision-making insights usually unavailable until official documents are declassified decades later.

[2] Daniel Bourmaud, "The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Paris, France," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 26 (1998): 47.

[3] Ibid., 49.

[4] Howard W. French, "U.S. and French Sniping Heats Up Over Paris's Links to Africa," *New York Times*, 17 October 1996.

[5] Stephen Smith, "Afrique noire: le duel Washington-Paris," *Politique Internationale* 63 (Spring 1994): 355–67. For an early view, see Stanley H. Hoffman, "Perceptions, Reality and the Franco-American Conflict," *Journal of International Affairs* 21 (1967): 57–71.

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The case study of francophone Africa is also fascinating in that Washington and Paris were caught off guard by rising tensions between their two countries. Policy makers and Africanists from both countries incorrectly assumed that the post-cold war era would yield equal if not greater levels of U.S.–French cooperation enjoyed during the cold war. But attempts by the Clinton and Chirac administrations to reduce multiplying U.S.–French tensions often have been stymied due to widespread misperceptions, especially among diplomatic personnel within the field, about the origins and motivations of each other's policies. An important irony of these misperceptions, explains Dominique Moïsi, a specialist of French foreign policy, is that now, more than ever, U.S. and French diplomats must cooperate if the Great Powers are to be effective in aiding Africa's resolution of a myriad of socioeconomic and political-military challenges that have intensified in the post-cold war era.[6] In this regard, developments in francophone Africa merely represent the tip of the iceberg of U.S.–French tensions that have manifested themselves in other foreign policy realms, as witnessed by the media's coverage of several public disputes: France's now discarded bid to reenter NATO; the most effective means of dealing with the recalcitrant Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein (France has called for diplomatic engagement whereas Washington favors military containment); Washington's threats amid strident French government opposition to sanction French companies that do business with the "terrorist" regimes of Iran and Cuba; and a growing trade dispute over French refusals to import genetically-altered American beef and agricultural products that ultimately resulted in the much-publicized demonstrations in southwestern France against the McDonald's food chain, which is one of the most prominent symbols in many French minds of everything that is culturally wrong with the United States and gradually destroying French culture.[7] An important theme of this article is that understanding the origins of misperceptions and subsequent diplomatic tensions in francophone Africa should contribute to the more effective handling of the U.S.–French diplomatic relationship as a whole.

The remainder of this article is divided into five sections. After briefly describing the emergence and consolidation (1947-1989) of a complementary cold war regime in francophone Africa in which U.S.–French relations tended to be balanced, cooperative, and predictable, the remainder of this article explores the emergence of rising U.S.–French tensions during the cold peace in the economic, political, and security realms. A final section offers concluding remarks and implications for the future.

[6] Dominique Moïsi, "The Trouble with France," *Foreign Affairs* 77 (May/June 1998): 94–104. See also Roland Marchal, "French Policy in Africa: Changing Track," *International Affairs* 74 (April 1998).

[7] See James Petras and Morris Morley, "U.S.–French Relations in the 'New World Order,'" *Review of International Studies* 26 (January 2000): 49–68.

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## Creation of a Complementary Cold War Regime, 1947–1989

American and French foreign policies toward francophone Africa were driven by different sets of motivating factors during the cold war. American policy makers were principally guided by the ideological interest of containing the former Soviet Union and its communist allies. A variety of presidential doctrines, beginning with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and culminating in the Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s, declared Washington's right to intervene against communist advances throughout the world, including in francophone Africa.[8] As a result, pro-West administrations, such as Senegal under Abdou Diouf, were treated as potential American allies deserving of foreign aid, whereas African Marxist states, such as Madagascar under Didier Ratsiraka, were isolated. In sharp contrast, French policy makers sought first and foremost to consolidate and promote the *rayonnement* (spread) of the most notable aspects of French culture, including the French language and intellectual traditions.[9] Also referred to as the promotion of *la francophonie* (a greater French-speaking community), this policy is best represented by the biennial Franco-African summit attended by the leaders of France and francophone Africa, the most recent of which was held at the Louvre Museum in Paris in 1998.[10] Economic interests were perceived by French policy makers as both parallel and integral to the promotion of French culture, as witnessed by the organization of thirteen former French colonies and Equatorial Guinea into the "franc zone," a supranational financial system in which France serves as the central bank and provides a common currency, the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc, is tied to the French franc and guaranteed by the French treasury.[11]

As long as the United States and France were pursuing fundamentally different but complementary foreign policy interests—ideology for the United States and culture and economics for France—francophone Africa remained the beneficiary of a complementary cold war regime in which U.S.–French relations tended to be balanced, cooperative, and predictable. Regardless of whether France was led by the conservative partisans of Charles de Gaulle or the socialists of François Mitterrand, French policy makers predictably claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justified placing francophone Africa within France's sphere of influence.[12] The implicit assumption of what is referred to as the French version of the Monroe Doctrine is that francophone Africa constituted France's *chasse gardée* (private hunting ground) and there-

[8] F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, "Containment in Africa: From Truman to Reagan," *TransAfrica Forum* 6 (Fall 1988): 7–34.

[9] Edward A. Kolodziej, *French Foreign Policy Under DeGaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974).

[10] Agir Ici et Survie, *Sommet Franco-Africain au Louvre: La sécurité au sommet, l'insécurité à la base* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998).

[11] Olivier Vallée, *Le prix de l'argent CFA: Heurs et malheurs de la zone franc* (Paris: Karthala, 1989).

[12] Claude Wauthier, *Quatre présidents et l'Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995).

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fore remained off limits to other great powers, regardless of whether they were "friends," such as the United States and the other northern industrialized democracies, or "enemies," such as the former Soviet Union and other "radical" powers.[13] As demonstrated in the memoirs of George Ball, undersecretary of state in the Kennedy administration, this conception of francophone Africa was strongly endorsed throughout the cold war by American policy makers who recognized Africa as a "special European responsibility," just as European nations were expected to recognize "our [U.S.] responsibility in Latin America."[14] Indeed, American policy makers perceived France as the only European power with both the long-term political will and the requisite military force capable of thwarting communist powers from exploiting instability, prompting some analysts to refer to France as Washington's de facto *gendarme* (policeman) in francophone Africa.[15]

This complementary cold war regime did not mean that competition and even conflict would not surface in French-American relations, but rather that such conflict would remain at acceptable levels and very rarely surface in public. Especially during the early years of African independence, there existed an undercurrent of argument among American policy makers that the United States should provide francophone Africa with an alternative to complete alignment with France, though not one really intended to remove the shield that kept much of the region separated from the socialist bloc. The United States, for example, to a degree that irritated the French, provided some aid and succor to Guinea when the regime of Sékou Touré was cut off from France.[16] Divergences also appeared over the African-Marxist orientation of several francophone countries, most notably Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, and Madagascar, which France viewed more indulgently than the United States.[17] The most noteworthy case of French-American tensions was the U.S. intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa; formerly Zaire). It is aptly documented in the memoirs of Jacques Foccart, the architect of French-African relations under the de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou administrations, who explained that French policy makers often privately equated the potential U.S. threat to francophone Africa with that posed by the former Soviet Union; in the extreme, they depicted the United States as the primary long-term threat to French interests. According to Foccart, Washington's successful efforts in 1965 to place in power the pro-United States Mobutu Sese

[13] Guy Martin, "Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33 (March 1995):1–20.

[14] George Ball, *The Disciples of Power* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).

[15] Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moïsi, "French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle Against Destabilization," *International Security* 3 (Spring 1979): 108–33.

[16] See an account by the former U.S. Ambassador William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

[17] See M. Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), esp. chaps. 2 and 5.

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Seko facilitated the penetration of "Anglo-Saxon influence" into the largest country of francophone Africa, and therefore constituted a clear "victory" for the United States at the expense of French interests.[18] Despite general French misgivings over America's true intentions in francophone Africa, Washington's explicit, publicly-stated acceptance of France's *chasse gardée* nonetheless ensured that Congo-Kinshasa and other, more minor cases constituted exceptions within a complementary cold war regime in which U.S.–French tensions remained at manageable levels and rarely surfaced in public.

American and French policies toward francophone Africa were also complementary in terms of what has been referred to as their "creative ambiguity" concerning the normative goal of promoting democracy.[19] In the case of France, French policy makers sought to spread French culture with the same ideological fervor with which American policy makers sought to prevent the spread of communism. Consequently, when francophone countries tried to renounce their special relationship with France, as Guinea did in 1958 when it voted against the creation of a revised French community of states, French retribution was swift: all aid to Guinea was abruptly cut off by an angry de Gaulle.[20] But as long as these countries maintained strong support for *la francophonie* and close ties with France, even authoritarian leaders were unlikely to find themselves under heavy pressure from Paris to democratize. For example, when asked why France did not militarily intervene when David Dacko, the democratically elected president of the Central African Republic, was overthrown in a military coup d'état in 1966, Foccart replied that the new leader, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, "after all was a very pro-French military man."[21] Similar contradictions were evident in Washington's often-stated preference for democracy in Africa and perceived national security interests. Whenever the ideal of democracy clashed with the national security objective of containing communism, containment often prevailed at the expense of democracy. For this reason both Democratic and Republican administrations were willing to downplay the internal shortcomings of a variety of U.S. allies, such as Ethiopia's Haile Selassie, Somalia's Siad Barre, Congo-Kinshasa's Mobutu Sese Seko, and a host of Afrikaner regimes in South Africa in favor of their strong support for U.S. anticommunist policies.[22]

[18] Jacques Foccart with Philippe Gaillard, *Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard*, 2 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1995, 1997); and Pierre Péan, *L'Homme de l'ombre: Eléments d'enquête autour de Jacques Foccart, l'homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la Ve République* (Paris: Fayard, 1990).

[19] Guy Martin, "Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations" in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

[20] Robert Bourgi, *Le Général de Gaulle et l'Afrique noire: 1940–69* (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1980).

[21] Foccart, *Foccart Parle*, vol. 1.

[22] Michael Clough, *Free at Last? U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 76–100.

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Neither France nor the United States, however, pursued monolithic Africa policies during the cold war era that could be characterized by a rigid centralization or uniformity. The historic lack of interest in Africa at the White House level typically ensured the de facto delegation during noncrisis periods of policy formulation and implementation to the bureaucracies of the executive branch and disparate portions of Congress. This typically led to the existence of numerous, often contradictory Africa policies.[23] In France, where the African continent enjoyed a much greater degree of importance among French presidents and Africa policies therefore presumably enjoyed a greater degree of coordination, a wide variety of actors, most notably Foccart's *Cellule Africaine* (Africa Unit) within the *Elysée*, the Ministry of Cooperation, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs competed for foreign-policy influence.[24] Francophone Africa's special place in French foreign policy-making circles nonetheless ensured that policies toward this region would enjoy a high level of presidential attention and coordination to be envied by other regional specialists within the French foreign policy-making establishment and their Africanist counterparts within the U.S. government. The simple reason for such high-level interest was that France's privileged role in francophone Africa essentially ensured its continued claim to great-power status.

## Emergence of Economic Competition during the Cold Peace

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end of the complementary cold war regime and its gradual replacement with a new competitive international environment in which French and American policies increasingly are being driven by the same factor: economic self-interest. The African economic stakes of this post-cold war economic competition are substantial. The slow, secular decline over time in the economic importance of Africa to the French economy has not mitigated the fact that this region (France's second largest market after Europe) in 1998 absorbed $15.9 billion of French exports, accounting for 40 percent of France's trade surplus.[25] The continuing importance of francophone Africa in French economic calculations is demonstrated by the fact that the franc zone countries of West and Central Africa (including the Comoros) absorb nearly 50 percent of all French exports to Africa ($7.5 billion).[26] The economic stakes are also important for the United States, despite

[23] Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. chap. 2.

[24] Marie-Christine Kessler, *La politique étrangère de la France: Acteurs et processus* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1999). See also Stephen Smith and Antoine Glaser, *Ces messieurs Afrique: Le Paris-Village du continent noir* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1992); and Stephen Smith and Antoine Glaser, *Ces messieurs Afrique 2: Des réseaux aux lobbies* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1997).

[25] Marchal, "La nouvelle politique africaine," 2.

[26] Ibid.

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some initial post-cold war analyses that emphasized the lack of U.S. economic interests in Africa.[27] As argued by Susan E. Rice, Clinton's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, in the State Department's budget request to Congress for fiscal year 2000, U.S. exports to Africa have grown significantly since the cold war's end to $6.2 billion in 1997. This exceeds U.S. exports to the countries of the former Soviet Union by 20 percent.[28] U.S. direct investment, most notably in the petroleum and mining fields, totaled $7.1 billion during that same year, yielding a 22 percent return on investment.[29] One of the cornerstones of the Clinton administration's economic initiatives for Africa has been to increase America's market share in Africa from 7 percent in 1997 to nearly 10 percent ($10 billion) in 2002, with an important portion of this increase expected to be achieved as a result of growing U.S. market influence in francophone Africa—the only truly protected African market of the cold war era.[30]

A turning point occurred in the complementary cold war regime when the French foreign policy-making establishment had to come to grips with an intensifying economic crisis on the African continent at the end of the 1980s, which created rising pressures for change within the carefully crafted web of economic ties that bound the French economy to those of francophone Africa.[31] With many of their clients on the verge of financial bankruptcy, French policy makers initially decided to undertake an economic bail-out that entailed massive increases in foreign aid. French aid increased from the already substantial level of $3.7 billion in 1980-1982 to $8.2 billion in 1990-1992—a nearly 120 percent increase during a ten-year period. Once it became clear that the short-term bail-outs were insufficient and that projected aid levels were beyond France's fiscal capabilities, French policy makers took the extraordinary step in January 1994 of devaluing the CFA franc by 50 percent. The decision not surprisingly sent shock waves throughout francophone Africa, which had never before suffered a devaluation; it clearly signaled that France's commitment to the cultural imperative of *la francophonie* no longer took precedence over the pursuit of economic self-interest in an increasingly competitive, post-cold war world.

The growing importance of economic factors in French foreign policy toward Africa coincided with France's determination to strengthen and expand its influence beyond *la francophonie.* This trend was nicely captured by the 1996 Franco-African summit held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which signaled a shift in France's relationships with both francophone and nonfrancophone Africa. The summit was attended by a record forty-five countries, including twenty-six heads-of-state, in essence functioning as a surrogate Organization

[27] For example, see Clough, *Free at Last?*

[28] U.S. State Department, *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations (Fiscal Year 2000)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], February 1999), 2.

[29] Ibid., 2–3.

[30] Ibid., 3.

[31] Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

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of African Unity (OAU). Attendees represented all the colonial heritages of the African continent, signaling the broadening of the Franco-African summit beyond its original francophone organizers, whose first official meeting was held in 1973 in Paris. The Chirac administration was especially pleased with the first-time attendance of Nigeria, which was represented by General Sani Abacha. The broadening scope of the Franco-African summit reflects what could be characterized as the Chirac administration's triple strategy of enhancing links with the three major anglophone powers of Africa: Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya.[32] In each case, French foreign policy is primarily driven by the pursuit of the economic self-interests of trade and investment. French policy makers also downplay the importance of human rights issues, as demonstrated by France's close relationship with the authoritarian Kenyan regime of Daniel arap Moi. Precisely because of its neomercantilist conception of bilateral relations within the anglophone world, France finally established close ties with the authoritarian military government of Nigeria prior to its democratic transition in 1999. This development only became possible after the death in December 1993 of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the former president of the Côte d'Ivoire, who viewed Nigeria as a regional threat. France intends to be a player in such promising spots as South Africa, even if this means ceding a certain degree of competitive advantage in francophone Africa.[33]

In the United States, the end of the cold war fostered the decline of ideologically-based policies in favor of the pursuit of trade and investment. The cornerstone of this new approach was the Clinton administration's aggressive pursuit of winning trade and investment market shares for U.S. companies in all regions of the world, while simultaneously deemphasizing the role of foreign aid as the privileged economic tool of foreign policy.[34]

In the case of Africa, the Clinton administration's new foreign policy theme of "trade not aid" initially constituted more of a default policy than one driven by the calculated pursuit of economic self-interest. In a political system in which aid in general is increasingly subject to criticism and regions of greater perceived interest, most notably the Middle East and the former Soviet bloc countries of Russia and Eastern Europe, receive the lion's share of a declining foreign aid budget, it should come as no surprise that U.S. aid to Africa, which had started on a downward trend during the Reagan and Bush administrations, continued to decline under the Clinton administration. Africa as a whole received $7.3 billion in U.S. aid during the three-year period of 1983–1985, but

[32] Peter J. Schraeder, "France and the Great Game in Africa," *Current History* 96 (May 1997): 211.

[33] Chris Alden and Jean-Pascal Daloz, eds., *Paris, Pretoria and the African Continent: The International Relations of States and Societies in Transition* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Daniel C. Bach, ed., *La France et l'Afrique du Sud: Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains* (Paris: Karthala, 1990).

[34] James M. Scott, "Trade and Tradeoffs: The Clinton Administration and the Big Emerging Markets' Strategy," *Futures Research Quarterly* 13 (1997): 37–66. See also Jeffrey E. Garten, *The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our Lives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

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this figure declined to $5.6 billion in 1989–1991 and $4.4 billion in 1992–1994. The figures for francophone Africa are particularly striking. They peaked at $1.9 billion for the three-year period of 1989–1991, but they declined to nearly $1.2 billion in 1992–1994. The Clinton administration nonetheless unveiled in 1996 America's first formal trade policy for aggressively pursuing new markets throughout Africa, including francophone areas, suggesting the beginning of a more pro-active trade policy to match those already in place for other regions of the world.[35]

The launching of the Clinton administration's long-awaited trade policy, which included the creation of an interagency Africa Trade and Development Coordinating Group jointly chaired by the National Economic Council (NEC) and the National Security Council (NSC), represented a significant departure from the cold war tendency to defer to European economic interests in their former colonies. This policy was preceded by the launching in 1992 of a series of highly publicized speeches rejecting Washington's past support for France's privileged role in francophone Africa in favor of a more aggressive approach to promoting U.S. trade and investment. "The African market is open to everyone," explained former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen in a 1995 speech in Libreville, Gabon, explicitly designed to denounce the concept of a *chasse gardée.* "We must accept free and fair competition, equality between all actors."[36] The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, envisioned to stimulate U.S. investment and trade, continues to serve as an important component of this economic strategy. A revised version of this act passed both the House and the Senate, although powerful domestic criticism, most notably within the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and the largely southern-based U.S. textile industry, still questions the degree to which this legislation will be actively applied to the African continent. American officials nonetheless increasingly agree that foreign policy should serve as the facilitator of U.S. private enterprise in all regions of the world, including francophone Africa.

This more aggressive business policy is especially highlighted by the Clinton administration's willingness to participate in a variety of high-profile regional events, such as the African/African-American Summit. Originally conceived by the Reverend Leon Sullivan as a vehicle for strengthening cultural ties between African Americans and Africans, the summit has evolved into a burgeoning forum for encouraging trade and investment between the United States and Africa. The inaugural summit was held in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire (1991); followed by summits in Libreville, Gabon (1993); Dakar, Senegal (1995); Harare, Zimbabwe (1997); and Accra, Ghana (1999). The most recent meetings have attracted more than three thousand participants, including increasing numbers

[35] U.S. Department of Commerce, "A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa. A Report Submitted by the President of the United States to the Congress," (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1996).

[36] Quoted in Henri Vernet, "La potion libérale de l'oncle Sam," *Jeune Afrique*, 9–15 March 1995.

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of African heads-of-state and notable African-American politicians, such as two-time presidential candidate Reverend Jesse Jackson and Coretta Scott King. The official U.S. trade and investment exhibition at the summit has also dramatically expanded since initial and limited U.S. government involvement in the first summit; and more recently it has been dedicated to the memory of Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, who took initiative in building U.S.–African relations before he died in a plane crash in Bosnia in 1995.

An important theme of this article is that it is precisely due to these ongoing changes in the foreign policy regime of the cold war era that we are witnessing the rise of U.S.–French competition and conflict in francophone Africa. Specifically, the decline of complementary yet different foreign policy interests in favor of the common driving force of economic interest has ensured rising conflict in a variety of economic sectors. In the eyes of French policy makers, the penetration of American and other Western companies constitutes "at best an intrusion" and "at worst an aggression" into France's *chasse gardée.* The seriousness with which this issue is treated at the highest levels of the French policy-making establishment was demonstrated at the beginning of the 1990s by the public admission of Minister of Cooperation Michel Roussin that a series of meetings had been held on how best to "defend" French interests, including those within the economic realm, against those of the United States.[37]

Intense competition between the government of the Congo-Brazzaville, Elf-Aquitaine (the French oil corporation), and Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy), a U.S.–based oil company, serves as an excellent example of the potential future stakes involved in rising U.S.–French economic competition.[38] Desperately in need of nearly $200 million to pay government salaries prior to the holding of rapidly advancing legislative elections, newly elected President Pascal Lissouba "naturally turned for help to Elf-Aquitaine (which controls 80 percent of the country's oil production)."[39] When its French manager refused to approve either a $300 million loan or "a request for a $300 million mortgage on the future production of three promising new off-shore oil deposits," Lissouba initiated secret negotiations with the U.S.–based Oxy. The net outcome was a signed agreement — ultimately renounced eight months later by the Lissouba administration due to "intense French pressure"—which resulted in a cash payment of $150 million in return for 75 million barrels of oil originally promised to Elf-Aquitaine.[40] Not surprisingly, France in 1997 backed the anti-government forces of former President Denis Sassou Nguesso in a devastating four-month civil conflict that destroyed the capital and led to Nguesso's emergence as the new leader of Congo-Brazzaville.

[37] Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, *L'Afrique sans Africains: Le rêve blanc du continent noir* (Paris: Editions Stock, 1994), 187.

[38] Martin, "Francophone Africa," 180–81.

[39] Ibid., 180.

[40] Ibid., 181.

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U.S.–French competition in the highly lucrative petroleum industry is not limited to Congo-Brazzaville. In the case of Benin, for example, the democratic alternation of power between the administration of Nicéphore Soglo (1991-1996) and Mathieu Kérékou (1996-present) coincided with rising U.S.–French competition over the right to explore for offshore oil reserves.[41] The fact that President Kérékou emerged victorious in the 1996 elections with French assistance against the American-backed Soglo led some to assume that a French company (in this case, Elf-Aquitaine) would be favored over its primary American competitor (The Bettis Group from Dallas, Texas). The contract, however, was awarded to the American company. In Senegal, the administration of President Abdou Diouf in 1995 was able to withstand intense French pressures to maintain the preferential treatment awarded to French petroleum companies under his predecessor (President Léopold Sédar Senghor), subsequently signing a contract with a consortium of South African and American petroleum companies to exploit newly discovered oil fields off Senegal's southwestern coast.[42] The actions of both the Kérékou and Diouf administrations are not unique, but rather indicative of a more competitive foreign policy environment in which francophone African leaders are less reflexive to French foreign policy interests.[43]

An important aspect of burgeoning U.S.–French competition is the willingness of local U.S. ambassadors to serve as advocates for business—in essence mirroring the activities of their local French counterparts and constituting a return to the pre-cold war era when U.S. diplomatic missions were more concerned with promoting economic linkages.[44] A new breed of diplomat has increasingly made the promotion of U.S. trade and investment an important component of U.S. embassy activities in the host country. Numerous examples stand out: Ambassador Mark Johnson facilitated the spread of U.S. internet and related computer technology to Senegal; Ambassador William A. Dameron III successfully pushed for the strengthening of U.S. petroleum interests into Côte d'Ivoire; and Ambassador Hume A. Horan aided the growing involvement of U.S. mining interests in Mali. "In the past the U.S. government was not as willing to serve as an advocate for business, and as a result Americans were here in name only, at least as concerns trade and investment," explained one private businessperson whose words captured the essence of America's changing economic vision of the African continent. "This definitely has changed under the Clinton administration—they most notably aided us by

[41] John R. Heilbrunn, "The Flea on Nigeria's Back: The Foreign Policy of Benin" in Stephen Wright, ed., *African Foreign Policies* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 43–65.

[42] Peter J. Schraeder with Nefertiti Gaye, "Senegal's Foreign Policy: Challenges of Democratization and Marginalization," *African Affairs* 96 (October 1997): 485–508.

[43] Howard W. French, "West Africa's New Oil Barons: Equatorial Guinea Joins the Region's Bonanza," *New York Times*, 7 March 1998.

[44] For an historical overview, see Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The United States and Africa: A History* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

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helping to keep the local playing field level from the often unfair economic practices of our competitors, and working with and facilitating our access to key government officials interested in what we could bring."[45] This comment is indicative of a changing U.S. Foreign Service that has elevated the role of economics in the training and mandate given to its ambassadors in all regions of the world, including francophone Africa.

## Impact of Democratization during the Cold Peace

The end of the cold war raised expectations that the Western democracies could make the promotion of democracy and human rights the cornerstones of a new international regime that would be consistently applied to all regions of the world, including francophone Africa. Scholars, activists, and policy makers in both the United States and France increasingly coalesced around the concept of making political democratization a precondition for the improvement of economic and political relations with Paris and Washington. However, the success of African democratic reform movements in seeking an end to single-party rule signaled the beginning of a process that threatened the essence of France's carefully crafted francophone network: the potential replacement of staunchly pro-French, undemocratic elites with opposition candidates less enamored with France and more sympathetic to seeking closer ties with other northern industrialized democracies.[46]

To the surprise of many, President François Mitterrand initially embraced these democratization movements in a much-quoted speech at the 1990 Franco-African Summit held in La Baule, France; he warned his counterparts in francophone Africa that future French aid would be contingent on their willingness to promote true democratic change. What became known as the La Baule Doctrine suggested that the promotion of democracy would become the new hallmark of French foreign policy. Bold rhetoric was obviated by the reality of ongoing foreign aid programs designed to keep pro-French elites in power.[47] In the case of Cameroon, French aid to the authoritarian regime of President Paul Biya expanded from $159 million in 1990 to $436 million in 1992—the year of the country's first multiparty presidential elections. The primary reason for the dramatic increase in French aid was to ensure Biya's victory, especially as the most popular opposition candidate was John Fru Ndi, an

[45] Author's interview carried out in 1996 in Gaborone, Botswana, with Michael A. Weaver, manager of plant operations for Owens-Corning in Botswana.

[46] John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier, eds., *Political Reform in Francophone Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997). See also Jean-Pascal Daloz, ed., *Le (non-)renouvellement des élites en Afrique subsaharienne* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999); and *L'Afrique politique 1999: Entre transitions et conflits* (Paris: Karthala, 1999).

[47] Agir Ici et Survie, *La France à Biarritz: Mise en examen de la politique africaine de la France* (Paris: Karthala, 1995). See also Jean-François Bayart, *La politique Africaine de François Mitterrand* (Paris: Karthala, 1984).

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anglophone politician perceived as a threat to French interests in Cameroon.[48] Any misunderstandings generated by earlier French rhetoric were resolved at the 1992 Franco-African summit held in Libreville, Gabon. At this meeting, French Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy stated that when confronted with the potentially conflicting goals of promoting democracy, ensuring development, and maintaining security, francophone African leaders were expected to adopt the following order of priorities: above all, security, followed by development and, finally, democratization.[49]

The election of Jacques Chirac as president of France in May 1995 coincided with an increasingly turbulent period in French foreign policy toward francophone Africa.[50] The growing contradictions in French support for democratization were shown by the Chirac administration's response to a 1996 coup d'état in Niger—the first against a democratically elected government in France's former colonies since the beginning of the democratization process in 1990. (The first coup against a democratically elected francophone leader actually took place in the former Belgian colony of Burundi, where Pierre Buyoya assumed power in 1996.) Despite a 1995 commitment by Minister of Cooperation Jacques Godfrain that France would intervene to reinstate a democratically elected government if a defense treaty had been signed with that country, France refused to intervene in Niger and ultimately decided to work with the military regime headed by Colonel Ibrahim Maïnassara Baré.[51] Not surprisingly, the democratically elected francophone neighbors of Niger were worried by French inaction. In a throwback to an earlier era of authoritarian rule and highly questionable democratic practices, Colonel Baré announced that there would be multiparty elections in 1996, presented himself as the candidate of the ruling party, and subsequently won the elections to the congratulatory toasts of local French diplomats.

U.S. diplomats on average have been more vocal than their French counterparts in their support for the democratization process throughout francophone Africa. This vocal stance is not due to a greater American commitment to promoting democracy in Africa. There is abundant evidence of ongoing contradictions between Washington's pro-democracy rhetoric and concrete actions within the foreign policy realm. For example, punitive measures designed to enforce pro-democracy rhetoric are at best unevenly applied, depending on the perceived importance of the African country. The Clinton administration was quick to enforce comprehensive economic sanctions against the ministate of Gambia when that country's military took power in a coup in 1994, but it re-

[48] Agir Ici et Survie, *France Cameroun: Croisement dangereux!* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996).

[49] Glaser and Smith, *L'Afrique sans Africains.*

[50] Roland Marchal, "La France en quête d'une politique Africaine?" *Politique Etrangère*, no. 4 (Winter 1995/96): 903–16. See also Agir Ici et Survie, *Jacques Chirac et la Françafrique: Retour à la case Foccart?* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995).

[51] Howard W. French, "France's Army Keeps Grip in African Ex-Colonies," *New York Times*, 22 May 1996.

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fused to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against the military dictatorship of Nigeria that would have affected U.S. access to Nigerian oil, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. The United States did impose a variety of more limited sanctions, such as the suspension of military cooperation.

The unusually vocal stances of American diplomats in francophone Africa are at least partially the result of a self-interested calculation that the United States has little to lose and everything to gain by excoriating pro-French elites who impede the transition to a new political order. The logic of diplomatic competition at the local level is based on perceptions of the democratization process as a zero-sum game—that is, one country's gain is another's loss. From the perspective of local U.S. ambassadors, for example, promoting multiparty democracy is a low-cost strategy with potentially high returns—namely, the replacement of pro-French elites with new leaders potentially more sensitive to U.S. interests. From the perspective of local French ambassadors, the reverse holds true, which explains why French policy makers often tend to emerge as protectors of the status quo. In the case of Benin, for example, President Nicéphore Soglo's victory in the first presidential elections to be held after his country's transition to democracy in 1991 led to the formation of an administration less dependent on France and more interested in promoting closer foreign policy ties with the United States.[52] It is precisely for this reason, argue critics of French policies in Africa, that local French diplomats provided significant support to Soglo's authoritarian predecessor, Mathieu Kérékou, who emerged victorious in the 1996 presidential elections. Although he ultimately accepted the 1996 election results, Soglo remained sharply critical of the "northern countries" (read "France"), who he at least partially blamed for his defeat at the hands of Benin's former dictator of nineteen years. Regardless of France's ultimate role in the 1996 presidential elections, however, Kérékou's reemergence did not signal a return to the same Beninois-French relationship that existed prior to 1991. The strengthening of several competing institutional actors, most notably a vibrant national assembly, has contributed to growing pluralism in Beninois foreign policy.

Other cases highlight the importance of the alternation of power in potentially realigning the foreign policy relationships of francophone African countries. In Mali, Benin's closest francophone African competitor for the most democratic country, the 1992 election of President Alpha Oumar Konaré witnessed the emergence to power of a new elite more sympathetic to restricting traditional ties with France in favor of the United States. When the newly elected French President Jacques Chirac requested that French West African leaders meet with him in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal as part of his first presidential visit to the African continent in July 1995, Konaré refused to make the trip on the principle that Chirac's itinerary implied an unacceptable hierarchy in

[52] Emmanuel V. Adjovi, *Une élection libre en Afrique: La présidentielle du Bénin (1996)* (Paris: Karthala, 1998).

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France's relationships with French West African countries. In Senegal, Diouf's accession to the presidency in 1981 was followed by the gradual relaxation and diversification of his predecessor's staunchly pro-French foreign policy.[53] Even in Côte d'Ivoire, as of January 2000 ruled by a military regime headed by General Robert Gueï, some observers predicted that the planned return to multiparty democracy could result in the election to the presidency of Allasane Ouattara, former deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This possibility initially caused some consternation in French foreign policy circles, not least of all due to the fact that France had de facto supported the authoritarian policies of the Henri Konan Bédié administration (1994–1999), including its declaration of the illegality of Ouattara's quest to run as an opposition candidate in presidential elections. General Gueï, who increasingly appears to be setting the stage for his own presidential bid, has deliberately distanced himself from France while simultaneously questioning the fitness of several potential rivals, most notably Ouattara. The military coup carried out by General Gueï served as a poignant reminder that the process of regime change—regardless of whether carried out by the barrel of the gun or the ballot box—entails significant risks for France's very carefully crafted francophone African network.

The very public war of words between the U.S. State Department and the French Ministry of Cooperation that peaked during fall 1996 served as a potent manifestation of this diplomatic competition. A turning point occurred when Minister of Cooperation Godfrain chided Secretary of State Warren Christopher for his decision to make his first (and last) official visit to Africa approximately four years after assuming office and literally weeks before the U.S. presidential elections of November 1996. Christopher responded to the perceived diplomatic slight by demanding an official apology. When none was forthcoming, he publicly criticized French policy: "All nations must cooperate, not compete, if we are going to make a positive difference in Africa's future," explained Christopher. "The time has passed when Africa could be carved into spheres of influence, or when outside powers could view whole groups of states as their private domain."[54] Not to be outdone, Godfrain responded in kind: "If I were a political or electoral counselor to President Bill Clinton, I would advise him to worry more about helping African development after the elections."[55]

The Christopher-Godfrain spat was not unique, but rather indicative of a growing political competition rooted in economic changes taking place in francophone Africa's foreign economic relationships. French diplomats increasingly characterize the United States as a hyper-power that is either unwilling or unable (or both) to establish a coherent foreign strategy that matches words with deeds; this leads to American countercharges of French paranoia over los-

[53] Schraeder, "Senegal's Foreign Policy," 1997.

[54] French, "U.S. and French Sniping Heats Up Over Paris's Links to Africa."

[55] Ibid.

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ing their privileged position in francophone Africa. French policy makers were particularly critical of President Clinton's presidential visit to the African continent in 1998 as typical of the rhetoric of a hyper-power that did not result in sufficient concrete measures in its aftermath. Especially in the case of Clinton's apology in Rwanda for Western inaction about the unfolding of genocide in that country, French policy makers are quick to note that the Clinton administration's opposition to a French-inspired military operation sealed the fate of thousands of Rwandan citizens. These critics argue that the Clinton administration's attempts at controlling the policies of others (in this case, France) while at the same time failing to offer a viable alternative captured the essence of America's new role as a hyper-power in the post-cold war era.[56]

## Debates over Conflict Resolution and Foreign Intervention

The emergence of new security challenges, such as the growing numbers of "collapsed states"[57] beset by ethnic, religious, and political rivalries, has fostered renewed international debate over the desirability of foreign intervention in Africa and has contributed to rising U.S.–French tensions. The American response to these security challenges was sharply influenced by U.S. military intervention in Somalia under the auspices of Operation Restore Hope, most notably after eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed and seventy-eight others were wounded in October 1993 in a fierce battle in Mogadishu, Somalia.[58] The Somali "debacle," as it came to be known, served as the cornerstone of May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), which not only rejected any future American involvement in UN-sponsored peace-making operations designed to militarily impose peace among warring parties, but ensured an overly cautious approach to ethnically- and religiously-based conflicts in Africa. When confronted in 1994 with rising popular demands for U.S. intervention in Rwanda, for example, the Clinton administration, fearful of being drawn into another Somalia, not only initially blocked the dispatch of 5,500 troops requested by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, but instructed administration spokespersons to avoid labelling the unfolding ethnic conflict as "genocide," lest such a label further inflame American public sympathy and demand American intervention as was the case in Somalia, or trigger American obligations under international treaties dealing with genocide and its prevention.[59]

The experience in Somalia also significantly affected the Clinton administration's approach to conflict resolution, most notably by resolving a debate

[56] Bourmaud, "The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Paris."

[57] I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

[58] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).

[59] Douglas Jehl, "Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings 'Genocide,'" *New York Times*, 10 June 1994.

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between two currents of thought in the newly elected administration. The first emphasized the classic belief that African issues unnecessarily distract the administration and potentially plunge the White House into unwanted domestic political controversies. According to this viewpoint, American involvement, even in terms of conflict resolution, should be restricted to avoid entanglement in "future Somalias."[60] A second, more activist approach to conflict resolution was also derivative of the Somali experience but underscored that the massive costs associated with Operation Restore Hope could have been avoided by earlier preventive action. "The choice is not between intervening or not intervening," explained one policy maker in the incoming Clinton administration. "It is between getting involved early and doing it at a cheaper cost, or being forced to intervene in a massive, more costly way later."[61] As witnessed by the Clinton administration's cautious approach to the initial stages of the Rwandan conflict, the events of October 1993 in Somalia clearly strengthened the position of those warning against getting too closely involved in "intractable" conflicts in Africa.

In sharp contrast, France took the lead in undertaking a series of military interventions in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994.[62] The Mitterrand administration's decision to intervene was the manifestation of the long-term French goal of integrating the former Belgian colonies of the Great Lakes region into the French sphere of influence. Mitterrand's military interventions also fostered one of the rare examples of popular outrage in France regarding policy toward francophone Africa, especially when it was learned that the Mitterrand administration had provided the authoritarian regime of Major General Juvénal Habyarimana with over $160 million in economic aid and an untold amount of military aid from 1990 to 1994, essentially contributing to the genocide that unfolded in 1994.[63] An attempt on the part of the *Elysée* to rationalize military intervention in Rwanda as a humanitarian response to local suffering was dubious at best.[64] In reality, the Mitterrand administration's actions were aimed at stemming the invasion and steady advance begun in October 1990 by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a guerrilla army supported by Uganda and perceived by French policy makers as hostile to France and "under Anglo-Saxon influence."[65] From the perspective of several French policy makers, the RDF's

[60] Jim Cason and Bill Martin, "Clinton and Africa: Searching for a Post-Cold War Order," *Bulletin: Association of Concerned Africa Scholars*, nos. 38–39 (Winter 1993): 2.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

[63] Agir Ici et Survie, *Rwanda: Depuis le 7 avril 1994, la France choisit le camp du génocide* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995).

[64] Pascal Krop, *Le génocide Franco-Africain: Faut-il juger les Mitterrand?* (Paris: Editions Jean-Claude Lattès, 1994).

[65] Stephen Smith, "France-Rwanda: lévirat colonial et abandon dans la région des grands lacs" in André Guichaoua, ed., *Les Crises politiques au Burundi et Rwanda (1993–1994): Analyses, faits et documents* (Paris: Karthala, 1995), 452.

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military victory in 1994 constituted the first time that a francophone country had "fallen" to Anglo-Saxon influence. Some even perceived Rwanda as the beginning of a series of regional "dominos" that eventually could lead to Anglo-Saxon domination of portions of Central Africa to the "detriment" of France and *la francophonie.*[66] According to this culturally inspired fear, often referred to as France's *Fashoda,*[67] Central Africa could become a Trojan horse projecting Anglo-Saxon influence throughout the remainder of francophone Africa.

The dilemmas associated with French military intervention were demonstrated by the Chirac administration's response to the expansion of the regional crisis in the Great Lakes region, particularly the emergence and spread in 1997 of a guerrilla insurgency determined to overthrow the authoritarian regime of Mobutu Sese Seko.[68] French policy makers perceived the Great Lakes crisis in francophone-anglophone terms: the guerrilla insurgency in eastern Congo-Kinshasa was led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who in turn was strongly supported by and allied with the Rwandan government of Paul Kagame and the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni. As a result, the French considered Kabila's guerrilla movement to be under Anglo-Saxon influence and therefore hostile to France. The worst-case scenario envisioned by French policy makers occurred when Kabila's guerrilla army overthrew the Mobutu regime in May 1997 and installed a new government (with Kabila as president) strongly allied with Rwanda and Uganda, which in turn are closely allied with the United States. According to this vision, Kabila's emergence as the president of Zaire not only constituted a clear victory for Anglo-Saxon influence at the expense of *la francophonie*, but also raised the possibility that Congo-Kinshasa might serve as a potential springboard for the further spread of Anglo-Saxon influence throughout francophone Africa. This fear was dampened after Kabila had a political falling out with his former Rwandan and Ugandan allies, who subsequently launched a second guerrilla insurgency in 1998 designed to militarily overthrow the Kabila regime.

The Chirac administration's attempts at playing a more proactive military role in the Great Lakes region were restrained by a variety of factors, including the lack of interest among the other Great Powers to authorize a UN-sponsored, multilateral military force; the publicly stated promise of the Rwandan government and Kabila's guerrilla forces to militarily engage and inflict heavy casualties on French forces; and the French military's limited capability to move independently and sustain the large numbers of troops and equipment that would have been necessary for a long-term engagement in such a vast military theater. France's long-term military role in francophone Africa was most

[66] Glaser and Smith, *L'Afrique sans Africains*, 182–85.

[67] Ibid. See also Roger Glenn Brown, *Fashoda Reconsidered: The Impact of Domestic Politics on French Policy in Africa 1893–1898* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

[68] See the December 1997 special issue of *Politique Africaine* (no. 68), "Politiques internationales dans la région des Grands Lacs."

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dramatically affected, however, by the decision to restructure and downsize the French military that followed in the aftermath of Lionel Jospin's election as prime minister in 1997 and the emergence of a new government of cohabitation under Chirac's conservative political forces (which control the presidency) and Jospin's Socialist party and allies (which were responsible for forming a new government).[69] As part of this general reorganization, the decision was made to downsize the French military presence in francophone Africa and in such cases as the Central African Republic to eliminate French military bases completely. One notable outcome of this policy is that French army units will be rotated in and out of Africa on short assignments, ultimately decreasing the insularity of French officers who previously specialized in Africa, most notably within the French Foreign Legion.

The restructuring of French-African military relations is tied to a growing consensus over the long-term impracticality of direct French military intervention in Africa—a trend that is captured in ongoing debates within the French foreign policy-making establishment between the so-called *anciens* (the ancients), who favor activist measures (including direct military intervention) to maintain pro-French clients in power and the *modernes* (the moderns), who emphasize the need to move beyond France's interventionist past in its former colonies.[70] At least as far back as February 1994, when the CFA franc was devalued, moves have been afoot to isolate the old-line defenders of France's *chasse gardée* in francophone Africa. No case demonstrated the rising influence of the moderns better than Chirac's rejection of the use of military force to return Henri Konan Bédié to power in Côte d'Ivoire—one of the linchpins of French foreign policy in francophone Africa—after his regime had been overthrown in a December 1999 military coup and replaced with a military regime led by General Gueï. The position of several ancients, most notably Michel Dupuch, presidential adviser for African affairs, for the need to consider using French troops to reinstate Bédié in power was successfully rejected by the moderns in Paris.[71]

The irony of U.S.–French tensions over the Great Lakes region, particularly Congo-Kinshasa, was that the Clinton administration early on adopted a conservative policy approach that, similar to its predecessors, perceived Mobutu as both "part of the problem" and "part of the solution" to what was expected to become an increasingly violent political situation.[72] At the heart of

[69] Guy Martin, "France's Africa Policy in Transition: Disengagement and Redeployment," *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines* 34 (forthcoming 2000); and André Dumoulin, *La France militaire et l'Afrique: Coopération et interventions* (Brussels: Editions GRIP, 1997).

[70] Daniel Bourmaud, "Nouvelles tendances dans la politique africaine de la France: Réforme institutionnelle et processus de décision," *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines* 34 (forthcoming 2000).

[71] Valérie Thorin, "Veni, vidi. . .," *Jeune Afrique*, hors-série no. 2 (January 2000).

[72] Rene Lemarchand, "U.S. Policy in the Great Lakes: A Critical Perspective," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 26 (1998):41–46.

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the Clinton administration's conservative approach was the implicit acceptance of the "Mobutu or chaos" argument advanced by specialists in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA since Mobutu took power in 1965.[73] "Regardless of the fact that we are no longer faced with a communist threat," explained a foreign service officer (FSO) of the State Department, "the destabilization of Zaire [Congo-Kinshasa]—which borders nine other African countries—could have a tremendously negative impact on regional stability."[74] With the experiences of Somalia and Rwanda still fresh in the minds of most policy makers, the Clinton administration sought to tread softly as, according to another FSO, the situation in Congo-Kinshasa "could easily turn into a Somalia and a Rwanda rolled into one, although this time in one of Africa's largest and most populous nations."[75]

Unlike their French counterparts, however, the Clinton administration during spring 1997 adopted a relatively benign approach that neither actively sought to remove nor openly sought to strengthen the Mobutu regime. Most important, the Clinton administration sought to ensure close ties with Kabila's senior political and military aides. For example, Dennis Hawkins, a political officer working at the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa, spent the months of April and May stationed at Kabila's guerrilla headquarters.[76] In sharp contrast, the Chirac administration consistently provided the Mobutu regime with strong support that included covert military aid (complete with the hiring of Serbian, Belgian, and French mercenaries) designed to keep Mobutu in power.[77] As Foccart underscores in his memoirs, French policy was driven by Congo-Kinshasa's status as the largest and most populous country in francophone Africa and therefore as a linchpin to the continued strengthening of *la francophonie* and other French geopolitical interests. Congo-Kinshasa "has the means to be a regional power," concluded Foccart, and therefore "the long-term interest of France and its allies is evident."[78] As explained by Roland Marchal, a specialist of French foreign policy toward Africa, it is precisely for this reason that France "absurdly" supported Mobutu until the very end, in contrast to policies adopted by the other northern industrialized democracies. Subsequently France sought to strengthen ties with the Kabila regime, most notably in the aftermath of Kabila's falling out with his former Rwandan and Ugandan military patrons in 1998.[79]

The Clinton administration's hesitancy to become directly involved in African conflicts and the Chirac administration's recognition of the need to de-

[73] Michael G. Schatzberg, *Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire 1960–1990* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991).

[74] Quoted in Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa*, 107.

[75] Ibid.

[76] R. W. Apple, Jr., "U.S. Influence Over Zaire Now Appears to be Limited," *New York Times*, 17 May 1997.

[77] Raymond Bonner, "France Linked to Defense of Mobutu," *New York Times*, 2 May 1997.

[78] Foccart, *Foccart Parle*, vol. 1, 310.

[79] Marchal, "La nouvelle politique Africaine," 3.

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crease the French military presence in francophone Africa have led to military cooperation that stands in stark contrast to ongoing conflicts between the U.S. State Department and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The cornerstone of U.S.–French military cooperation, which also includes Great Britain, is the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a military aid program designed to train African armies in the art of peace-keeping and peace-making so that African countries can take the lead in resolving African conflicts. An earlier version of this initiative, the U.S.-promoted African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), was denounced by France as a unilateral measure that did not take into account French desires, as well as those of African countries that presumably would contribute troops. ACRI, however, has been based on the comparatively harmonious planning between the American, British, and French military establishments. Training is now going on, and there has been signal French-American cooperation in multinational military exercises like Guidimahka, which involved Senegalese, Malian, and Mauritanian troops, with French and American support units. While not without friction, this cooperation is based on the recognition of common French and American military interests, and the unwillingness (and/or inability) of both countries to commit major new public (especially military) resources to Africa.[80]

## Future Implications for African International Relations

Three trends associated with the emergence of the cold peace in francophone Africa have significant implications for the future of African international relations. First, the transformation of U.S. and French foreign policy interests clearly suggests that the beginning of the new millennium will be marked by intense economic competition that harkens back to the Great Game of the nineteenth century. The Great Game, also referred to as the Victorian prologue to the cold war and the Tournament of Shadows, involved intense imperial rivalry for the mastery of Central Asia and ultimately all regions of the non-European world.[81] As long as U.S. and French foreign policies were essentially driven by different foreign policy concerns—ideology for the U.S. and culture and economics for France—francophone Africa remained the chief beneficiary of a complementary cold war regime (1947–1989) in which U.S.–French relations tended to be balanced, cooperative, and predictable. In the cold peace aftermath of the cold war, however, U.S. and French policy makers increasingly find themselves at odds over their countries' common pursuit of the same foreign policy concern: economic self-interest.

The intensification of Great Power competition for economic markets is neither limited to francophone Africa nor the U.S.–French dimension of Afri-

[80] Martin, "France's Africa Policy in Transition."

[81] See, for example, Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, *Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia* (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 1999).

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can international relations. Japan and Germany have emerged at the beginning of the new millennium as two of the most important powers on the African continent after France and the United States.[82] Especially in the case of Japan, a generous African foreign aid program ($1.1 billion) second only to that of France ensured more than $5.5 billion in Japanese exports and $4.7 billion in Japanese imports from African markets in 1996. A close partnership between government and big business (*kanzai ittaishugi*) in the pursuit of business diplomacy (*minkan keizai gaiko*) has served as an essential ingredient of Japan's economic success. All Japanese government agencies, most notably the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), operate from the assumption that big business and diplomacy are both complementary and mutually reinforcing.[83] As symbolized by the 1995 decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to adopt a new logo—a red sphere for the Japanese rising sun and a blue sphere for the world, both of which are reaching out to each other—the Japanese foreign policy establishment is firmly committed to the extension of Japanese influence throughout the globe, including Africa.

Japan's increasing economic role in francophone Africa, where it has replaced the United States as the second largest foreign aid donor after France, similar to the rising economic role of Germany, has not attracted the same degree of French criticism or antagonism directed against their American counterparts. This is perhaps due to the fact that Japan, like Germany, is not perceived as imposing upon French cultural institutions and leadership, as is the case with the U.S.–supported African/African-American summits. Another reason might be that Japan is not a competitor in the extremely lucrative and jealously guarded petroleum industry in francophone Africa. Japanese gains in the telecommunications and automobile industries in francophone Africa nonetheless have underscored Japan's movement away from its past role as purchaser of primary products in favor of greater penetration of traditional French markets. Japan's increasing financial success in francophone Africa has led some within the French policy-making establishment to criticize the rising economic influence and anglophone proclivities of what is sometimes referred to as America's Asian protégé.[84]

The process of democratization is a second important trend of the cold peace that has significantly affected African international relations. The inevitable result of free and fair elections in francophone Africa has been the rise to power of a new generation of elites less willing to accept the privileged pro-

[82] Peter J. Schraeder, "Japan's Quest for Influence in Africa," *Current History* 98 (May 1999): 232–35.

[83] Jun Morikawa, *Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1997).

[84] Peter J. Schraeder, "From Berlin 1884 to 1989: Foreign Assistance and French, American, and Japanese Competition in Francophone Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33 (December 1995): 539–67.

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French ties enjoyed and permitted by their predecessors. These same elites are often more inclined to take advantage of the highly competitive international environment of the cold peace to seek closer economic and political ties with the United States and other industrialized democracies. Precisely for this reason French policy makers view with suspicion Washington's rhetoric in favor of democratization. The democratization process itself has unwittingly contributed to the intensification of U.S.–French conflict in francophone Africa.

Democratization is not the only process through which newly emergent elites have taken advantage of rising Great Power competition in Africa. A series of successful guerrilla insurgencies has fostered the rise of a new bloc of African leaders that includes Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda.[85] Successful in their pursuit of power primarily because of their control over strong, disciplined, and battle-tested guerrilla armies, this new generation of elites shares a commitment to create "responsive and accountable" (but not necessarily democratic) governments that significantly reorder the foreign policy relationships pursued by their predecessors.[86] This new bloc has become enmeshed in rising U.S.–French tensions due to the tendency of its leaders to remain "suspicious of anything that comes from abroad, especially from France," while at the same time seeking to curry special favor with the U.S. policy-making establishment.[87] For this reason France has denounced the Kagame regime and its allies in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda as the Anglo-Saxon pawns of the United States and other northern industrialized democracies, most notably Japan, which use the English language as a medium of international business.

A final trend of the cold peace is the rising tendency of African countries to militarily intervene in their neighbors against the backdrop of declining military intervention on the part of the Great Powers. One decade after the cold war's end, Africa's new bloc of leaders and other regional military powers, such as Nigeria and South Africa, are becoming the new power brokers of African international relations. The validity of this trend is highlighted by several examples: cooperative efforts among Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda (at least prior to the outbreak of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict) to undermine Sudan's Islamist regime; Rwandan military involvement in Kabila's 1997 guerrilla victory in Congo-Kinshasa; South Africa's military intervention in neighboring Lesotho in 1998; and Nigeria's military intervention in Sierra Leone to restore the democratically elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who was returned to power in March 1998.

The most dramatic example of this new trend is the continuing military conflict in Congo-Kinshasa, which foreign observers now commonly refer to as Af-

[85] Don Connell and Frank Smyth, "Africa's New Bloc," *Foreign Affairs* 77 (March/April 1998): 80–94. See also Marina Ottaway, *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

[86] Ibid., 88–89.

[87] Ibid.

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rica's First World War because of the introduction of ground troops by at least five foreign countries (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). In sharp contrast to Great Power conflict in the region during the 1960s, however, when the United States launched a series of very aggressive covert and overt military operations to counter the spread of perceived radical influences within the region, the dawn of the new millennium has witnessed the Clinton administration's determination to employ its UN Security Council veto to block the dispatch of any UN-sponsored force that includes peace-making in its mandate. This is a clear signal that the United States and other Great Powers are either unwilling or perceive themselves as unable to impose peace in this vast politico-military arena. Peace, according to this vision, can only emerge from the evolving regional military balances of power and the politicomilitary and economic interests of regional actors. In short, the United States and the other Great Powers can only serve as the "facilitators" of an outcome that must be based first and foremost on regional realities and interests.[88]

Unfortunately, as both external and local powers continue to manipulate the new realities of the cold peace, it is highly likely that undemocratic governments will tend to persist. While the patrons of these regimes—be they French, American, or African—may espouse the rhetoric of democratization, they more likely than not will continue to subordinate the ideal of democratic reform to policies designed to advance their own political and economic agendas. Africa, having provided a battlefield for the cold war, provides another for world and regional powers competing for economic and political influence at the beginning of the new millennium.*

[88] Donald Rothchild, "The Clinton Administration and Ethnic Conflict Management: Limits of Intervention in a Partially Autonomous Africa," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 26 (1998): 41–46.

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# From Republican Virtue to Technology of Political Power: Three Episodes of Czech Nonpolitical Politics

AVIEZER TUCKER, KAREL JAKEŠ, MARIAN KIŠŠ, IVANA KUPCOVÁ, IVO LOSMAN, DAVID ONDRAČKA, JAN OUTLÝ, VĚRA STÝSKALÍKOVÁ

One of the defining properties of totalitarianism is the encroaching expansion of the political realm to suppress, destroy, and abolish the realm of civil society, composed of voluntary autonomous associations, private exchanges, and institutions. In civil society, autonomous individuals and communities may coexist in peace, protected by the rule of law.[1] Communist totalitarianism did not tolerate the existence of any independent organizations between the state and the family. To achieve total control, the communist state had to politicize and ideologize all aspects of life. The Marxist-Leninist ideology that was used initially to mobilize popular support for the ruling dictatorship devolved since the 1950s into a meaningless ritual in which few believed, but all acted out of fear and hypocrisy. Communist totalitarianism created a total separation between what politicians did and how they described and justified their actions.

East European dissidents reacted to their totalitarian environment by attempting not just to resurrect civil society from its ashes, but also to expand it to abolish the political realm. Instead of the politicization of life, dissidents

[1] John Gray, "Totalitarianism, Reform, and Civil Society" in Ellen Frankel Paul, ed., *Totalitarianism at the Crossroads* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1990), 97–142; Zbigniew Rau, "Four Stages of One Path Out of Socialism" in ibid, 143–169; Jacques Rupnik, "Totalitarianism Revisited" in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988), 263–289.

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hoped to depoliticize politics and abolish ideology. This doctrine was called "antipolitics" (Joseph Konrád and Adam Michnik) or "nonpolitical politics" (Václav Havel). Many Central European intellectuals, especially dissidents, sought to return to a pre-enlightenment, or even pre-Machiavellian politics founded on morality and virtue rather than on the technology of power. This civil antipolitical, political theory was dominant in virtually all East-Central European dissident circles during the 1970s and part of the 1980s, partly to unite dissidents who had radically different political opinions and partly in the hope of avoiding a backlash from the secret police.[2]

By the second half of the 1980s, Hungarian and Polish dissidents were quickly transforming themselves into politicians. The slow reforming trend in Hungary and Poland allowed dissidents to adapt slowly to the emerging conditions of greater freedoms and looming parliamentary democracy. In Hungary, political parties were already permitted in the late 1980s. The negotiations with the Communist party were conducted there by party representatives. In Poland, though Solidarity still conducted much of the roundtable negotiations, groups within Solidarity were already forming as protoparties according to their position in relation to the Right-Left, Catholic-secular poles during the late 1980s. Former dissidents like Michnik, who did not join a political party, found themselves out of politics. Only in Czechoslovakia, nonpolitical politics lasted well into the transition process.[3] Partly, this was a lingering effect of the conservative and repressive nature of the Czechoslovak communist regime. Political parties were impossible before November 1989, and they needed time to evolve later. But partly it also reflected sincere nontactical convictions among many dissidents that party politics should be avoided if possible and be replaced by some kind of civil community guided by personal responsibility.

It is possible to distinguish three periods of theorization and experimentation with nonpolitical politics in the Czech context. First, Václav Havel's theorization of the concept in his 1978 essay, "The Power of the Powerless," corre-

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in Olomouc, Czech Republic, during 1997–1998. Marian Kišš and David Ondračka continue their graduate studies at the Central European University in Budapest.

[2] George Konrád, *Antipolitics*, trans. Richard E. Allen (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984); Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*, trans., Maya Latynski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); T. G. Ash, "Does Central Europe Exist?" *New York Review of Books*, October 1986, 45–52; T. A. Rowland and S. A. Rowland, "Contemporary Central European Reflections on Civic Virtue," *History of European Ideas* 21 (Fall 1995): 505–513; Gideon Baker, "The Changing Idea of Civil Society: Models from the Polish Democratic Opposition," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 3 (Summer 1998): 125–145. On various other forms of antipolitics, see Andreas Schedler, ed., *The End of Politics? Explorations into Modern Antipolitics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

[3] Knud Erik Jørgensen, "The End of Anti-Politics in Central Europe" in Paul G. Lewis, ed., *Democracy and Civil Society in Eastern Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 49–55; John Michael, "The Intellectual in Uncivil Society: Michnik, Poland, and Community" *Telos* 88 (Summer 1991): 141–154; Jon Elster, ed., *The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

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sponded with the practice of Charter 77 dissidents—about 2,000 Czechs and Slovaks who signed the declaration that called upon the government to respect the final act of the 1975 Helsinki convention on human rights. Second, following the November 1989 revolution, Czechoslovakia was ruled by a coalition of two civil nonpolitical movements, the Czech Civil Forum (OF in Czech acronym) and its Slovak sister organization, Public Against Violence. This experiment lasted little more than a year until February 1991, when OF split. Havel made a final attempt at technocratic nonpolitical politics from November 1997 to June 1998.

Though each of these experiments was labeled nonpolitical politics, they refer to different practices. Common to all three attempts is the rejection of what Czechs call *stranickost*, derived from *strana* (party). *Stranickost* should be translated literally as partyism, in parallel use to nationalism, an ideology and social practice that values the political party highly and justifies its existence and practices. *Stranickost*, which we translate henceforth as partisanship, has bad connotations in the Czech language, just as "party" and "faction" always had bad connotation in the American Federalist papers. But in each of the three episodes of nonpolitical politics, the partisanship under attack had somewhat different properties, and the nonpolitical alternative differed as well.

The Czech experiments with nonpolitical politics bear certain basic similarities to American Republicanism in its late eighteenth century sense, despite the different philosophical backgrounds and political contexts: aversion to political parties and partisanship; belief in the inherent virtue of the citizen as the foundation of politics; and a certain aversion to modernity. A comparison of the emergence of political parties in Czechoslovakia in 1991 and in the United States 200 years earlier may explain why all modern mass societies develop political parties.

We follow the three Czech experiments with nonpolitical politics and attempt to understand them critically in their theoretical, political, and practical contexts. Finally, we add a few comments on the Czech party-parliamentary system in the wake of the failure of the third episode of nonpolitical politics.

## Dissident Nonpolitical Politics

Following the crisis of identity and direction that followed the founding of the dissident movement of Charter 77 and the death of its leader, Jan Patočka, Václav Havel wrote in 1978 *The Power of the Powerless*, a seminal text that made the case for a nonpolitical dissident movement.[4] Havel identified partisanship with universalized properties of the Communist Party, most notably anonymity, automatism, and irresponsibility. Havel's understanding of political parties was influenced by the writing of the exiled Czech-Italian philosopher,

[4] H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 19–123.

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Václav Bělohradský. Havel was "extraordinarily taken" with his *The Crisis of the Eschatology of the Impersonal*.[5] Bělohradsky's inspiration came from Martin Heidegger's claim that cybernetics replaced philosophy in the modern world, Hannah Arendt's account of the banality of evil, and the philosophy of history of Jan Patočka. He claimed that the eschatology of European rationality is impersonality. The bureaucracy serves and embodies this eschatology. Bělohradský, and following him Havel, conceived the modern state as a cybernetic entity, governed by anonymous, faceless bureaucrats who rule a multitude of atomized and alienated individuals living an inauthentic existence. However, the nameless, depersonalized bureaucrats are not controlling the system to whose survival they contribute, because the system has acquired a self-momentum of itself, an autonomous automatism. The automatism and autonomy of the technological age are not restricted to the relations between machines and men, but dominate also the relations between social-bureaucratic systems and humanity.

The automatism of modern political systems, their anonymity, leads to a loss of personal moral responsibility and the ethical dimension of society. Havel conceived of Western democracies as different in means from Communist states, rather than in their moral essence. Both are the victims of the automatism of technological civilization and its loss of moral responsibility.[6] In Havel's opinion, the crisis of the modern technological world was even more acute in the Western world, since it was better hidden than in the East, through manipulative, professionally-run political parties, secret and sophisticated methods of capital accumulation, and advertisement.

In 1978, Havel considered the restoration of parliamentary democracy as merely an appropriate transitional solution to restore a sense of civil awareness, renew democratic discussion, allow political plurality, and basic expression of the aims of life. But Havel also claimed that clinging to tried and tested parliamentary democracy is "shortsighted." Havel wished to go "beyond" parliamentary democracy to an existential revolution and a restoration of a relation between human beings and the "order of being." Postrevolutionary social structures should be held together by communality rather than by expansionist mentality directed outward. The new structures can and must be "open, dynamic and small," so that their members will not lose the dimension of personal responsibility. The new structures "would be . . . . not in the sense of organizations or institutions, but like a community" whose authority is not based on tradition or power, but on their relevance for the solution of a certain problem. Havel wished social organizations to appear and disappear spontaneously according to the needs of the moment. The value underlying such organizations

[5] Václav Havel, *Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvížďala*, trans. Paul Wilson (New York: Knopf, 1990), 165; Václav Bělohradský, *Přirozený svět jako politický problém: Eseje o člověku pozdní doby* [1978] (Praha: Československý spisovatel, 1991), 61–125.

[6] Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," trans P. Wilson in Jan Vladislav, ed., *Václav Havel or Living In Truth* (London: Erasmus Foundation, 1986), 116ff.

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should be "mutual confidence," not the mistrust of the "collective irresponsibility" characterizing the "classic impotence" of traditional democratic organizations.[7]

Havel wished to reverse the totalitarian expansion of the state beyond its proper boundaries to overtake civil society and expand it beyond its traditional boundaries to overtake the state. Instead of political parties, Havel preferred unaffiliated individuals as candidates to preserve the responsibility of public officials. Parties should not participate in politics, because they are bureaucratic, corrupt, and undemocratic. Instead of parties, Havel wanted independent clubs or associations of free individuals for specific causes, like the associations of dissidents.[8]

Havel's concept of nonpolitical politics was useful in uniting dissidents who had little in common politically beyond their objection to the communist regime. Though it did not matter to the communist regime, the nonpolitical self-definition of Charter 77 kept it within the law, such as it was, which did not permit political associations outside the communist dominated National Front. Under the conditions of communist oppression, it was not very practical to attempt to start a political opposition. Only few signatories of Charter 77 advocated the transformation of the movement into a structured organization with clear political goals. The large majority of Charter 77 signatories upheld the original 1977 nonpolitical character and methods of the movement until the 1989 revolution and beyond.[9]

Irrespective of its metaphysical foundations, the philosophy underlying Havel's antipartisanship bears striking resemblance to some American Republican themes. Like Republicans such as Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine, Havel held that the nature of people is good and virtuous, and they are corrupted by political institutions. Havel acknowledged that subjects of communist regimes were corrupted by participating in constructing their social environment, by ideology, and by a general crisis of metaphysics in modernity. But his solution was existential-personal rather than political-institutional. Like the Republicans, Havel held that good government is founded on good people and not good institutions.[10]

Like most of the founders of the United States, Havel objected to political parties, though when James Madison and George Washington rejected political parties, they had in mind the destruction of the Roman Republic, while Havel was theorizing on the practice of the Communist party. Madison and Washington were worried that parties might lead to violent civil strife and oppression

[7] Ibid., 116–117. Also see Václav Havel, *Letters to Olga*, ed. Jan Lopatka, trans. Paul Wilson, (London: Faber & Faber, 1990), letter nos. 129–137.

[8] Havel, *Disturbing the Peace*, 16–17.

[9] Skilling, *Charter 77*, 63–84, 180–185; Janusz Bugajski, *Czechoslovakia: Charter 77's Decade of Dissent* (New York: Praeger, 1987), 40–41.

[10] John Zvesper, *Political Philosophy and Rhetoric: A Study of the Origins of American Party Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 87–131.

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of minorities as in the late Roman Republic. As Madison put it: "By faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."[11] Washington cautioned against the baneful effects of party politics that lead to cycles of oppression and revenge and to the collapse of democracy as people seek a despot to halt the instability. Party serves "to distract the Public Councils and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms: kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions."[12] Political parties were in their opinion guided by passion or interest, but never by reason. Neither Madison nor Washington nor Havel could imagine political parties that aspire for the public good, although the three have different visions of it or of the proper means to achieve it.

Havel's wish to replace the government with civil society is most similar to Paine's ideas in *The Rights of Man.* Paine perceived Republican government as Havel conceived a return of parliamentary democracy, a temporary remedial measure to restore lost virtue, "the natural dignity of man," before the reconstructed community can move to the next stage that will make government increasingly redundant.[13] Like Paine, Havel left most of the details of the post-revolutionary period out of his analysis, since "the essence of such a 'post-democracy' is also that it can only develop *via facti*, as a process deriving directly from *life*, from a new atmosphere and a new 'spirit.'"[14] When the revolution finally came, life had to fill in the details as well as find the holes in the scheme.

## The Nonpolitical Politics of Civil Forum

In several countries in Central-East Europe, nonpolitical movements that represented society in negotiations with the Communist party led the transition from communism. In the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, *Občanské Forum* emerged spontaneously following the student demonstration on 17 November 1989. The leadership of Charter 77 held court at the Laterna Magika theater in Prague and was directing from there the protests and demonstrations that eventually brought down the communist regime. Interested nondissident figures, mostly from the professional "gray zone," joined them to form OF. A similar movement, Public Against Violence, emerged in Slovakia, where Charter

[11] James Madison (Publius), *The Federalist,* No. 10.

[12] George Washington, "Farewell Address," (http://xroads.virginia.edu/~DRBR/gw-bye.html). [Accessed April 1999.]

[13] Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man* (London: Penguin, 1976).

[14] Havel, *The Power of the Powerless*, 119–120. (Emphasis in original.)

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77 had hardly any presence. OF satisfied several of Havel's prescriptions for nonpolitical politics: it emerged spontaneously; it was clearly a civil movement rather than a political organization, because it had no bureaucracy or hierarchic structure; individuals became leaders of OF on the basis of their personal character, skills, and background; and OF had no anonymous party functionaries and no ideology. The main differences between OF and Havel's earlier vision of existential revolution were metaphysical and moral. Havel had hoped that following a metaphysical revolution, people would become decent, responsible, and moral, and create civil organizations that would reflect their character and abolish the party-political realm. The Velvet Revolution was a political revolution, not an existential transformation. The individuals who joined OF at its inception were not transformed responsible and virtuous citizens. OF attracted a good many opportunists who perceived a chance for upward mobility. But at this early stage, it was easy to overlook these problems and revel in the resurrection of civil society after forty years of totalitarian oppression.

It is clear that during the first euphoric months after the Velvet Revolution, Havel did not revise his advocacy of nonpolitical politics. Stephen B. Cohen reported following an early 1990 visit to Czechoslovakia that Havel objected to political parties: "Favoring what he calls 'nonpolitical politics,' the President wants citizens to vote directly for individual candidates." These views were echoed by Jana Petrová, a Civic Forum member of the Federal Assembly (who became years later the spokeswoman of Prime Minister Václav Klaus and left politics in 1998): "When the West found out we overthrew the communists, they thought we'd embrace the American system. But we want neither Communism, nor American Capitalism, but a third way. Social justice, a market economy and the nonpolitical parties of Havel. When the West finally understands, it will be surprised and perhaps inspired by us."[15]

The first democratic elections in June 1990 were designed to legitimize the transfer of power from the Communist party to OF and Public against Violence. These elections had the character of a popular referendum to legitimize the Velvet Revolution. For that purpose, the elections were proportional rather than majoritarian. Though a majoritarian system as in the U.S. Congress or the British Parliament is nearer to Havel's ideal of nonpolitical politics, Havel supported the proportional system in the 1990 elections to prevent the Communists from claiming that they were silenced by a majoritarian system.[16] Still, OF

[15] Stephen B. Cohen, "Czeching Murdoch," *The Nation*, 12 March 1990, 333; Aviezer Tucker, "Václav Havel's Heideggerianism," *Telos*, no. 85 (1990): 63–78; Aviezer Tucker, "Waiting for Meciar, review of Tim D. Whipple, ed., *After the Velvet Revolution: Václav Havel and the Leaders of Czechoslovakia Speak Out*," *Telos*, no. 94 (1992–1993): 167–182.

[16] Proportional representation did not prevent the Communists from protesting anyway that the elections were "undemocratic" and designed to silence them. For the views of a former officer of the Communist Czechoslovak Secret Service on Czech democracy, see Oskar Krejči, *History of Elections in Bohemia and Moravia* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs CDXXXIII); a review by Aviezer Tucker in *Europe-Asia Studies* 5 (July 1998): 915–918.

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and Public Against Violence, as civil movements without ideology or hierarchy, fulfilled Havel's ideal of nonpolitical politics. Apart from the Communist party, the other parliamentary parties represented identities rather than programs or ideologies: Catholic parties were successful in both the Czech and Slovak halves of the federation; regional Moravian, Slovak nationalist, and Hungarian ethnic parties were successful in their respective regions of the federation.[17]

Following the victory of OF in the June 1990 elections, Václav Bělohradský, whose early philosophy inspired Havel's early concept of nonpolitical politics, differentiated between a change of regime and a change in government. A regime defines the rules according to which governments change. OF was a movement for a change of regime; as such it could not become a government. The supporters of nonpolitical politics are intellectuals and artists who wish to question the rules of the political game but do not wish to govern themselves. The nonpolitical politics and politicians of OF entrenched the new regime, but they could not participate in it, or there would be no difference between regime and government.[18]

Bělohradský's analysis was vindicated when OF needed to make controversial decisions on policy. Journalists criticized the leadership of OF—Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart and federal Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier—for indecision, inability to agree on many issues, and lack of effort to explain clearly their policy once they agreed on it. In the opinion of the journalist Jiří Hanák, it resulted from hanging on to the tradition of nonpolitical politics. The leadership squandered the mandate it had received through its victory in the first postcommunist elections.[19] Economic reform created the first serious rift within OF between those who supported Finance Minister Klaus's plan to end subsidies and liberalize prices, those who favored a more moderate plan, those who favored maintaining the status quo, and those who wished to return to 1968-style experimentation with a new kind of socialism. Klaus's supporters became the right-wing of OF, while the rest became the center and the left.

The Congress of Civil Forum on 13 October 1990 was convened to elect new leaders and approve a new program and a proposal to redefine OF as a political party with a vertical or hierarchical structure. Before the October 1990 congress, OF had no membership system or structure. By the 1990 congress, a club of OF members of parliament who supported Finance Minister Klaus's policy of radical economic reforms was established. OF member Miloš Zeman (who later became the leader of the Social-Democratic party and since the summer of 1998 is the prime-minister of the Czech Republic) suggested before the congress that OF be divided into right, center, and left wings. This broad coalition continues the political plurality of the dissident movement of Charter 77 that had been forced by external circumstances. Zeman held in 1990 that OF

[17] Eric Stein, *Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 87–88.

[18] Václav Bělohradský, "O politice politicko-antipolitické," *Lidové noviny*, 29 November 1990.

[19] Jiří Hanák, "Konec starých časů," *Lidové noviny*, 15 October 1990.

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would survive only if it transformed itself into a party of the liberal center. A centrist party may have left and right factions, but they would be united by few basic common principles that could keep these factions together.[20] MP Jana Petrová also supported the transformation of OF into a centrist party with some kind of hierarchy and a clearer policy, though she still wished to avoid partisanship.[21]

On 13 October 1990, the congress of OF elected its new leader. The three leading candidates were: Václav Klaus, who was then finance minister; Martin Palouš, a former Charter 77 spokesperson and then deputy foreign minister; and Pavel Rychetsky (who is today one of the leaders of the Social-Democratic party). Palouš represented the centrist, civil, nonideological, decentralized approach of OF leadership and President Havel. Klaus represented the attempt to politicize OF by transforming it from a grassroots protest movement and an umbrella group of anticommunists to a political party with a hierarchy and clear direction in favor of radical economic reforms. Before the elections, Rychetsky bowed out to improve Palouš's chances against the challenge of Klaus. Nevertheless, Klaus won 115 votes to Palouš's 52.[22] This represented a defeat for the former dissident leadership of OF and their ideals of nonpolitical politics.

After his election as the leader of OF, Klaus outlined his policies in a press conference. He intended to define clearly the policy goals of OF, take the umbrella of OF away from some of the political groups that had been under it previously, and strengthen the organizational structure of OF.[23] Klaus's first initiative in that direction on 31 October 1990 was the expulsion by the Council of OF of members of two left-wing clubs within OF, *Obroda* (Revival) and *Levá alternativa* (Left Alternative). Klaus defended this decision against criticisms that it broke the November 1989 unity of OF by claiming that it was impossible to reach decisions in a nonstructured quasi-coalition as OF had been. It was unrealistic in his opinion to expect a civil initiative to last. Short-term civil initiatives could not be a basis for a stable political structure of society under normal conditions.[24]

Klaus's opponents within OF created in December 1990 *Meziparlamentní občanské společenství* (Interparliamentary Civil Association) within OF to maintain the centrist broad civil character of the movement. The leading members of this anti-Klaus club were Rudolf Battěk (a leading Charter 77 dissident who represented the independent socialist stream of dissidents), Pavel Dostál

[20] Miloš Zeman, "Ta naše pravice česká," *Lidové noviny*, 2 October 1990.

[21] Jana Petrová, "Kde je politický střed," *Lidové noviny*, 11 October 1990.

[22] *Lidové noviny*, 15 October 1990.

[23] Ibid., 20 October 1990.

[24] Rudolf Zeman and Vladimír Mlynář, "Jsem člověk konzervativní" (an interview with Klaus), ibid., 2 November 1990. Klaus's distrust of civil initiatives and belief that "the people" should leave political decisions to better qualified and informed leaders like himself has a "federalist" ring to it. Although it relates to his early attempts to reform radically the economy and the later corruption of his political party, both required a passive civil society.

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(a theatre director who later joined the Social-Democrats and is today the minister of culture), Zdeněk Jičínský (a former Charter 77 dissident who would later join the Social-Democrats), Valtr Komárek (an economist who had been Klaus's boss in the Economic Prognostics Institute a year earlier and would later become a Social-Democrat), Vlasta Parkánová (who would later join the ideologically libertarian Civic Democratic Alliance party and become a minister of justice and today is a member of the Christian-Democratic party), Jana Petrová, Petr Uhl (a former leading Charter 77 dissident and an admirer of Leon Trotsky who later became head of the Czechoslovak News Agency and editor of the daily *Právo*), and Miloš Zeman. They wished to defend the original, nonpolitical character of OF. Their shared formula was: "Economic reform is a means to prosperity and not vice-versa!"[25]

Jiří Dienstbier, a former Charter 77 dissident and political prisoner and a former communist, who was Czechoslovakia's foreign minister at the time, continued to support nonpolitical politics. A united OF was necessary in his opinion to achieve reform and establish democracy. OF gained its popularity in the elections because it was able to overcome personal and group interests and appeal to a broad electorate of citizens with different opinions. He called for mutual tolerance among the members of OF.[26] Miloš Zeman held that OF's shift to the right made its transformation into a political party impossible. In his opinion, if OF transformed itself into a party, it would split into two parties, one on the right and one in the center, while those on the left would join the Social-Democratic party. At that stage, Zeman clearly linked his fortunes with the liberal center rather than with the Social-Democratic Left that he would join later. He suggested keeping OF together until the 1992 elections while parties were forming within it.[27] This opinion was echoed by Jan Sokol (a former Charter 77 dissident who later ran unsuccessfully for parliament and Senate on the Christian-Democratic ticket and was appointed education minister in Havel's technocratic government of 1997–1998). Sokol also thought that OF should remain united at least until the 1992 elections. It could have two leaders in the meanwhile and have more than one list of candidates competing in future elections.[28] Sokol did not elaborate on his novel concept of a united political party that has two heads and separate lists in elections.

There was almost a universal agreement in the press and among commentators that OF has to transform itself into a political party. The implementation of necessary economic reforms required party discipline to ensure a parliamentary majority. Consequently on 12 January 1991, OF Congress voted 175 to 126 to become a political party. The main opposition to the transformation of OF into a party came from President Havel, who called for preservation of the non-

[25] *Lidové noviny*, 1 November 1990.
[26] Jiří Dienstbier, "Rozcestí Občanského fora," ibid., 29 December 1990.
[27] Miloš Zeman, "Skončil čas hájení," ibid., 29 December 1990.
[28] "Pravidla jsou jasná," (report on a press conference with Sokol), ibid., 22 December 1990.

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political pluralistic nature of OF, albeit with greater discipline and stronger leadership.[29]

Klaus attempted then to introduce a series of economic reforms that appeared at the time to risk high social cost. Those members of OF who were not ready to shoulder the responsibility for potentially unpopular economic measures or could not tolerate Klaus's somewhat authoritarian leadership and had their own ambitions, split OF on 25 February 1991. The "right wing"of Klaus loyalists formed the Civil Democratic Party (ODS in Czech acronym) which had its founding congress on 20–21 April 1991. The nonpolitical centrists formed the Civil Movement (OH in Czech acronym) led by the Czech prime minister, former Charter 77 dissident and former communist, Petr Pithart; Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier; and his deputy, Martin Palouš. Other members of OH were former members of the Liberal Club of OF who later became members of the Social-Democratic party (Rychetský, Jičínský, Komárek). OH had its founding congress on 27 April 1991. A third offspring of OF was the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA in Czech acronym) that had an explicit Libertarian ideology. The new parties formed an uncomfortable coalition until the June 1992 elections.

The OH referred at the beginning of its program to Civic Forum: "The Civic Movement wishes to pursue the basic aims of Civic Forum. . . ." The ODS, by contrast, began its program by claiming that it "aims to transform Czechoslovakia into a modern European state based on civil society." OH attempted to continue Charter 77 and Havel's tradition of politics without politicians, of nonideological politics: "Politics is not understood by the Civic Movement as a technocratic mechanism of power. . . . The Civic Movement calls for dialogue and cooperation with the democratic right and the democratic left."

During the internal struggles in OF, President Havel remained mostly on the sidelines. In October 1990, he said that it would be good if OF could continue united until the June 1992 elections, though he did not consider it crucially important. He did not care if there were one bloc or two or three parties. He cared only that they should cooperate with each other in a nonpartisan spirit, because political organizations are not as important as the individuals who compose them.[30] In an interview he gave in December 1990, Havel said that he had expected the transformation of OF into political parties even before the June 1990 elections. Vladimír Mlynář and Jaroslav Veis, who conducted the interview, reacted in disbelief, recalling that he supported the nonpolitical character of OF much longer. Havel answered that he was explaining the concept of nonpolitical politics, rather than defending it. The journalists recounted then

[29] Jana Šmídová and Jaroslav Veis, "OF: Hnutí stranou," ibid., 14 January 1991; Stein, *Czecho/Slovakia*, 88–91.

[30] Alexander Kramer, "Svět je veliké drama," (an interview with Havel) *Lidové noviny*, 1 October 1990.

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his older dissident philosophy of life in truth and nonpolitical politics. Havel answered that he did his best to follow his ideals.[31]

In *Summer Meditations*, written in the summer of 1991, Havel moderated his earlier radical opinion by reinterpreting his earlier positions: "The political parties occasionally accuse me of being against political parties. That of course is nonsense. . . . One of the most sophisticated kinds of association—and at the same time an integral part of modern democracy and an expression of its plurality of opinion—is association in political parties. It would be difficult to imagine a democratic society working without them. . . . So—obviously—I am not against political parties; if I were, I would be against democracy itself. I am simply against the dictatorship of partisanship. . . ."[32]

Yet, five years earlier Havel claimed that: "It would make more sense if . . . people rather than political parties were elected (that is, if people could be elected without party affiliation). Politicians would solicit the support of the electors as individuals in their own right, not merely as appendages to the mega-machinery of parties or as party favorites. . . . Parties should not take direct part in elections, nor should they be allowed to give anyone, *a priori*, the crutches of power. In other words, they should not participate directly in power, since when they do they inevitably become bureaucratic, corrupt, and undemocratic."[33]

Instead of his earlier aversion to all political parties, Havel wanted in 1991 to limit their loyalty to their partisan interests at the expense of the public good by adopting a new electoral system. Havel preferred a majority electoral system to a proportional representation system. According to the majority system, people would vote for a specific person rather than for a party list where beyond the first names on the list, most of the candidates were publicly unknown. To prevent the total elimination of small parties from parliament, Havel suggested an interpretation of the German electoral system according to which two thirds of the parliament would be elected by a majority system, while the other third would be elected proportionally.

In late 1991, President Havel attempted to prevent the looming split of the Czech and Slovak Federation by extraparliamentary means. He called for public demonstrations and presented the federal parliament with several bills, including ones that would have allowed referenda, expanded the authority of the president to dissolve parliament, allowed the president to enact decrees, and changed the election system to a revised majority system as outlined in *Summer Meditations*. The deputies simply rejected all of Havel's proposals, mostly because they were clearly against their own institutional interests. Havel had no political party to represent him and only OH even to be sympathetic to him.[34]

[31] Vladimír Mlynář and Jaroslav Veis, "Snazší by bylo o politice psát," ibid., 7 December 1990.

[32] Václav Havel, *Summer Meditations*, trans. Paul Wilson (New York: Knopf, 1992), 53.

[33] Havel, *Disturbing the Peace*, 16–17.

[34] Stein, *Czecho/Slovakia*, 139–145. For a general explanatory framework of constitution making, see Jon Elster, "Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process" *Duke Law Journal* 45 (November 1995): 364–396.

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As a result of difficulties in adapting the old dissident politics to the changing political circumstances, administrative incompetence, indecisive economic policy, and policy toward Slovak separatism, and without Havel's popular leadership, the Civic Movement, the political party whose policy was the nearest to nonpolitical politics, did not pass the 5 percent threshold in the 1992 Czech elections.

Usually, a chief executive cannot influence the decisions of the legislature and the policy of the government without a sympathetic political party in parliament. An exception has to be made when the political scene is fragmented among several roughly equal political parties. The president may then use his power to tip the political balance and maneuver between the political parties. Czechoslovakia's founder and first president, Tomáš G. Masaryk, was able to divide and rule a fragmented political scene during most of the First Republic (1918–1938), when parties representing ethnic, religious, ideological, and sectoral groups and interests found it difficult to create and maintain coalitions.[35] But Havel did not enjoy in 1991–1992 the fragmented political scene that Masaryk manipulated. Havel wanted a presidential regime without accepting the means of presidential democracy.

The elected leaders of the Czech and Slovak parts of the binational federation, Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar, negotiated the breakup of the federation without popular referendum or a clear public mandate. Once it became obvious that Havel could not prevent the impending end of Czechoslovakia, he resigned in late 1992 as the last Czechoslovak president. It was obvious that Havel would become the first president of the Czech Republic after its founding on 1 January 1993. Havel had no influence over the split of Czechoslovakia and the December 1992 constitution of the Czech Republic that defined the responsibilities of the president. Fearing Havel's ambitions, Klaus's ODS legislated that the president be elected by both houses of parliament, rather than directly by the Czechs, as Havel wished. ODS further curtailed presidential authorities when compared with those defined in the 1920 constitution of the first Czechoslovak Republic: Havel's authority to dissolve the parliament was severely limited, and his power to recall ministers was revoked as was his right to initiate legislation. The president did retain the constitutional authority to appoint the prime minister, because it appeared ceremonial until the political crisis of 1997.[36]

There are some interesting similarities between the birth of Czech party politics in 1991 and a similar process two centuries earlier in the United States. The Federalists, like OF, were not a political party. Their sole purpose was the establishment of a new regime; they had no plans to outlast the ratification of

[35] Victor S. Mamatey, "The Development of Czechoslovak Democracy 1920–1938" in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža, eds., *A History Of The Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 99–166.

[36] Stein, *Czecho/Slovakia*, 288–290.

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the constitution.[37] Madison, like Havel, realized that it was impossible to eliminate the causes for the emergence of parties, especially economic interests, without creating a cure worse than the disease—the abolition of freedom of association. Madison believed, though, that representative democracy in a large enough mass society would make the emergence of political parties unlikely,[38] just as Havel believed in the summer of 1991 that a revised majoritarian election system might mitigate against the worst effects of partisanship. Madison himself later became one of the founders of the Democratic-Republican party. Madison, unlike Havel, realized that he must join a political party to implement his antipolitical policies. Havel's resigned approach to the emergence of political parties is reminiscent of Washington's recognition that the emergence of the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans was inevitable, though he never became a partisan politician. Like Havel, Washington thought that principles, cooperation for the common good, and gentlemanly agreements should mitigate the baneful effects of partisanship.[39]

As in the Czech case, the first rift within Congress that led to the emergence of political parties in 1790–1791 was over economic issues, commercial policies, foreign trade and protectionism, the national bank, public debt, and taxation.[40] Once the Republican party was organized with the support of Madison, he also acknowledged that some kinds of partisanship were acceptable and not related to brute interests and passions. Madison distinguished "natural" parties that do not violate the rights of minorities from bad factions. Similar statements were articulated by Monroe and Jefferson.[41] Unlike Havel, the Republican leaders were able to revise their earlier positions and found a political party to try to implement their ideas of the public good. Havel may resemble in that respect George Washington, a state founder who refused to join a party.

## Technocratic Nonpolitical Politics, 1997–1998

From the founding of the Czech Republic in 1993 until the political crisis of November 1997, Havel continued occasionally to express his mistrust of parties and specialists and support for civil initiatives. He attempted to be a "popular tribune" above and against the parties.[42] Havel had neither understanding nor interest in economic matters; he left them to Prime Minister Klaus, as George Washington delegated economic decisions to Alexander Hamilton. Constitutional constraints on the presidency, the continued dominance of ODS in par-

[37] Zvesper, *Political Philosophy*, 39–40.

[38] *The Federalist*, No. 10.

[39] Matthew Spalding and Patrick J. Garrity, *A Sacred Union of Citizens: George Washington's Farewell Address and the American Character* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 74.

[40] Zvesper, *Political Philosophy*, 68–81.

[41] Ibid., 116–119, 155–157.

[42] Václav Havel, *Projevy 1992–1993* (Prague: Paseka, 1994), 174. See the special issue of the weekly *Týden* on Havel's sixtieth birthday, No. 40 (1996).

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liament, the hostility of Prime Minister Klaus to any presidential involvement in policy making, and the absence of permanent political allies in parliament made Havel's position nearly ceremonial.

In the meantime, the political parties and Czech voters moved in opposite directions. The party-political loyalties of Czech voters crystallized, influenced by class, values, declared values (what voters think their values are but which are not necessarily their values), expectations from the state, and feelings of anomie and alienation.[43] But as Czech voters crystallized their right-left political allegiances, the ideological commitments of political parties became increasingly insignificant as politicians became mired in corruption. The economic ministers of the coalition parties took massive kickbacks and bribes relating to privatization and decisions on economic policies such as indirect state subsidies and contracts with state-controlled industries. Some of these products of corruption were siphoned off to the political parties. Other funds, largely from inside trading, went into the private pockets of leading politicians. Though Klaus's government maintained the most libertarian ideology in Europe, in practice Czech reforms ground to a halt behind Poland and Hungary.[44] Eventually, the corruption of ODS led to its split into two parties and the collapse of Klaus's government in November 1997. The faction of ODS that brought down the government, headed by Interior Minister and former Charter 77 dissident Jan Ruml probably coordinated its tactics with President Havel. Havel objected in 1997 to the vanishing of virtue from politics, the inside trading, the corruption of the political and financial systems, and the end of reforms. His criticism is reminiscent of Jefferson's criticism of Hamilton's economic policy. The payment of the debts of states that were incurred during the war of independence was as uncontroversial as privatizing state property a couple of centuries later. Yet Jeffersonian Republicans accused Hamilton of serving the interests of wealthy speculators who bought the debt for bargain prices and of northern manufacturers for whose interests he proposed protectionist tariff against European competition. Jefferson accused Hamilton of dealing in inside information and practicing nepotism:

> . . . [S]ons, relations and friends of Senators, representatives, printers of other useful partisans Colonel Hamilton has provided among the hundred clerks of his department, the thousand excisemen, customhouse officers, loan officers etc. etc. etc.

[43] Petr Matějů and Klára Vlachová, "Values and Electoral Decisions in the Czech Republic" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31 (Spring 1998): 249–269; Petr Matejů & Klára Vlachová, "The Crystallization of Political Attitudes and the Political Spectrum in the Czech Republic" *Working Paper of the Research Project "Social Trends"* (Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic, September 1997).

[44] Aviezer Tucker, Jana Balharová, Ivo Losman, Jan Němec, Jan Němeček, David Ondračka, Zdeněk Polak, Roman Skýva, Martina Výrková and Marketa Zidková, "The Czech Transition: Politics before Economics" *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 22 (Fall 1997): 395–416; David Stark and László Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 153–165.

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> appointed by him, or at his nod, and spread over the Union; . . . the dealing out of Treasury-secrets among his friends in what time and measure he pleases, and who never slips an occasion of making friends with his means. . . .[45]

Similar themes were raised by president Václav Havel in his 9 December 1997 address to parliament:

> . . . power is again in the hands of untrustworthy figures whose primary concern is their personal advancement instead of the interests of the people. Many are convinced that honest business people fare badly while fraudulent nouveaux riches get the green light. The prevalent opinion is that it pays off in this country to lie and to steal; that many politicians and civil servants are corruptible; that political parties—though they all declare honest intentions in lofty words—are covertly manipulated by suspicious financial groupings. . . .
>
> Fascinated by our macro-economic data, we disregarded the fact that this data, sooner or later, reveals also that which lies beyond the macro-economic or technocratic perception of the world; . . . things like rules of the game; the rule of law; the moral order behind that system of rules, that is essential for making the rules work. . . . The declared ideal of success and profit was turned to ridicule because we allowed a situation in which the biggest success could be achieved by the most immoral ones, and the biggest profits could go to unpunishable thieves . . . morality decency, humility . . . respect for law, a culture of human relations . . . were relegated to the realm of the superstructure, and slightly derided as a mere "seasoning" of life—until we found there was nothing to season: the fundament had been tunnelled. . . .[46]

Following the resignation of the Klaus cabinet on 30 November 1997, President Havel faced a fragmented political scene. Of the seven parties in parliament, two were considered beyond the pale—the Communist party and the neo-fascist "Republican party." The coalition junior partners (the Christian Democrats and ODA) and the faction that split from ODS (later to form the Freedom Union Party) refused to be in a coalition with ODS, and the Social-Democrats could not reach a majority with the centrist Christian-Democrats and coalition with the right-wing members of parliament. Consequently, Havel was able to divide and rule the political parties. His ceremonial constitutional prerogative of appointing the prime minister suddenly became extremely important, because the political parties were unable to reach agreement by themselves on a candidate that would have a majority in parliament.

Havel proposed four nonpoliticians as possible candidates for prime minister for the political parties to choose from: Marián Čalfa, the last Communist prime minister of Czechoslovakia who cooperated with Havel on the transfer of power until the June 1990 elections and had been working as a consultant of the former secret police-controlled Chemapol corporation involved in the

[45] "Thomas Jefferson to President Washington, September 9, 1792" in Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., ed., *The Early Republic, 1789-1828* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), 36.

[46] Havel, Address to Parliament, 9 December 1997.

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import of oil and gas from Russia, arms dealing, and as it turns out, assassinations;[47] Josef Jařab, an independent senator and former rector of Palacký University in Olomouc; Jan Švejnar, a professor of economics from the University of Michigan who was disqualified because he is a U.S. citizen; and Josef Tošovský, the governor of the Czech National Bank, who was eventually accepted by the mainstream political parties with the exception of the Communists and "Republicans." The Tošovský government was composed partly of nonpolitical experts chosen by Havel and partly of center-right politicians who were not tainted by corruption.

Havel's critics accused him of resurrecting his old idea of nonpolitical politics. Miroslav Macek, a top ODS insider and former dentist, accused the former dissident of wishing to abolish political parties and rule from the Prague Castle as an elitist monarch. Macek rebutted Havel's claim that he was forced to intervene in politics and offer candidates for prime minister because the political parties were unable to agree among themselves. Macek said that Havel had been looking for an opportunity to weaken the power and influence of political parties.[48]

Havel's defenders came from the ranks of his fellow former dissidents: the philosopher Radim Palouš, a former Charter 77 dissident, former rector of Prague's Charles University, and father of Martin Palouš agreed with Havel that partisanship should be contained to create space where civil society might appear. The chairman of the Senate, former Prime Minister Petr Pithart, interpreted Havel's nonpolitical politics as attempting to create a strong, independent, and self-confident civil society, rather than a new regime. Pithart traced Havel's use of the term "nonpolitical politics" to the founders of the Czech national movement, Karel Havliček and Masaryk, who used the term to denote politics of decency, free of egoism, envy, and interpersonal enmity.[49]

Initially, it was unclear how long the technocratic nonpolitical government would last. Even after general elections were scheduled for June 1998, it was unclear whether political fragmentation would continue after the elections and lead to another presidentially-appointed nonpolitical government. Continued fragmentation could have led to a political system resembling the first Czechoslovak Republic, where President Masaryk had strong influence over the composition of most cabinets and in times of crises over the appointment of nonpolitical governments. The first 1920 democratically-elected Czechoslovak government had two Masaryk-appointed nonpolitical ministers, Edvard Beneš as foreign minister and Karel Engliš as finance minister. When this government collapsed as a result of a split in the Social Democratic party in September 1920, Masaryk appointed a nonpolitical government headed by Jan Černy, a bureaucrat, which lasted for a year. Edvard Beneš, who was the next prime minister

[47] *The Financial Times*, 23 November 1998, 2.

[48] Vladimír Dubsky, "Prezidentova vize má zastánce i odpůrce," *Lidové noviny*, 7 January 1998.

[49] Ibid. Pithart voiced these opinions in a conversation with students from the department of Politics and European Studies of Palacký University in Olomouc, 11 May 1998.

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in a political government was a nonpolitical protege of Masaryk. The main political parties reached an agreement on a political coalition government only in October 1922. In 1926, this political government collapsed, and Masaryk appointed again his nonpolitical allies, Beneš, Černy, and Engliš with a nonpolitical cabinet. Masaryk's political opponents from the National-Democratic and Agrarian parties accused him in 1926 of harboring autocratic aspirations to rule undemocratically through appointed officials who depended on him. Similar accusations were addressed to Havel during 1997–1998. Until 1932, Masaryk continued to intervene directly in the operation of the government by appointing and dismissing ministers at will.[50]

## Nonpolitical Politics in Czech Retrospective

The 1997 political crisis and Havel's intervention led to a renewed debate over nonpolitical politics, mostly in the pages of the weekend supplement *Orientace* (Orientation) of the quality morning daily newpaper, *Lidové noviny*. Two of Havel's oldest intellectual adversaries joined the fray—Bohumil Doležal and Emanuel Mandler. In the mid-1960s they cofounded the first independent magazine of literature, philosophy, and art, *Tvař* (Face), and quarreled consequently over its editorial direction.[51] Following the Soviet invasion, *Tvař* was shut down. In 1977, Doležal joined Havel as one of the first signatories of Charter 77 of human rights, the founding document of the Czech dissident movement. Mandler declined to sign Charter 77, because he regarded it as an elitistic club, out of touch with ordinary citizens. After the Velvet Revolution, Doležal and Mandler were for a short period politicians. Following the 1992 elections, both found themselves out of politics and became academics (in political science and history respectively) and publicists.

Doležal held that Havel's nonpolitical ideology in *The Power of the Powerless* laid the foundation of the Czech dissident movement. In Doležal's opinion, dissidents signed Charter 77 out of desperation over the conditions of 1970s "normalization" and the arrogance of the regime that dared to incorporate into its legal code principles of human rights that it had no intention of respecting. In Doležal's opinion, Charter 77 dissidents were united by desperation, not by a political program. The paragraph in the Charter 77 Declaration that called for dialogue and negotiation with the regime proves in Doležal's opinion that the authors of Charter 77 had no intention to overthrow the communist regime:

> Charter 77 is not an organization; it has no rules, permanent bodies or formal membership. It embraces everyone who agrees with its ideas, participates in its work,

[50] Mamatey, *Czechoslovak Democracy*; Daniel E. Miller, *Forging Political Compromise: Antonín Švehla and the Czechoslovak Republican Party, 1918–1933* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1999).

[51] A selection of the most interesting articles from that journal is in Michal Špirit, ed., *Tvar* (Praha: Torst, 1995).

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> and supports it. It does not form the basis for any oppositional political activity. Like many similar citizen initiatives in various countries, West and East, it seeks to promote the general public interest. It does not aim, then, to set out its own programmes for political or social reforms or changes, but within its own sphere of activity it wishes to conduct a constructive dialogue with the political and state authorities, particularly by drawing attention to various individual cases where human and civil rights are violated, by preparing documentation and suggesting solutions, by submitting other proposals of a more general character aimed at reinforcing such rights and their guarantees, and by acting as a mediator in various conflict situations which may lead to injustice and so forth.[52]

In Doležal's assessment, since 1987 it would have been possible for the dissidents to propose definite political programs, try to start political parties, and become a political opposition. The nonpolitical principle led the dissidents to miss that opportunity. Consequently, in Doležal's harsh judgment, the dissidents contributed nothing to the fall of communism.[53]

Doležal interpreted the founding of OF as an attempt to reconcile Havel's dissident nonpolitical politics with the new democratic system. The nonpolitical nature of OF preserved the weakness of the dissident movement; excessive tolerance of opinions preserved false unity. In Doležal's opinion, this tolerance allowed the infiltration of former communist functionaries into OF, and from there into the mainstream of Czech politics. Doležal interpreted Havel's 1997 intervention in politics as an intrigue designed to weaken parliamentary democracy in order to give way to nonpolitical politics.[54]

Emanuel Mandler interpreted Havel as rejecting parliamentary democracy in favor of direct democracy. He interpreted Charter 77 as a political movement with political goals. The communist regime certainly treated the first wave of Charter 77 signatories as its political enemies. The moral, nonpolitical interpretation of Charter 77 emerged only as a result of communist oppression. Havel's philosophy offered a developed doctrine of nonpolitical dissidence that unified Charter 77 as a moral opposition. OF embodied, in Mandler's opinion, Havel's doctrine of nonpolitical politics. OF presumed that the era of political parties was over. The absence of vertical institutional structure in OF led in Mandler's opinion to elitist politics, just as it did in Charter 77. The elite of OF, composed mostly of dissidents, made decisions without consulting the wider membership, considering ordinary people as intellectual inferiors. According to Mandler, the nonpolitical politics of OF negatively affected the character of ODS by pushing it to the opposite extreme of partisanship and libertarian ideology where "the invisible hand" replaced OF's "truth and love." The slogan of the anticommunist demonstrators during the Velvet Revolution was "truth and love will win over lies and hate."[55]

[52] Skilling, *Charter 77*, 212.

[53] Bohumil Doležal, "Stopa českého disentu," *Lidové noviny*, 24 January 1998.

[54] Bohumil Doležal, "Je kritika disentu projevem šílenství?" ibid., 14 February 1998.

[55] Emanuel Mandler, "Dotčenost jako politický luxus," ibid., 7 February 1998; "Disent, mýtus a národní konvence," ibid., 21 March 1998.

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Doležal and Mandler held that there is a continuity between the three episodes of nonpolitical politics. Still, we think that apart from Havel's antipathy to political parties, the three episodes of nonpolitical politics were radically different. Originally, Havel wished civil society to replace the political realm. In his latest attempt, civil society had no role to play. The nonpolitical element of Charter 77 was there from the beginning in Jan Patočka's moral foundations of human rights and was not just the effect of desperation.[56] The attitudes of the dissidents toward the regime, even the pathetic hope of some of them such as former communists like Zdeněk Mlynař, Jiří Hajek, and Pithart, to create a dialogue with the regime were irrelevant for the longevity of the regime. True, the dissidents did not bring about the collapse of communism. But once the regime started collapsing, the dissident movement and leadership shortened the birth pangs of democracy and provided the alternative elite that was able to arrange an orderly transfer of power from the communists.

We think that criticism of hidden elitism in the nonpolitical politics of OF is correct and reminiscent of criticisms of various utopian egalitarian political schemes that reject hierarchies, institutions, and bureaucracies but replace them with another kind of uncontrolled and informal elitism, such as Mikhail Bakunin's insightful criticism of Marx.[57] But elitism is not necessarily undemocratic. For example, Jefferson believed that the rulers should be aristocrats who earn the trust of the people. Like Havel, Jefferson thought that virtuous people should elect their betters to rule them.[58] Still, Havel's 1997–1998 government of experts was chosen by him without any reference to civil society. There is little continuity between the second and third episodes of nonpolitical politics.

Among Havel's defenders was Petr Placák, a former dissident of a younger generation whose father, Bedřich Placák, was a founder of Charter 77. Petr Placák came to prominence during the 1980s as a founder of a movement called "Czech Children." He was a monarchist who supported the restoration of the Habsburg Empire and suggested that nonpolitical politics was exclusively relevant to the conditions under totalitarian rule. Havel attempted to reconstruct the political subject out of the context of communist politics. Political parties were associated during the communist years with the parties that joined the National Front, an umbrella group of parties dominated by the Communist party that had ruled Czechoslovakia after 1948. Under the circumstances, nonpolitical politics was the only possible type of opposition. A direct political resistance to the regime would have been just another doomed-to-failure attempt to reform communism. Havel's specific doctrine of nonpolitical politics was not shared, in Placák's opinion, by many dissidents and was not the topic of many discussions.

[56] See Patočka's texts in Skilling, *Charter 77*, 217–223.

[57] "After the Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin" in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 542–548.

[58] Zvesper, *Political Philosophy*, 105–106.

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Dissidence was never monolithic or united; it was based on the social relations of people who decided to live in freedom in an oppressive environment. Each dissident had a different philosophy and relationship with the world. The only common denominator among the dissidents was the attempt to form a civil opposition, lead a moral life, and pursue cultural, religious, ecologic, and other interests.[59] Isaiah Berlin reached independently a similar conclusion: "I don't suppose it [Havel's Heideggerian inspired philosophy] will make much difference to his political activities, but it does show that there is an unfortunate intellectual background, or perhaps even foreground, to all these Czech thinkers, which may make some difference even to political activities on Havel's part; but I somehow don't think so, I think it will remain a private fad on his part."[60] It is difficult to examine empirically how widely accepted Havel's nonpolitical politics was among the dissidents during the 1980s. But we think there is overwhelming evidence before and after 1989 that this was not just a private fad on Havel's part.

Miloslav Bednář (a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Science, who is today a member of ODS) agreed that OF was founded on Havel's principles of nonpolitical politics, but he interpreted it as the rule of virtue and civil society against partisanship. In Bednář's opinion, the partisanship that characterizes European parliamentary democracy is one of the reasons for Europe's weakness in relation to the United States, where politics are based ultimately on civil virtue.[61] Though Bednář's vision of a nonpartisan U.S. Congress is somewhat idealized, we think that he correctly noted the similarity between American Republicanism and Czech nonpolitical politics.

In January 1998, a new party attempted to represent the old ideas of OF. It started as a political discussion club that included Josef Wagner, a member of parliament who seceded from the Social-Democratic party; Martin Palouš and Rudolf Battěk, former leading Charter 77 dissidents who were among the leaders of OF; the rock musician and wealthy businessman, Michal Kocáb, who was among the leaders of OF; Ivan Havel, younger brother of Václav; and Miloslav Bednář. This new party was called *Občanský klub*, Civil Club (OK). Its name and symbol imitated that of Civil Forum. Its program favored revising the constitution to allow popular referenda, the direct election of the president, greater authorities for the senate to resemble those of the German *Bundesrat*, and the introduction of an ombudsman.[62] In the June 1998 election, OK received 0.2 percent of the votes. This is a realistic estimate of the current popularity of nonpolitical politics in the Czech Republic.

[59] Petr Placák, "O věcech politických bez osobní dotčenosti," *Lidové noviny*, 24 January 1998; "Politická ontologie versus smrtelníci," ibid., 28 February 1998.

[60] Isaiah Berlin, private correspondence with Aviezer Tucker, 22 November 1991.

[61] Miloslav Bednár, "Nepolitická politika a politické strany," *Lidové noviny*, 28 March 1998.

[62] "Pohrobek OF vytáhl do boje," ibid., 13 May 1998.

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## Nonideological Politicians

The new Czech political elite is nonpolitical in at least one sense: it clearly has no ideological convictions. The two main political parties, ODS and the Social Democrats, reached an agreement following the June 1998 elections according to which ODS would support a minority Social Democratic government in return for immunity from prosecution for corruption. The two parties agreed to revise the constitution to replace the proportional parliamentary election system with a majoritarian one that eliminates the smaller parties and prevents the kind of fragmentation that allows the president to divide and rule. They further agreed to curtail the constitutional power of the president by abolishing the presidential prerogative of appointing prime ministers, supreme court judges, and governors of the Central Bank. Conversely, Havel objected suddenly to a majoritarian electoral system, because he shared the belief with his opponents that it would give enough power to a single party to marginalize the president. The defeat of the Social Democrats in the November 1998 majoritarian elections to the Senate and the rise of the Communist party in the polis at the expense of the Social Democrats demonstrated that this party had little to gain and much to lose from a majoritarian system. In the absence of ideology, politics became in the Czech Republic purely technical.

Czech politicians crisscrossed the political-ideological spectrum in search of positions of power and influence. The actual policies of the former right-wing and present left-wing governments have had little to do with their declared ideological commitments and much to do with the personal interests of the politicians in charge. Prime Minister Zeman had expressed centrist, liberal positions before it became evident that the center had no electoral support. Within the Social Democratic party, Zeman has relied on the support of the stronger left wing of the party and opposed the attempt of younger, more centrist Social Democratic members of parliament like Petra Buzkova and Stanislav Gross to moderate the policy of the party. Zeman's power base within the Social Democratic party is based on those who wish to maintain and expand the communist welfare system and finance it by foreign loans. Zeman declared that he intends to privatize the banks, and he has created greater unemployment, an indication of restructuring. The people around Zeman do not show greater ideological constancy than he does. Former Deputy Prime Minister Egon Lansky was in charge of foreign policy. He immigrated during the communist period to Sweden. As a Swedish citizen, which he still is, Lansky was a member of the Swedish Conservative party, which is committed to reducing taxes and state paternalism. He resigned in late 1999 after it was divulged that he received U.S. $300,000 from the government as a kickback for negotiating subsidies for failed firms. Pavel Mertlík is in charge of economic policy. Previously, Mertlík was an academic economist noted for his criticisms of Klaus's lethargic economic policies and calls for real privatization, restructuring, and greater unemployment. Either Zeman, Lansky, and Mertlík discovered Socialism in the mid-1990s or they were looking for a vacant spot on the Czech political stage.

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The creation of a political cartel by the two main political parties and ideological rivals led during 1999 to several nonpolitical civil protest movements. Intellectuals close to President Havel, led by the Catholic priest and former Charter 77 signatory Tomaš Halík and former Havel adviser and current director of the Prague branch of New York University Jiří Pehe, wrote a petition entitled Impulse 99, formulated after Charter 77, protesting the new corruption of the political elite. Far more popular was a petition entitled "Thank You, Now Leave!" written by the former student leaders of the 1989 revolution, which called on the leaders of the main political parties to resign, but avoided endorsing clear political policies. In late 1999, they organized a demonstration that attracted tens of thousands to Prague's St. Wenceslav Square. This was the first time such crowds had gathered since 1989. One of the main speakers in that rally was the independent Senator Václav Fischer, whose landslide victory in by-elections in the first district of Prague was widely interpreted as a protest vote against the established political parties.

The opportunism of Czech politicians could have been lauded as pragmatism had there been a rule of law. Czech judiciary and police have not been radically reformed since 1989. The Czech judges and police still behave as low officials in a unified state hierarchy; they do not investigate or prosecute politicians who are above them in the hierarchy.[63] Consequently, politicians are immune to prosecution for corruption. This has led to massive corruption of the political and bureaucratic elites.

The interpretation of the corruption of the Czech political elite may follow the traditional federalist-institutional vs. republican-individual perspectives. From an American federalist's perspective, the absence of the rule of law resulted from inattention to reforming the relevant institutions. Havel's Republicanism and Klaus's belief in unregulated markets share a disregard of institutional designs. Havel presumed that if people are good, institutions are insignificant. Klaus held that anything goes as long as it is profitable; institutions only get in the way. Neither of them understood the significance of the rule of law, radical restructuring, and expansion of law schools, the court system, and the police. Law schools do not produce a sufficient number of lawyers and do not give them the kind of education that would prepare them to function in a liberal democratic system. The institutional rules, sanctions, and compensations do not create incentives for police, judges, and their staff to excel in implementing the rule of law. The separation of the three branches of government has not been accomplished.

[63] Vojtěch Cepl, "A Note on the Restitution of Property in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia" in Neil J. Kritz, ed., *Transitional Justice* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), vol. ii, 581–585; Jan Obrman, "Rehabilitating Political Victims," in ibid., vol. ii, 585–586; John Borneman, *Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 152 ff; Aviezer Tucker, "Paranoids May Be Persecuted: Post-totalitarian Transitional Justice," *Archives européennes de sociologie* 40 (1999): 56–100.

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From a Republican perspective, implicit in Havel's speech on the tenth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution on 17 November 1999, problems in implementing the rule of law and the prevalence of corruption result from the mental legacy of communism. The totalitarian regime abolished communities and civil society, combated civil virtue and interpersonal loyalty, duty, and moral responsibility. It created a society of deconstructed, atomized individuals who care only for their day-to-day survival and petty materialist interests. From such building blocs, it is impossible to build the city on the hill.

It appears to us that both opinions are partly right. George Washington, the nonpartisan Federalist republican, noted in his Farewell Address and elsewhere that the virtuous republic will not survive without virtuous, common people. Virtue is promoted by institutions of education that diffuse knowledge and create public opinion. Washington further associated virtue and responsibility with religion and community. Good citizens make good laws and vice versa. Responsible government, achieved through checks and balances, promotes responsibility among its citizens and vice versa. Corrupt government corrupts its people.[64] The Czech case demonstrates that Washington was right. In comparison with the early years of the United States, the virtuous patriotic citizens that care for the politics of their country and are involved in civil society are clearly missing from postcommunist societies. Still, the emergence of virtuous and patriotic citizens may be encouraged by institutional arrangements. The institution of private property is conducive to civil responsibility and virtue, if accompanied by the establishment of other necessary institutions that guarantee the rule of law. Instead of clarifying property rights, the system of mixed ownership and government subsidies for bribes maintains vagueness in ownership and encourages irresponsible behavior. The middle class in general and lawyers in particular do not grow on trees; they are educated in universities. The higher education law gives no incentive to universities to improve the level of education they offer and to increase the relatively small numbers of students; nor does the Ministry of Education reverse the communist policy of preventing the emergence of a middle class by encouraging technical education relating to heavy industry, and limiting the number of students of the liberal arts, the social sciences, and law. State-accredited private higher education became possible only following the passing of the 1998 higher education law. The absence of active civil society allowed the politicians to be corrupt and gave them no incentive to reform the institutions. The absence of good institutions prevents the emergence of civil society. The judiciary and police do not investigate corrupt politicians, and the interest of corrupt politicians has been to avoid strengthening the independence of the police and judges.

## CONCLUSION

Nonpolitical politics was a successful and appropriate doctrine for a dissident movement that wished to remain united but did not have to govern. Nonpoliti-

[64] Spalding and Garrity, *A Sacred Union*, 30–34, 71–82.

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cal politics is impossible in a modern representative democracy. In the absence of political parties, a government would have to negotiate individually with each member of parliament who may at any moment secede from a governing coalition. Such a situation would lead to political instability, difficulties in changing a status quo, and lack of predictability in political decisions. In a political context where the government must be able to implement quickly decisive reformist policies, it needs to be able to rely on a steady support of political parties rather than be forced to negotiate each issue with a multitude of mavericks. Without political parties, minorities would not be able to use their organizational advantages to protect their rights, and candidates who were not already members of elites would find it difficult to enter politics. Politics without politicians could become the government of a populistic elite, because there is no formal structure to connect the elite with the population and give the citizens some form of control over their leaders. Since the eighteenth century, the creation of political parties seems to be a universal phenomenon in free societies. The size of modern societies requires mediating institutions between government and citizens. A return to face-to-face politics of the ancient Greek type is utopian. The republican Americans, no less than the Czech dissidents, had to recognize that implementing their policies required a political party that could mobilize nonactive voters behind a program and promise a level of control and discipline over individual members of representative assemblies, while giving them financial and organizational support that might immunize them from the effects of lobbying by special interests. Eventually, American republicanism was successful because it could rely on a developed virtuous civil society, the good laws and institutions that the Federalists constructed, and the mutual reinforcements that both have exerted on each other. The Czech republicans, like Havel, had none of these advantages; consequently, Czech republicanism deteriorated into an attempt to stop the corruption of the politicians by a nonpopular technocratic government.*

* This article represents the results of Aviezer Tucker's seminar on political theory that took place at Palacky University in Olomouc, the Czech Republic, during the academic year 1997–1998.

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# Book Reviews

**A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937–1945** *by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2000. 650 pp. $35.00.*

World War II is the most significant event of the twentieth century. For Americans, it was "the last good war," a time of heroism, national purpose, as well as the beginning of an era of unparalleled prosperity. In less fortunate parts of the world, the war was an immeasurable catastrophe whose scars have not yet healed: in the former Yugoslavia, for example, the memories of World War II reemerged after 1989 to poison relations between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians.

Those interested in the war are well served by a number of distinguished general accounts, including Gordon Wright's still indispensable *Ordeal of Total War* (1968), Gerhard Weinberg's magisterial *A World at Arms* (1994), and Richard Overy's astute assessment of *Why the Allies Won* (1995). As its subtitle tells us, Williamson Murray and Allan Millett's new book is about how the war was fought. There are brief treatments of diplomacy, social developments, and political legacies; but the book's major emphasis is on the fighting itself. Appendices on military organization, terminology, and weapons provide admirably clear and concise introductions to these complex subjects. A generous collection of maps and some well-chosen photographs add to the book's usefulness.

Murray and Millett focus on the operational level of military action, that is, the level between tactics (which they define as "discrete action taken by ground combat units, aircraft, and ships . . . to defeat the enemy in battle" [p. 589]) and strategy ("a general plan for the creation, deployment, and employment" of forces to achieve the war's objectives [p. 583]). Their scope is global, but their major interest and expertise is in Europe, which was—as Franklin Roosevelt and his military advisers immediately recognized—the decisive theater of operations. They tend to see the war from the Allies' point of view and leave no doubt about where their sympathies reside.

In both Europe and Asia, the Axis powers' careful preparation, skillful use of tactical surprise, and, most important, superior operational performance enabled them to win a series of stunning initial victories. But by the middle of 1942 it was clear that neither Germany nor Japan could sustain these early successes; both had conquered more territory than they could adequately defend. In the long, painful



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war of attrition that followed, they were bound to lose. The extraordinary productive capacity of the United States, combined in Europe with the Soviet Union's no less extraordinary ability to sacrifice and suffer, gradually overcame the military skills of Germany and Japan.

The authors clearly believe that this was a war worth fighting. Nor do they question that victory came because of the valor and skill of millions of ordinary men and women who sacrificed their youth and sometimes their lives to save the world from tyranny. About their leaders' military and political abilities the authors are much less enthusiastic. They are, for instance, rightly critical of French generalship in 1940: Maurice Gamelin, the French commander, "had not an ounce of real soldierly qualities" (p. 52). Nor do the Americans come off particularly well. Mark Clark's performance in Italy was "disappointing" (p. 377), while Omar Bradley was "unimaginative and dour," jealous of George Patton's superior abilities and incapable of earning the respect of his men (p. 417). German generals were often more skillful practitioners of modern war, but they were morally corrupted and eventually destroyed by the regime they served.

While *A War to Be Won* may be too detailed for beginners, it is the most complete, balanced, and well-informed history of military operations now available. All serious students of the war will want a copy on their shelves.

JAMES J. SHEEHAN
*Stanford University*

**Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999** *by Edward C. Luck. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 374 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

America's hesitant relationship to international organizations seems the perfect candidate for an episode of the Oprah Winfrey show: great powers who love and abuse the UN. The episode would undoubtedly air a long history of hurt feelings, mistrust, and grave misunderstandings; and we might find the encounter mildly amusing except for three reasons. First, the stakes are high. The United States helped to create the UN and other international organizations not because it wanted to earn a merit badge but rather because they furthered international stability, which presumably furthers U.S. national interests. Second, the hot and cold U.S. attitude toward the UN runs counter to U.S. national interests. Why, for instance, is the United States increasingly suspicious of a UN that is increasingly keen to promote the values that Americans hold dear? Third, unlike most Oprah shows, in this saga the estranged pair is unlikely to reconcile.

How we might make sense of the U.S. century-long ambivalence toward international organizations is the subject of Edward Luck's exhaustive, entertaining, and erudite book, *Mixed Messages*. A former president of the United

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Nations Association, Luck is as well qualified as anyone to address the roots of this ambivalence. Using U.S. policy toward the United Nations as an exemplar of U.S. attitudes toward international organizations, Luck argues that eight core themes recur in the U.S. debate about involvement in the UN: American exceptionalism; the desire to protect national sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world; a fear of "others"; not wanting to be relegated to a minority position and given equal status with other states; the unwillingness to put American troops under international command; the inability to see how the UN furthers U.S. national interests; enduring questions about UN reform; and tensions over burden sharing and financing. Although Luck acknowledges that other states exhibit similar behavior, it is exaggerated in the American case because of its history, position in the international system, political culture, and a domestic political process that makes it easy to be critical of the UN and gives presidents little political incentive to defend it. The book is organized around these eight themes, and each chapter proceeds historically and attempts to demonstrate how these root causes play themselves out over time.

Luck somehow manages to write with both tremendous verve and analytic coolness. He deftly identifies many of the sources of U.S. ambivalence and shows how those sources shape U.S. policy. To substantiate his analytical claims, he carefully weighs the evidence and produces juicy anecdotes and statements from American politicians, sometimes to the point of nearly drowning out the points he wants to make. Yet as a longtime defender of the UN, Luck also cannot help but write with an eye toward convincing the naysayers of the folly of their positions; Luck is passionate without being polemical.

His objectivity shines through in the conclusion, when he provocatively calls for a domestic and international compact; the former would involve a discussion surrounding the necessity of the UN and what Americans are willing to do to maintain it, while the latter would involve a wide-ranging discussion among states concerning what sort of UN is desirable and politically feasible. Only after such a discussion, Luck concludes, will the United States be able to rid itself of its inconsistent policy, and member states will finally agree on what roles the UN should fulfill. However desirable such compacts might be, Luck himself acknowledges that the same factors that got the United States and the international community into this situation are likely to preclude such a debate. But in the event of the improbable debate, this book would be its primer.

MICHAEL BARNETT
*University of Wisconsin*

**Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945** *by David M. Kennedy. New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 940 pp. $39.95.*

At the turn of the century, the Great Depression and World War II still weigh heavily on the U.S. national consciousness. Discussions about a tax credit for

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World War II veterans, a recent spate of World War II films, and current debates about Nazi and Japanese war atrocities attest to the lingering popularity and controversies of the "Good War." Likewise, the New Deal's achievements—the growth in the size and duties of the federal state, the expansion of the meaning of citizenship—have become heightened points of contention. David M. Kennedy's book, which recently won the Pulitzer Prize, is therefore well timed. The author's central argument is that the years 1929–1945 are best understood as a single period in which the U.S. economy made a transition from paralysis to prosperity, while statesmen extended a sense of "security" to the whole of society. In the process of waging another world war, policy makers also repudiated a century and a half of isolationism.

For Kennedy, professor of history at Stanford University, the notable aspect of this period was not the cold war that followed, but rather the advent of globalization. He states that "America's half-century-long ideological, political, and military face-off with the Soviet Union may appear far less consequential than America's leadership in inaugurating an era of global economic interdependence" (p. 855). In his arguments, Kennedy contributes to existing literature linking New Deal legislation to the unintended legacies of the Herbert Hoover administration. Like other historians on the subject, he argues that just as the Depression proved an ironic asset in mobilizing for war, the war itself highlighted how the state could promote economic growth. Kennedy concludes that the U.S. victory did not stem from exceptional American sacrifices (the Russian people suffered far more) but rather from American industry's ability to out-produce its enemies.

Like other volumes in the Oxford history series, this work is broad in scope, yet detailed and informative. The author's discussion of the Great Depression's causes is at once complex and accessible. Further, the chapters in which Kennedy restages the war are sure to appeal to military history readers. The book has a literary quality, and like a novel revolves around the characters of Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Adolph Hitler, and Winston Churchill. Still, it is highly scholarly. While its length might hamper usage in the classroom, its subject matter and Kennedy's breezy writing style will secure a mass audience.

However, for a work claiming to be about the "American people," the book contains surprisingly little about them. Race and gender, for instance, are dealt with substantively in only one chapter, as is labor. This lack of social and cultural history may confirm for many such historians the dangers of grand narrative history. Social historians might also criticize as old-fashioned Kennedy's overemphasis on the various "great men" of the period and object to his almost exclusive focus on statecraft. In these respects, the book is a decidedly traditional political history.

Yet, unlike the consensus scholarship of the past, this work acknowledges the pervasive social conflicts and inequalities during depression and war. Similarly, Kennedy forthrightly discusses how anti-Japanese sentiments infused the Pacific war with a barbarism absent in the European theater. Details like these

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weigh against the book's limitations and allow one to readily appreciate the truly magisterial work Kennedy has written.

CLARENCE LANG
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

**Rostenkowski: The Pursuit of Power and the End of the Old Politics** *by Richard E. Cohen. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 1999. 311 pp. $27.50.*

Dan Rostenkowski's congressional career spanned the years from Speakers Sam Rayburn to Newt Gingrich, one of the most intense periods of political and institutional change in the history of Congress. This artfully crafted book by the *National Journal's* Richard E. Cohen combines a biographical account of Rostenkowski's rise from the tribal politics of Chicago's near northwest side to national prominence as chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, with a concise and readable political history of the unbroken forty-year period during which Democrats controlled the House. Both accounts draw on extensive interviewing, oral histories, and archival sources, as well as work on Congress by political scientists and other journalists. Both also strike a judicious balance, detailing legislative achievements as well as the excesses and ethical lapses that ultimately brought both Rostenkowski's political career and Democratic control of the House to an end in 1994.

The central paradox of Dan Rostenkowski's political career is that a product of the Chicago Democratic machine of the 1950s became such an important congressional figure during an era marked first by extensive political reform, and then by the ascendancy of independent, entrepreneurial politicians. Cohen's account argues convincingly that Rostenkowski's personal qualitites—his consistency, his tenacity, and especially his political skill—are critical in understanding why he never was far from the center of power throughout his congressional career and why he developed into one of the most important national legislators of the 1980s and 1990s—arguably of the postwar era. If some aspects of Rostenkowski's approach to politics had come to seem anachronistic or worse (calling Ways and Means the "Cadillac" committee, conducting business over red meat and gin at Morton's, putting people on his office payroll who tended to personal matters or did little work at all) others proved surprisingly effective in the postreform House. The inattentiveness of so many other members to the hard work of coalition building and the practices that foster and sustain organizational solidarity made Rostenkowski's knowledge and skill in these areas highly valuable assets to his party and to the House as an institution. As Cohen documents, Rostenkowski's efforts were central to any number of major congressional decisions in the areas of tax, budget, trade, and social welfare policy during the 1980s and 1990s. Some of the legislative episodes Cohen

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recounts have been treated in more detail elsewhere (in Paul Light's *Artful Work* and Jeffery Birnbaum and Allan Murray's *Showdown at Gucci Gulch*, for example) but overall this is a well-rounded portrait of one of the most interesting legislators to serve in the modern House. It could work well as a supplementary text in undergraduate courses on Congress or political parties.

Cohen's biography also sheds light on some larger questions of interest to political scientists who study Congress. First, this account provides additional evidence that parties matter a lot more in the congressional politics of the 1980s and 1990s than they did in the politics of the 1950s and 1960s. Like Wilbur Mills before him, Rostenkowski always preferred to craft legislation that would appeal to the median voter on the House floor. But this proved harder and harder to do as House politics became more and more polarized along partisan lines during his tenure as chair of Ways and Means. Second, consistent with the theory proposed by the political scientists who wrote the *The Federalist* (but less so with theories that view politicians as always motivated by narrow self-interest), Rostenkowski's development from parochial Chicago politician to responsible and public-spirited national legislator confirms that achieving a prominent leadership position can elevate the goals of elected officials from the mere pursuit of power to the pursuit of the public good.

RANDALL STRAHAN
*Emory University*

**Gorbachev: On My Country and My World** *by Mikhail Gorbachev. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. 300 pp. $29.95.*

Currently president of the Green International, Mikhail Gorbachev presents in this book wide-ranging proposals for global reform as the natural outcome of the new thinking that he championed as the basis for *perestroika* (restructuring). The first part seeks to present both negative and positive aspects of Soviet history by tracing his reforming policies to those of V.I. Lenin in his last years and of Nikita Khrushchev. In the second part, Gorbachev argues for the idea that the Soviet Union could have been preserved even after the coup of 1991, and he presents excerpts from key intergovernmental discussions to prove the obstructionism of Boris Yeltsin. In the third part, he locates the stimulus for the new thinking in the arena of world politics rather than the domestic problems of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev offers a rather idiosyncratic list of the new thinking precursors who are scientists rather than politicians or philosophers and who are divided equally among Russians and Europeans. Its postulates are the interdependence of nations based on universal human values and diversity among nations, each with its own rights and interests. They are linked by a dialectical process. Taken

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together with the development of nuclear weapons, these postulates lead to the realization that security can only be guaranteed by political means; that "politics based on the use of force is doomed" (p. 191); and that security can only be mutual. Gorbachev insists that these ideas guided the practical steps taken by the Soviet Union in the realm of foreign policy from 1985 to 1990. At the center of the Soviet vision of a new global politics was the attempt to create a European-wide security system and a similar system of security and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region. He further argues that these ideas were foiled by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole global power. Nevertheless, *perestroika* left a rich legacy of ending the cold war and contributing to the humanization of international relations.

Critical of his domestic opponents, mainly Yeltsin, for having brought about the destruction of the Soviet Union and its policies of new thinking, he assigns equal blame to the United States for adhering to its previous policy of achieving global hegemony and resorting to force before diplomacy is exhausted. As a result, he views the world as entering a transitional order in a politically fragmented condition and moving toward a series of crises with a diminished potential for constructive action. In concrete practical terms he offers a variety of nostrums: a revival of the Organization for Security and Cooperation, a kind of "permanent world wide brains trust" (p. 230), a more active role for nongovernmental organizations in solving environmental and even security problems and, above all, a revitalized and reconstructed UN. Familiar to anyone who is attentive to world events, Gorbachev's proposals remain at a high level of abstraction. It is undeniable that he deserves the praise of Western statesmen and political writers and the gratitude of the people of Central and East Central Europe for his bold initiatives in dismantling the Soviet empire. He can only be admired for his continued involvement in the good fight for noble causes. But it does not help his case to overemphasize the role of *perestroika* in inaugurating fresh approaches to global problems. It might be preferable to offer more specific and detailed proposals for bringing about the transformation of world politics that is highly desired by a multitude of individuals throughout the world who have long pondered and published about these problems.

ALFRED J. RIEBER
*Central European University*

**British Politics in the Global Age: Can Social Democracy Survive?** *by Joel Krieger. New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 232 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

There used to be in the United States a school of political scientists who were fascinated by the British political system in general and by the Labour party in

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particular. Many of them had served in the army or air force in Britain during the war; most were staunch anglophiles and Labour sympathizers. The luminaries among them included Samuel H. Beer and Leon D. Epstein, both still very much alive, and the late Harry Eckstein. By now, however, this school, as a school, has largely ceased to exist. Britain is no longer the uniquely fascinating country it once was—France, Germany, and Italy, not to mention the European Union, are nowadays at least as interesting—and the Labour party, with the likes of Ernest Bevin, Aneurin Bevan, and Hugh Gaitskell long gone, has largely lost its transatlantic drawing power.

It therefore comes as something of a shock to find Joel Krieger, a professor at Wellesley College, writing with all the ardor and commitment of a 1940s or 1950s American social democrat. Needless to say, it comes as less of a shock to find Sam Beer commending the book on the back cover. Krieger asks in his subtitle, "Can social democracy survive?" He obviously and desperately hopes that it can. *British Politics in the Global Age* is as much tract as dispassionate scientific analysis.

It has to be said straightaway that aesthetically these two-hundred plus pages afford little pleasure, indeed inflict considerable pain. Krieger operates on the twin principles: never use a monosyllable when a polysyllable would do, and never use one word when a dozen would do. Moreover, his tone throughout—like that of so many Marxists and former Marxists—is didactic, hectoring, and heavy. The following sentence is typical: "It"—it does not matter what "It" is—"leaves a legacy of primary emphasis on political economy constituted within a class-compromise model that cannot easily engage other dimensions of political contestation, such as the authoritarian-communitarian axis discussed below in the strategic adjustment model" (p. 10). Reading *British Politics in the Global Age* is thus rather like attempting to chew and swallow pure gristle.

But does this solid protein, however tough, also provide nourishment? The short answer is: a little, but not a lot. To be sure, Krieger is adept at laying bare the evasions and ambiguities that undoubtedly underlie much of Tony Blair's New Labour project; he notes, for example, that New Labour policy makers cannot make up their minds whether unemployed single mothers are to be regarded primarily as mothers, in need of all the social support they can get, or as state welfare dependents, whose benefits should be cut so as to force them into work. Krieger is also right to point out that despite the scale of New Labour's victory in May 1997, the Labour party's electoral base is now much less solid than it once was.

But *British Politics in the Global Age* is ultimately unsatisfying because the author has failed to meet the challenge he has set himself: identifying a new social democratic project, adapted to the emerging global economy but also compatible with democratic politics. He essays the task in his last dozen pages, but his observations are without exception high-flown rather than persuasive. It does not advance matters very far, for instance, to be told that a new social democratic model would argue for "the vital place of decentralized workplace

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mobilization that insists on a role in shaping the contours of a progressive post-Fordist alternative" and also for "a robust modular identity alliance strategy that engages diversity and commonality in a wage-earner-feminist strategy to face the fundamental challenges of the social organization of productive and social life" (p. 171). True? Possibly. Helpful? Probably not.

ANTHONY KING
*University of Essex*

**The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-First Century** *by Immanuel Wallerstein. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 248 pp. $29.95.*

Immanuel Wallerstein has long conceived of social science grandly. He was an innovator of world systems analysis, which portrays societies, sectors within societies, and the very disciplines of the social science as linked, bound, and analytically inseparable: To parse them is to misconceive them. As recent president of the International Sociological Association (1994 to 1998), Wallerstein continued to develop such grand thinking through numerous addresses on the state of the social sciences, capitalism, political justice, and the world. Here, he offers these collectively. He divides them into two topics—the world of capitalism and the world of knowledge. Toward both grand worlds, his thesis is similar: they are in crisis.

The modern capitalist world system, configuring core and periphery, industrialist and agricultural societies, rich and poor, capitalist, proletariat, and peasantry, is unlikely to last, Wallerstein tells us. Disappearing, too, will be the state—the institution legitimates and holds together the capitalist order. In modern history, the system has attained legitimacy and allegiance from the working classes and other have-nots through its promise of a better plight: rising expectations trump relative deprivation. But the scheme imploded in 1968, this year of upheaval, this terminus of hopes for improvement within the system, this crucible for antisystem movements, right and left. Today capitalism is bedeviled by problems that it is unlikely to solve short of collapse, including the drying up of crucial cheap labor through deruralization, an ecological crisis that externalizes the costs of production onto the environment, democratization, requiring expenditures on a "social wage" for workers, and the increased demands that all of these trends place upon an ever shrinking state. Not far beneath Wallerstein's prediction that capitalism will end is a moral critique that welcomes its demise. "Capitalism," he argues, "has generated the greatest economic and social polarization in the history of humanity" (p. 56).

Both crisis and critique suffuse Wallerstein's analysis of contemporary social scientific knowledge. He scorns again and again the bifurcation of knowl-

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edge into science and humanistic understanding. Complementary pernicious distinctions include nomothetic laws versus idiographic knowledge, civilization versus "the other," European versus non-European, and the distinction in the social sciences between the market, the state, and civil society. The worst effect of the divisions is a privileging of Eurocentric, instrumentally rational, scientific knowledge, smitten with the hope of modern progress, buttressing capitalism.

Wallerstein would replace these dichotomies with complexity theory, whose articulation he borrows from Nobel scientist Ilya Prigogone. Prigogone and Wallerstein, hold that science is in transition to a rationality based on complexity and that such a development is a source of great hope, since it unleashes human creativity. Wallerstein also calls for a return to substantive rationality, which will help us to think morally. Echoing his critique of capitalism, he builds his morality around egalitarianism and democracy.

Big thinking requires a big response—unfortunately, impossible here. Clearly, the scope of his career's thought is remarkable, his expertise impressively broad. Those who disagree most will be those who also think grandly, but who place their emphases differently, perhaps softening the centrality of capitalist domination, maybe stressing the autonomy and power of religion, culture, ethnicity, and nationality. Wallerstein's evocation of substantive rationality is also admirable in a field whose suppositions crowd out morality. Yet here lies a contradiction: His endorsement of complexity and elsewhere his mention of the social constructedness of knowledge both serve to undermine precisely the knowledge that sustains any morality—that is, knowledge of our fixed nature and of our true goods and obligations. Whether the new social science can offer the moral critique that he desires is ultimately dubious.

DANIEL PHILPOTT
*University of California, Santa Barbara*

**The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies** *by Robert E. Lane. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. 466 pp. $35.00.*

Is it true that there has been a loss of happiness in market democracies? According to Lane, in the ten Western European countries on which he has data between 1981 and 1990, "those who were predominantly satisfied with their lives increased . . . from 79 to 83 percent. . . . In light of these cross-national data it is difficult to indict modernity for making people less happy; rather, it seems that in its declining SWB . . . America is exceptional" (p. 21).

SWB stands for subjective well-being, that is, the answers people give to questions like "Would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?" But do measures of SWB get at what we are really interested in when we wonder about the conditions of happiness? For example, protection of rights in a country has zero correlation with SWB. "How can this be? . . .

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One answer is that people will and do fight to the death to gain these rights, but, as with income, once achieved, they adapt to their good fortune" (p. 267). But this does not entail that the same people would say, if asked, "It was a complete waste of time risking our lives to get civil and political rights, because we're no better off than before." It may be that people get used to having a washing machine so that after a time it ceases to contribute to SWB, but that does not mean they would not object strongly to doing without it. We could interpret this, as Lane does, to imply that we are all slaves to the "hedonic treadmill," or we might think that we are genuinely better off with rights and home comforts and that there is something wrong with SWB. The subjective aspect of SWB is emphasized by the finding that "by group discussion of beliefs and values and rehearsing positive statements, self-reported happiness can be improved" (p. 46). Why bother with rights and amenities if all we have to do to increase our SWB is lower our expectations and count our blessings? Alternatively, why bother with SWB?

The claim of loss of happiness outside the United States is bolstered by evidence of "an epidemic of depression" and an increase in the suicide rate, especially among the young. But these statistics are notoriously liable to reporting bias. Lane acknowledges this for depression in an Appendix (p. 347), but does not allow skepticism into his main account. Yet the reported finding that of those Americans born before 1955, only one percent had suffered major depression by age 75 is incredible on its face. Recent notions that lethargy and apathy in the old are "really" depression simply mean that they have been found to perk up when administered antidepressive drugs. Similarly, there were plenty of people who were miserable for obvious external reasons in the past, but there was no point in calling this depression until antidepressant drugs came along. Again, the rise in youth suicides may just reflect increased openness. That the rate has declined in Sweden—generally thought to be the one country that was reporting suicides as suicides all along (Table 2.1, p. 23)—strengthens the suspicion that other increases may be an artifact of the declining stigmatization of suicide.

It may well still be true that most people in the United States suffer from increased stress because, in contrast to all other Western countries, they are working more and enjoying it less. But this, even if true, is far from substantiating the sweeping claim made in the title of the book.

BRIAN BARRY
*Columbia University*

**The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century** *by Robert Gilpin. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000. 373 pp. $29.95.*

Robert Gilpin's magisterial new book makes a provocative case for the continued relevance of interstate politics to global economic management. Gilpin

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covers the history and current trajectory of international politics in the areas of trade, exchange rates, finance, development, and regulation. Given the book's breadth, it is hardly surprising that its contribution lies in the sweep and scope of its synoptic overview more than the precision and reliability of its detailed analysis. Before elaborating the former, it is only fair to acknowledge the latter.

Two examples of the empirical analysis must suffice. First is the chapter on the international monetary regime, which asserts that "a well-functioning system requires strong leadership by . . . historically . . . a dominant economic and military power, such as Great Britain in the late nineteenth century and the United States following World War II" (p. 116). In fact, hegemonic interpretations of the late nineteenth-century Gold Standard and even the late twentieth-century Bretton Woods have come under significant fire as of late. Since the entire section on the nature of monetary regimes contains but one footnote to a general text by Paul De Grauwe, nonexpert readers (and many experts) are left ignorant of both the empirical support for Gilpin's specific claims and the existence of an even larger body of empirical evidence against them.

Second, consider the chapter on European economic integration. Gilpin begins by stating that in European integration "economic goals have been secondary to political concerns" (p. 194). The mid-1980s single-market initiative resulted primarily from "European leaders' realization that Western Europe was losing influence in world affairs." The 1991 Maastricht agreement to establish a single currency (EMU) was the result of "the 1990 reunification of Germany," which "caused West European leaders to transform dramatically the purpose, logic and timetable of integration" (p. 197). Gilpin's stridently geopolitical interpretation lacks an empirical basis. Nearly all analysts now accept that the single-market initiative was primarily motivated by commercial concerns. As for Maastricht, the primary documentation and the precise sequence of events are flatly inconsistent with any interpretation that places such heavy reliance on German reunification. Again Gilpin cites no support for his contrary interpretations. The section in question is without a single footnote. (The entire 373-page book contains only 98 footnotes, many without page numbers.) The list of "suggested readings" contains a number of works that flatly contradict his thesis. Gilpin's more general arguments against an economic explanation of regional integration—for example, why no political union in North America?—take similarly little account of potential counterarguments.

Since Gilpin's intelligence and integrity cannot be doubted, we can only conclude that he simply does not intend for this volume to be judged on the empirical accuracy of specific arguments. It must instead be approached as commentary more than history or social science. As such, we should ask: Does it highlight previously overlooked connections between disparate events? Does it challenge conventional wisdom? Does it convey a coherent sense of the challenges facing global economic management at the dawn of a new millennium?

In these three tasks Gilpin succeeds splendidly, as he has consistently over a distinguished career, by reasserting the classical realist (or mercantilist) posi-

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tion he has long held—albeit in a form ever more cognizant of the benefits of free trade. Three closely related conclusions emerge. First, the global economy remains "fragile" (p. 3ff). In a direct challenge to many economists, commentators like Thomas Friedman, and others who proclaim the inevitability of globalization, Gilpin insists that political sustainability of an open international political economy cannot be taken for granted. Free trade and capital flows, Gilpin argues, rest on political foundations and these are, as the titles to Chapters 3 and 4 remind us, "insecure" and "unstable."

Second, the current international economic order lacks a consensual political structure. We live in transitional times. Interdependence does not necessarily create policy convergence. Gilpin, like Suzanne Berger, Ronald Dore, and others, stresses the enormous differences that remain among the institutions and policies of interdependent countries.

Third, the global order (or lack thereof) that ultimately emerges will reflect not just economic efficiency but also—as has been true throughout history—the domestic and global purposes of the major powers. In particular, U.S. leadership is the single most important political factor shaping the future of global economic management—an assessment not unrelated to Gilpin's skeptical assessment of the economic benefits of regionalism. Effective leadership will require in turn that the U.S. government acknowledge the legitimacy of the diverse institutions and practices found among its major trading partners. This historically informed, politically moderate, and utterly unsentimental counsel is the hallmark of the classical realist tradition of international relations scholarship, which Gilpin continues so brilliantly to represent.

ANDREW MORAVCSIK
*Harvard University*

**The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere** *by Carl Boggs. New York, The Guilford Press, 1999. 315 pp. $23.95.*

Protests in Seattle and elsewhere remind us that not all Americans are enamored with globalization. In a densely written and far-ranging critique, Carl Boggs combines a leftist reaction against the hegemony of capitalism at the turn of the twenty-first century with classical political theorists' emphasis on the importance of political participation. To Boggs, the main problem is not corporate power alone, but corporate power combined with the depoliticization of ordinary citizens, as reflected in low rates of participation and the commercialization of everyday life. "[A] rationalized corporate-state order coexists with an atomized civil society, the world presented by Max Weber tensely juxtaposed against the world described by Thomas Hobbes" (p. 40). Here are Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci married to Plato and Hannah Arendt.

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To ordinary Americans, politics is the money-soaked and corrupt province of political elites, while citizens prefer to pursue private gratification through the goods of the market and the pleasures of family life. The consequences are abandonment of the public good, atrophy of civic and self-developmental skills, and lack of challenge to the corporate-political order. "[M]inimalism at the level of citizen politics automatically equates with a maximalization of *elite* politics" (p. 251; emphasis in original). Depoliticization, therefore, has serious effects at both the individual and societal levels.

Besides the fruitful combination of leftist and classical democratic concerns, Boggs's analysis is unique in laying blame for depoliticization not only on the usual suspects, elites that seek to pacify the masses and distract them from political activism, but also on elements of old, new, and postmodern lefts as well. Within the old Left, Marx himself treated politics as epiphenomenal, and the Soviets destroyed genuine mass participation; within the new Left, political activists often had a viscerally antistatist and antipolitical stance, while many of those attracted to the counterculture replaced politics with narcissistic self-actualization that abandoned politics entirely. As for postmodernism, Boggs accepts that older theories and hierarchies needed shaking up, but he laments postmodernists' turn away from politics and toward modes of analysis that pose little threat to economic and political power structures.

This woeful catalogue of the many ways in which the system sustains itself leaves the reader wondering if there is any hope for change. Boggs concedes the problem, and, consistent with his analysis, he looks to politics for the way out. He presents an annotated inventory of leftist political parties in the United States, and calls for a new ideology appropriate to a postindustrial age. Unfortunately, his solutions are sketchy. What this new ideology would look like, how the splinter parties of the Left could coalesce, and why greater participation would likely help the Left are undeveloped.

Panoramic social critiques have characteristic shortcomings. There are many sweeping generalizations here, frequently repeated. One small example from this reviewer's area of specialty will suffice. In asserting flatly that the differences between the major U. S. parties are disappearing, Boggs is on firm ground if he is referring solely to macroeconomic policy. It would be more difficult to justify the assertion with regard to social issues such as abortion, gun control, or gay rights, areas of very personal concern to many citizens who might be attracted to Boggs's ideal leftist coalition. The book has a repetitious quality: arguments, and sometimes even exact wording (see pp. 51 and 63), appear and reappear like events in *Catch-22*. Finally, the index contains very few of the numerous proper names that appear throughout the text.

These shortcomings do not overshadow the genuine accomplishment of Boggs's book, which presents a comprehensive analysis of the decline of American politics at a time when, as Boggs argues, politics is needed more than ever.

HOWARD L. REITER
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**Global Capital and National Politics: Reforming Mexico's Financial System** *by Timothy P. Kessler. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1999. 208 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $21.95.*

This is a fine study of the politics of financial reform in Mexico. Kessler carefully traces the evolution of Mexican financial policy during the last thirty years, showing how political elites consistently manipulated financial policy as a tool for coalition-building and political survival. In addition to shedding new light on the Mexican case, this politician-centered approach to financial policy has broader relevance. Scholars and policy makers have increasingly recognized that the recent global wave of market-oriented, neoliberal policy reform has resulted not in the universal triumph of free markets, but rather in curious amalgams of liberal, pro-market and illiberal, antimarket institutions at both the national and subnational levels. By setting domestic political factors at the center of analysis, this book helps us understand why neoliberal reforms have had such varied and often surprising consequences.

The heart of the book is a case study of Mexican financial policy between 1970 and 1999. By taking an in-depth look at the financial policies implemented by each of the five presidential administrations during this period, Kessler shows how these policies often did not fit the ideological mold (for example, populism or, alternatively, neoliberalism) conventionally seen as characterizing each administration. Thus the empirical evidence supports Kessler's argument that Mexican financial policy was driven by complex and varied political pressures, not by coherent ideological or technical blueprints.

The analysis of the populist administrations of presidents Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) and José López Portillo (1976–1982) is especially intriguing because it challenges the conventional view of populism as illiberal and antimarket. Because of the political imperative of securing the resources required to fuel high levels of public spending, both Echeverría and López Portillo actually carried out liberalizing, pro-market reforms in the financial sector by deregulating the banking system and strengthening markets for debt and equity.

Just as Kessler's study reveals a liberal side to these populist administrations, it also highlights a populist side to the neoliberal administrations of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) and Carlos Salinas (1988–1994). Although de la Madrid liberalized the securities market and reprivatized brokerage houses, reforms that can be seen as conforming to neoliberal orthodoxy, he also implemented a massive government bailout of indebted corporations, a move that does not fit neoliberal prescriptions. Kessler shows how this incongruent mix of policies makes sense in light of de la Madrid's overarching political goal of reviving the ruling party's strained alliance with big business. Similarly, Kessler shows that financial policy under Salinas consisted of a package of reforms that does not fit neatly into any ideological mold. Salinas liberalized capital markets and reprivatized banks. But his government extended illiberal, anticompetitive protections to the banks and artificially inflated the country's currency via ex-

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change rate interventions. Kessler argues convincingly that these illiberal measures—especially the maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate—were meant to shore up support for the ruling party among middle class and poor voters in the context of an increasingly competitive political system.

The main shortcoming of the book is its somewhat simplified view of the Mexican political system during the long period of hegemony by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Kessler self-consciously conflates "state, party, and presidential interests" (p. 13) and chooses not to consider how conflict or slack among the distinct political and bureaucratic actors involved in financial policy might help explain its uneven, patchwork nature. A more nuanced picture of how the old PRI regime worked would have added to the considerable merits of this book.

RICHARD SNYDER
*University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign*

**National Politics in a Global Economy: The Domestic Sources of U.S. Trade Policy** *by Philip A. Mundo. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1999. 308 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $22.95.*

This is a timely book. As political conflict over globalization has begun to spill over into demonstrations in the streets of Seattle and Washington, and as Congress wrestles with the issue of whether to authorize the president to negotiate new trade agreements, Philip Mundo has written an informative new book about American trade politics. With the direction of American trade policy now open to question (perhaps more than at any time since the 1950s) and with the future of the international trading system at stake, it seems more important than ever to examine the forces that shape American trade politics.

Mundo has written the book for a broad audience of students and nonspecialists. It begins with an overview of the history of American trade policy, tracing the roots of the debates over free trade and protectionism back to the disputes between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. There is a chapter that frames the trade policy-making process in terms of its component stages (agenda setting, program adoption, and implementation) and major influences (interests, institutions, and ideas). The book then examines recent GATT agreements, the battle over NAFTA, the channels through which industries can appeal for administrative relief from import-competition, and the protective measures adopted for several major industries (steel, automobiles, and semiconductors) in recent decades.

There is plenty of important information here. There are wonderful accounts, for instance, of how Congress wrestled with trade legislation in 1988 and how the Clinton administration pushed for passage of NAFTA in 1993. Mundo also does a fine job of describing how the administrative relief mecha-

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nisms work and how they have changed over time. Most impressive are the detailed descriptions of the evolution of U.S. policies affecting the steel, automobile, and semiconductor industries.

There is less here of theoretical interest. The overall theme is that domestic politics matters. This is no revelation to anyone familiar with the literature on the political economy of trade or with the substance of trade politics. The book never attempts to tackle the deeper question of how security and other foreign policy concerns, and the dynamics of international bargaining interact with domestic forces to produce policy outcomes. While the separation of agenda setting, adoption, and implementation phases of the policy-making process may be useful as a descriptive device, it is not used to further theoretical development in any direction. And while there are references throughout to the importance of interests, institutions, and ideas in shaping outcomes, these are not integrated in any way. Fundamental questions about the pattern of interests, the origins of institutions, and the effects of ideas and information are left unexamined.

On more specific points, Mundo falls into the common trap of assuming that American presidents are constitutionally disposed to favoring trade liberalization, when in fact many Republican presidents were diehard protectionists before 1945. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) and later renewals, by which Congress delegated authority over policy to the president, are portrayed here as the simple result of Congress realizing the error of its past protectionist ways and choosing to shift policy-making power to someone better able to withstand lobbying pressures. This interpretation must be revised to account for early partisan conflict over the RTAA and for the recent failures to renew fast-track authority. A source of more general frustration is that Mundo shies away from taking stands on key policy questions, preferring simply to describe views on either side of issues like the causes and correct responses to the U.S. trade deficit, the extent to which trade increases wage inequality, and whether "strategic" policies to assist high-technology industries are warranted.

MICHAEL J. HISCOX
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**Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence** *by Mark Juergensmeyer. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000. 316 pp. $27.50.*

This comparative cultural study of religious terrorism is in two parts. The first consists of case studies of Hamas, Sinn Fein, the Kach party, and the like. It is based on scores of goal-directed, unstructured interviews over several years. Part two examines the "logic" of the cases. We learn that terrorism is driven less by strategic considerations than by symbols. It is "theatrical violence,"

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carefully staged for dramatic effect, not for its practical utility. This explains its most notable attributes. It attacks signifiers of collective security like parks, airports, federal buildings, and churches. It is staged on holidays: Ramadan, April 19, the Olympics, etc. It is played out with full awareness of television ratings. Above all, it is mythically charged. It sees its acts as episodes in a cosmic war between Good and Evil. Evil is pictured as chaos, a prefiguration of death. It is an anonymous corporate category, placement in which renders anyone guilty, including the otherwise innocent child and mother. In the manner of an allopathic remedy, their murder is a small pain administered to cure a virulent disease.

This book addresses intriguing questions. What is "silent terror"? Why is America today so often a target of terrorists? What is a "secondary enemy"? What are the steps in satanization"? Most importantly, why? What is the cause of terrorism? Juergensmeyer argues that the typical terrorist is young, male, single, and poor. At least in Muslim countries, he has few licit sexual outlets. His terrorist cell compensates for this by presenting itself as a homoerotic "marriage" between comrades. Its hypermasculine stance against women and vice is an abreaction to the terrorists' sense of emasculation. The gun is their symbolic phallus, the bomb its explosive ejaculation, their frenzy of hate the orgasmic seizure. What this means is that terrorists don't fight because they have enemies; they manufacture enemies so they can fight. The dynamics of struggle empowers those who have no other way of heroically signifying themselves.

But terrorism not only empowers the terrorist; it also revivifies his faith, for it compels the materialistic, secular mind to heed the spiritual dimension of the human soul. More than anything, today's terrorist rejects on principle "de-centered," open-minded, postmodern sensibilities. He yearns for a pre-modern world and the comforting security of rigid boundaries.

This book is far less tendentious than Scott Appleby's *Ambivalence of the Sacred* (1999), which also emphasizes the religious factor in "political" violence. But there is a price for Juergensmeyer's breezily engaging style, namely, an evident carelessness about the facts. It is Gritz, not "Greitz." Although implicated in the crime, Bob Mathews is not suspected of actually having "killed" Allen Berg. British Israelism was never anti-Semitic. Most Montana Freemen were not Identity Christians, but radical constitutionalists. Errors of this sort regarding Americans lead one to suspect there also may be misstatements about non-Americans. None of this, however, bears on the validity of the author's theory. Overall, this is an insightful, subjectively sensitive, and as far as I can tell, true account of affairs. Recommended for public libraries and for students of international relations.

JAMES A. AHO
*Idaho State University*

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**All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies** *by Michael Herb. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999. 352 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $25.95.*

Michael Herb tackles an important and interesting question: What explains the success or failure of monarchies? Herb argues that family control over state institutions helps smooth over potentially difficult questions of succession; provides an extensive, loyal information network for the ruler; and makes the ruler accountable to the dynasty. This promotes cohesion of the family and unity among the ruling elite. Thus dynastic monarchies can weather political crises, and nondynastic monarchies are likely to fail.

The author presents his argument in a well-written, concise analysis of Middle Eastern monarchies. In the first section, he describes the characteristics of ruling families and the rise of dynastic rule in petrostates. The next chapters examine how dynastic rule mitigated the problems of internal cohesion and external threats in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Oman. Finally, he examines the cases of nondynastic rule (Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, and Morocco) arguing that nondynastic monarchies are unstable. Where they have survived, such as in Jordan and Morocco, personal statecraft—and a bit of luck—played important roles in maintaining the regime.

The argument is not entirely convincing. Herb largely ignores an important counterexplanation for the success or failure of monarchies: the fragmentation or cohesion of political opposition. As John Waterbury argues, monarchs maintain rule by arbitrating over competing centers of power. In this case, the shah of Iran's critical mistake in maintaining rule was not that the Pahlavis failed to develop family rule, but that the shah formed a single political party in the 1970s and uniformly repressed political opposition. At least regarding Iran, this explanation is more satisfying than Michael Herb's: The Pahlavis sustained a nondynastic monarchy for more than seventy years (longer than the "successful" dynastic monarchies in the Gulf states). However, they fell less than four years after the shah eliminated competing political parties and formed his officially sanctioned Rastakhiz party. Moreover, the counterargument is consistent with the fact that failed monarchies generally have larger populations than successful monarchies. Libya, with five million people, is an exception among failed monarchies, and Saudi Arabia and Morocco, with nineteen and twenty-four million people respectively, are notably large, successful monarchies. Monarchs ruling small states may find it easier to divide and manage opposition groups successfully, thus helping to maintain their rule.

The counterargument does not negate Michael Herb's contribution. Rather, John Waterbury's and Michael Herb's arguments are complementary. Herb gives an interesting, useful explanation of the continued cohesion of the ruling coalition, while Waterbury focuses on the presence or absence of destabilizing political opposition. A complete theory of regime stability requires both.

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In addition, *All in the Family* makes several other important contributions to the prevailing literature. For scholars interested in the Middle East, it provides a wealth of substantive information on some largely understudied states. For this alone, it is important. Moreover, the book provides important lessons about authoritarian regimes both within and outside the region. First, it suggests that elite control over state resources and the identification of a particular group with the regime should help ensure the cohesion of the ruling coalition. This can help explain the success of minority regimes as well as family rule. Second, it makes an important contribution to the rentier literature. Herb shifts our focus away from the resources-elite command in petrostates toward the mechanisms by which monarchies maintain themselves. Finally, the analysis extends our understanding of monarchies specifically and authoritarian regimes more generally. Not all authoritarian regimes are identical; not even all monarchies are similar. Important differences in institutional arrangements of these regimes exist, and they must be taken seriously. Michael Herb's *All in the Family* does so, and it provides an interesting, thoughtful contribution to the literature. This work deserves serious attention from scholars and policy makers interested in the Middle East or the stability of authoritarian states more generally.

ELLEN LUST-OKAR
*Yale University*

**Being Modern in Iran** *by Fariba Adelkhah. Jonathan Derrick, trans. New York, Columbia University Press, 2000. 190 pp. $25.00.*

Fariba Adelkhah asks in the preface to the English edition of her book, do the surprise victory of Mohammad Khatami in the May 1997 presidential election and the subsequent victories of his supporters in the municipal elections of February 1999 and the parliamentary elections of spring 2000 mark "a new era of 'post-Islamism' for Iran and for the Muslim world more generally" (p. viii)? An urban anthropologist based in Paris, Adelkhah offers a persuasive analysis of the profound changes that had been shaping Iranian society over the previous two decades and which crystallized in Mohammad Khatami's election. Written before that election and published shortly after it in French, the book covers these critical changes with great insight. Adelkhah focuses in each chapter of this elegantly dense book on particular urban institutions and practices of daily life to argue that these transformations involved several dimensions: First, "the bureaucratising and above all the rationalising of social life have made considerable progress over twenty years. No sphere of society is free of this trend, religion least of all" (p. xi). This process of bureacratization and rationalization has in turn produced paradoxical and unintended consequences, most impor-

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tantly "the political field has . . . become differentiated from the religious field" (p. xii).

In the Introduction, the author considers not only the grand political questions that have preoccupied political analysts of revolutions and societies in transition, but seeks understanding of the complexities of revolutionary and transitional developments through study of "the religious practices of the believers, such as participation in new forms of religious gathering, ritualizing of a ceremony for the 'age of obligation' for children, reform of Islamic education on formal schooling lines, and use of new media in dealing with religious matters" (p. 5). Adelkhah looks at the global and local processes that have led to "the creation of a unified national space" down to "changes in funeral rites, the press, and the increasing number of manuals dealing with 'caring for oneself' in the fields of food, health and beauty, and in consumption practices in daily life" (p. 6).

Subsequent chapters flesh out this approach. Chapter 1 looks at transformations of Teheran under Gholamhossein Karbaschi from a "geography of nostalgia" to a "geography of desire" (p. 16). Adelkhah analyzes how the vast municipal program of construction of a network of public gardens produced spaces and scenes for "reconciliation and conflict," for "alliance and tension." Public parks became the early stages for production of civil society (pp. 20–21). "The public parks, watered everyday by local taxes, are an essential element of consensus, conflict and movement within the 'democratic city.' They are helping it gradually to win preeminence over the old city of the guilds, and they may be proclaiming the birth of a new idea of citizenship" (p. 27).

Chapter 2 looks at transformation of the concept of *javânmardi* (man of integrity) into a "modern political 'imaginaire'" (p. 46). Chapter 3 traces the changes in the institution of charity: "[C]haritable action is no longer the attribute of the devout only. It can be a form of social participation, favoured by women of the middle and upper classes who find in it an opportunity for going out, for social contact, even for showing off" (p. 55). Chapter 4 analyzes the dynamic between "centralisation and localisation" in post-1979 Iran, demonstrating some of the continuities between post-revolutionary developments and the old regime.

Chapter 5, "A New Public Space for Islam?" considers the changes through which the religious domain itself has gone, concluding that "the politico-religious issues of the Islamic Republic not only confound too rigid categorizations between the popular, learned and political forms of religious activity, but also arise at the meeting point of the national and the local, of control and participation. Indeed, they can only be understood in terms of the creation of a public space, even of a civil society" (pp. 111–112).

In a final chapter and a conclusion the author brings to our attention that, contrary to much current literature about premodern or obscurantist nature of Islamist movements and governments, what we are witnessing in Iran is precisely about "Being Modern in Iran": "[T]he public policies of the Republic

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relating to the body and life, for example regarding sexuality and dress, are not the expression of an obscurantist return to the past, as is often said, but of modernity. . . . Iran's modernity comes precisely from the formation of the moral being, the social being, to the extent that he is constantly and critically renegotiating the relation between private and public" (pp. 176–177).

The Islamic Revolution, Adelkhah concludes, "triumphed over an illusion: the illusion of a modernity that would have confined religion to the private sphere." But she also warns us of the opposite illusion, "which would make Islam the conveyer of modernity *par excellence* or even the alpha and omega of socio-political change. It is more prosaically a part of Iran, certainly a central part, but not necessarily more important from the social point of view than, say, the reality of cities, the search for knowledge, the economic crisis, the upward thrust of youth, the regional environment and family obligations" (p. 178).

For anyone interested in understanding the complexities of contemporary Iranian politics, this book should be mandatory reading.

AFSANEH NAJMABADI
*Barnard College*

**How the Troubles Came to Northern Ireland** *by Peter Rose. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1999. 216 pp. $69.65.*

Anyone who doubts the ability of violence to concentrate the minds of politicians should cast an eye over Peter Rose's book on Labour party policy toward Northern Ireland during the 1960s. Even during the civil rights protests, "the last thing on his [Harold Wilson's] mind was Northern Ireland" (p. 91). In 1966, Roy Jenkins, the British home secretary, admitted that it was "about 12th on my agenda" (p. 46). When James Callaghan succeeded Jenkins as home secretary in 1997, he asked his private secretary to provide briefs on the priority issues he would face during his early months. Six concerns were identified, "but not a word about Northern Ireland" (p. 92). It did not even feature on the agenda for the 1968 Labour party conference.

Less than a year later, the picture had been transformed by the outbreak of violence. Richard Crossman's cabinet diaries reported on the new priorities, referring to "the other big story of the week. . . . Northern Ireland is *of course* [emphasis added] far more important than Rhodesia, infinitely more important than Anguilla, here we are on the edge of civil war" (p. 146).

This book sets out to answer "one central question: Why did the government not act sooner?" (p. xiii). Rose shows clearly that elements within the party were well aware of the abuses in what was described by a 1966 investigation by the *Sunday Times* as "John Bull's Political Slum." Since 1923, the Labour party's failure to address the issue was rooted in a convention that Westminster should stay clear of Northern Ireland's domestic affairs, a convention

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that Rose shows was legally dubious. It was reinforced by irritation at Dublin's neutrality during World War II and its decision to leave the Commonwealth in 1948. Above all, every British politician knew that the history of Anglo-Irish relations since the 1870s was dotted with the gravestones of predecessors who had set out to solve the Irish Question.

So the Labour party was aware of the issue, but chose not to act. There is, of course, a follow-up question. If the Labour party had moved more quickly to address the emerging crisis in Northern Ireland, would we have been spared thirty years of violence? Having posed the question, Rose's answer is lame. "It is not possible to prove that such a course would have worked but many share the view that it might have done" (p. xiv). His most novel discovery is that contingency plans had been drawn up in late 1968 for intervention, including the possibility of direct rule. This was regarded as a final and unlikely resort.

The book does not explain "how the Troubles came to Northern Ireland," as its title claims. What it does is give a useful and tidy review of the Labour party policy on Northern Ireland from 1964 to 1969. It provides an efficient narrative, enriched by interviews with civil servants and politicians. The results reinforce rather than change previous perceptions. Terence O'Neill, Northern Ireland's prime minister, was even more indecisive and out of his depth than he seemed at the time. It is refreshing to be reminded how old-fashioned expressions of sectarianism have been replaced by more politically correct abuse. The strength of Unionist confidence in their ability to maintain the Stormont system seems almost incomprehensible. Reading it during the week when the Ulster Unionist Council seemed to shackle progress toward a political compromise is a reminder that the changes during peace processes are more difficult for power-holders than power-seekers.

JOHN DARBY
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**Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior** *by Scott Snyder. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. 220 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $17.50.*

In foreign policy, Americans have the unfortunate tendency to demonize their political adversaries, especially those they understand only imperfectly. The term "rogue regime" takes pride of place in the current political lexicon, but other popular epithets include labeling a state "unpredictable," "crazy," or "irrational." Unfortunately, this combination of anti-intellectual contempt and reflexive jingoism has real policy consequences. Sooner or later, adversaries may seek accommodation, leading Washington to improve relations with the former object of scorn. It is then faced with the embarrassing task of explaining to the American people how U.S. officials can sit down and break bread today with

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people they were vilifying only yesterday. More immediately, this approach presents policy makers with an analytical dead end. How can the United States comprehend the reasons for a state's behavior—and thereby shape the appropriate policy response—if it believes its leadership to be certifiably unbalanced?

Few countries better characterize this dilemma for the United States than North Korea, a diplomatic black hole led by a reclusive leader espousing a trumped-up ideology of individual self-reliance. The North has the capability to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and mount them on ballistic missiles. North Korean conventional forces are large, forward-based, and threatening to South Korea and the American troops stationed there. Pyongyang also exports ballistic missiles to Pakistan and the Middle East, thereby destabilizing other regions around the globe. That this behavior frustrates U.S. foreign policy objectives in Northeast Asia and elsewhere is not in question. What is much more difficult to discern is: Why does the North behave this way? And what, if anything, can the United States do to influence North Korean policy in more constructive directions?

At a time when the North appears to be seeking greater engagement with the outside world, it is particularly useful that Scott Snyder has tried to lift the veil of North Korean secrecy and divine the underlying patterns in North Korea's negotiating strategy, style, and tactics. The great strength of Snyder's study is his emphasis on taking the long view—grounding North Korean negotiating behavior in the country's distinctive historical and cultural experience, especially through its participation in the guerrilla war waged against Japanese colonial rule. "Always probing for weakness, avoiding frontal attacks, maintaining endurance while using tactics of diversion to disguise potential weakness, pocketing concessions without reciprocating" (pp. 24–25)—these are some of the lessons the North has transferred from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

*Negotiating on the Edge* would have been more rigorous if it had paid greater attention to the diplomatic maneuvering by the United States and KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) that served as the counterpoint to the North's own negotiating behavior. Only by understanding both sides can the North's behavior be fully evaluated. Snyder seems to realize this, at one point explaining Pyongyang's resort to "crisis-oriented tactics" as a means to force the U.S. to pay more than sporadic attention to the North's agenda. But the need to understand this larger context extends well beyond the negotiating room. For example, Snyder cites the North's booming "vituperative propaganda over North Korean loudspeakers aimed at the South" at the December 1996 ceremony when Seoul handed over the remains of the North Korean commandos who had been killed after their submarine had run aground off the South Korean coast three months earlier (p. 88). Yet Snyder doesn't ask why the North Koreans were handed the cremated remains of their soldiers instead of the actual corpses (pictures of which had appeared immediately after the

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North Koreans were located in the South) and whether this might have had anything to do with their belligerent response.

What emerges from Snyder's book is that the North Koreans are adequate but hardly gifted negotiators. Undoubtedly, this reflects their lack of sophistication about the way the world works (due to their not getting out very much), as well as their country's relatively weak position and limited options. Examples large and small abound in the negotiating histories mined by Snyder. The North offered to pay for the nuclear power reactors in the Agreed Framework nuclear deal and yet was still forced to accept that they would be South Korean in origin. The North always relied on KEDO to produce a first draft of protocols, thereby ceding the initiative and the chance to set the agenda. The North's repeated efforts to elicit concessions by engaging in brinkmanship gradually lost their drama after their threats proved hollow. However, Pyongyang was able to manipulate the negotiations to its advantage when its negotiating partner was unclear as to its objectives (unfortunately, a not infrequent occurrence) or worse, impatient to reach agreement. The United States and KEDO were much more effective negotiators when they promoted coherent, reasonable positions and maintained them.

An undercurrent running through all of Snyder's analysis is caution; he refrains from drawing hard and fast conclusions. His findings are often highly conditional and sometimes even contradictory—not dissimilar to North Korean behavior. In other studies, this caution would be a serious shortcoming. Here, it is a tribute to his care as a scholar. As Snyder well knows, humility should be our lodestar when dealing with Pyongyang, patience our constant companion. With North Korea, the only thing we know for sure is how little we know.

MITCHELL B. REISS
*College of William & Mary*

**Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis**
*by William H. Gleysteen, Jr. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 256 pp. $29.95.*

This is an important book that is interesting and valuable for shedding light on the workings of U.S. policy during perhaps the most fascinating period of U.S.–Korea relations since the Korean War. William Gleysteen, U.S. ambassador to Korea between 1978–1980, was confronted with a series of events that created a great deal of friction in the bilateral alliance during a time highly critical in terms of the regional strategic balance: the Carter plan to withdraw U.S. troops in Korea; the assassination of Korean President Park Chung Hee; the coup and seizure of power by Chun Doo Hwan; military brutality and the massacre of civilians in Kwangju City; and the saving of dissident Kim Dae Jung, the current Korean president, from execution. This was a period of singularly

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tumultuous events for a single ambassador's career, and the book highlights the complexities of managing a position that forces one to capitulate to the domestic pressures of two countries, while ultimately being answerable and responsible for policy outcomes that may seem satisfactory to neither.

Nevertheless, this work should be read carefully and with a large grain of salt. The book's information is most useful for those who already have some knowledge of the events covered in this book, as these accounts are very detailed and clearly one-sided interpretations of the events. This book does offer some astute and fair-minded assessments of the Korean perspective. As an outsider to Korean domestic politics, Gleysteen may be in a better position to offer objective and revealing insights. However, it is important to keep in mind that he is not a disinterested observer and clearly represents an agenda with particular interests.

In addition, while the book is clearly written in crisp language that brings to life the fascinating behind-the-scene events in great detail, the lack of some explanations leaves the reader frustrated. For example, Gleysteen is highly critical of President Jimmy Carter's troop withdrawal and human rights plans, which Gleysteen believes were conceived in abstraction from East Asian realities and therefore contributed to Park's demise. Gleysteen often describes the particular challenges he faced amid the often ignorant, narrow-minded, and stubborn views and policies of the Carter White House, which seemed to all but ignore the sensitivities of the Korean psyche or regional security factors. But Gleysteen never sheds light on Carter's stubbornness in insisting on total troop withdrawal despite a clear and highly unusual consensus within the administration in opposition to this position. Carter's near zealous insistence on human rights is also not adequately explained, because Gleysteen implies that ultimately Carter always sacrificed human rights goals for security goals.

Finally, the title of this book is ironic, because Gleysteen's account begs the question: Why was U.S. influence "marginal"? Gleysteen explains in great detail how the United States really had marginal ability to influence Korean domestic politics, oftentimes referring to the dilemma the United States faced in possessing military and economic leverage too powerful to use. Yet the consequences of this dilemma are never adequately explained. And he also admits at times, quite correctly, that Koreans—both the leaders and general society—are greatly influenced by what Americans think and want. Adding to the inconsistency, Gleysteen also argues that the United States did have an effect on Korean domestic politics, for example in promoting political liberalization and stability.

Ultimately, despite these deficiencies, the book itself is an important contribution to both the American and Korean public records, if for nothing else than the purposes of dispelling rumors and misconceptions about the U.S. role in these critical Korean events.

BALBINA Y. HWANG
*Georgetown University*

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**Republic of Denial: Press, Politics, and Public Life** *by Michael Janeway. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999. 216 pp. $22.50.*

Here is another classic in the government-media-bashing tradition that has become fashionable among academics and media gurus. Michael Janeway, whose career has spanned government service, newspaper and journal editing, and academia, laments the breakdown of political structures in the United States since the 1960s. The country has become socially and culturally fragmented, the public has become depressed and alienated from bad government and worse politics, and the political disasters have hurled the media into a maelstrom of decline. What is worse, there is little chance that the descent to doom can be reversed because all of the movers and shakers are frozen into a state of denial.

*Republic of Denial* is Janeway's analysis of how it all happened and why. He acknowledges that other writers have dissected the social and political trends of these pivotal decades in greater detail than is possible or intended in his brief volume. His special contribution, Janeway argues, is to tell the story based on the unique perspective of an insider who combines work experience in government with extensive experience in practical and academic journalism. It is an ominous story that must be told with brutal frankness in hopes of alerting Americans to the gravity of the crisis that is encircling them.

Who are the main culprits in the debasement of government and the media? On the governmental side, they are overly-demanding, often violent interest groups, declining political parties, and unprincipled, corrupt politicians. On the media side, the rise of television has turned solid news into cotton-candy infotainments. Pressured by advertisers, marketers have turned to tabloid journalism and have splintered the national audience into ever smaller segments. Business tycoons, with their eyes glued on the bottom line of profits, are ever ready to cut the resources needed for excellent journalism and to divert profits into the nonmedia sectors of their huge and diverse business conglomerates.

The best and the brightest among young journalists, along with a few elite print media institutions, are the remaining ray of hope that the precious cultural values of the past may be rekindled. But journalism leaders will not be able to pull the country away from disaster as long as American government remains "ineffective, degraded, debased, despised, incompetent to deal with society's real and deep problems, and irrelevant to so many millions of Americans" (p. 171). Political power inevitably trumps media power.

I do not share Michael Janeway's vision of gloom and doom about the future of American politics and the future of American journalism. Though he will probably see my disagreement with his worst-case interpretation of the American scene as an example of unwarranted denial, I see it as a case of greater realism. The problems that Janeway discusses in the political arena and in journalism are real; but they are neither as universal nor as serious and incurable as he alleges. Many of the developments that he labels as utter disasters have their positive aspects along with the negative ones. For example, niche

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programming, which he sees as the cause of destructive social and political fragmentation, has the advantage of serving the interests of many hitherto neglected groups. The dire consequences that he attributes to segmentation have not happened. The United States is not on the verge of becoming a feudal society split into thousands of disconnected ghettos.

*Republic of Denial* may serve well as a warning clarion call that shatters illusions that all is well on the political and media fronts. But the message loses persuasiveness because its lack of nuances strains credibility.

DORIS GRABER
*University of Illinois at Chicago*

**School Choice and Social Controversy: Politics, Policy and Law** *edited by Stephen D. Sugarman and Frank R. Kemerer. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 380 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

Few current policy issues are as politically contentious as the school choice movement and especially educational vouchers and charter schools. Educational vouchers comprise a financing mechanism in which private schools, both for-profit and nonprofit, and public schools compete for students in an educational marketplace. A government-provided, tuition voucher is the funding mechanism. Cleveland, Milwaukee, and the state of Florida sponsor voucher plans at present, and legislation or constitutional initiatives on vouchers are on the drawing boards of many states. Charter schools are public schools that are largely exempt from state and local educational regulations as long as they meet the goals set out in their charter applications. In less than a decade, the charter school movement has expanded to about 1,700 schools in more than thirty states. Many are operated by for-profit, educational management organizations. Both of these movements emphasize the expansion of choice and diverse schooling opportunities through deregulation and markets.

Debates about charter schools and vouchers tend to be strong on assertion and weak on evidence. Advocates claim that both types of schools will be more responsive to student needs than existing public school "monopolies" and will improve educational outcomes at lower cost through market competition. Detractors argue that they will lead to increasing inequities as well as racial and social stratification through skim creaming of more able students without compensating improvements in academic performance. The debate tends to be emotional and ruled more by ideology than evidence. In contrast, this volume is a highly readable compilation of chapters that are balanced in tone and informative in content. This is not to say that every reader will agree with every contention and interpretation, but the book has the earmarks of highly reasoned discourse.

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Jeffrey Henig and Stephen Sugarman address the nature and extent of school choice by delineating the types of choice including private schools, home schooling, vouchers, charter schools, various forms of intradistrict and interdistrict choice and residential choice. In contrast to those who charge that the public schools are a singular monopoly, they conclude that about 60 percent of elementary and secondary students are in schools of choice. Robert Bulman and David Kirp address the politics underlying the rise of school choice movements with evaluation of specific cases. Jeffrey Henig attempts to summarize the impacts of educational choice on educational outcomes. Although his conclusions are buttressed by available data, this is likely to be the most controversial contribution. Stephen Sugarman provides a good analytic survey of school funding and choice, arguing that such a system of school finance could ultimately separate the amount of per-pupil spending from the locality. Paul Hill questions whether school supply can respond adequately to meet an expansion of demand. Frank Kemerer provides a lucid discussion on how schools of choice can be accountable to parental and state interests without overly burdensome regulation.

The final section of the book contains essays on legal issues. Robert M. O'Neil questions whether the new forms of school choice can impose constitutional obligations on private schools such as freedom of expression in religious institutions. Jesse Choper provides a provocative discourse on the long-debated question of whether public funding for religious schools will pass constitutional muster (it's a very close call). The final chapters address legal and policy issues regarding racial diversity and choice (by Betsy Levin), teachers' unions and school choice (by William Buss), and implications for students with disabilities (by Laura Rothstein).

Academics who teach courses on public policy should consider this for use as a text. Its coverage of pertinent subjects, its clarity, and its balance recommend it highly. For those who simply wish to become informed on the subject of school choice in its several different forms, this is an excellent source.

HENRY M. LEVIN
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**Choosing Equality: School Choice, The Constitution, and Civil Society**
*by Joseph P. Viteritti. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 284 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $18.95.*

For Joseph Viteritti the answer is school choice. With education voucher programs slowly gaining ground and charter schools expanding exponentially, that is not an unusual answer today. What distinguishes Viteritti's analysis and keeps *Choosing Equality* from being just the latest in a lengthening line of pro-

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choice manifestos is the particular framing of the question to which he voices that answer.

Public debate about school choice has been framed primarily within the market metaphor. From this vantage point, the question is how to bring the stimulating forces of competition to bear on a sector long buffered by bureaucracy and enforced governmental monopoly. The answer is that freeing families to select the school that best meets their children's needs, with the assurance that public funding will travel with them to the receiving school, will force schools to increase quality and become more attentive to consumers' demands.

Others have settled on school choice for very different reasons and as an answer to very different questions. Some progressive educators have seen choice as a way to make room for schools offering alternative forms of education. Some libertarians see choice as a way to maximize personal freedom and attenuate the power of government to instill conformity of thought and behavior. Some proponents of racial integration have seen choice in the form of magnet schools as a pragmatic compromise—an answer to the question of how cities can counter the threat of white flight in a political and legal environment that is not conducive to using governmental authority to mandate that children of different races and ethnic backgrounds go to school with one another.

The first half of *Choosing Equality* is a useful, albeit fairly conventional review of the various arguments in favor of school choice. Viteritti tries to give due consideration to the concerns of choice critics. He acknowledges that there is at least some risk that vouchers and charter schools might cream off middle-income students or exacerbate social fragmentation by allowing like-minded families to huddle together protecting their children from ideas and values that are in any way different from their own. But Viteritti's heart is not really in this exercise of weighing pros against cons. He thinks most choice critics are simply wrong-headed, and because he sees the current system as patently unproductive and unfair, he has little tolerance for those who counsel caution in the name of protecting the valued elements of democratically directed public education and the ideal of the common school. While an unbalanced presentation in my view, these early chapters make a welcome contribution to the literature in at least two senses. First, Viteritti draws together a fairly wide range of literature and offers an up-to-date account of a phenomenon that has been rapidly changing. Second, his eclectic sampling of the pro-choice arguments makes for a stronger base, I believe, than the crisper but one-dimensional arguments fashioned out of abstract economic theory.

In the second half of the book, Viteritti's argument gets more original and interesting. His central goal is to promote community and social capital in low-income neighborhoods. When he asks himself how to do this, the answer he favors has to do with religion and the culture and values that he believes are uniquely promulgated in parochial schools. School choice, then, is not a value in itself, nor is it to be valued for its link to mobility, individualism, and responsiveness to consumer demands. Currently, the healthy environment fostered by

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parochial schools is closed to the poor for reasons of cost. Viteritti wants to open that option to the poor; and the way to do that is to allow public dollars to travel on the backs of low-income students if they choose to transfer out of their local public schools. In the second half of the book, Viteritti fleshes out this rationale for choice and challenges the arguments levied against it, in particular the constitutional objections and the concerns that abandoning the common school ideal will foster intolerance and erode civic values required for healthy democracies.

This is not a book for scholars who have been closely following the school choice debates; they will not find much they have not encountered before. Nor is it a book that will change the minds of many who have thought through the issues and concluded that school choice is both risky and off-target. Even those who are still open-minded to new evidence will be put off by Viteritti's overly cavalier dismissal of competing values and fears. But *Choosing Equality* will find its way into the intellectual armament of the pro-choice movement, and those who have reservations would be wise to treat it seriously, because it has opened another front in the broad public debate.

JEFFREY R. HENIG
*George Washington University*

**Children's Interests/Mothers' Rights: The Shaping of America's Child Care Policy** *by Sonya Michel. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999. 410 pp. $35.00.*

American politics has been forever altered by feminism. Witness the past four presidential campaigns when even Republican candidates, from George Bush, Sr. to George W., have spoken directly to the daily issues faced by women and their young children. Child care and early education are pivotal topics in this ongoing desire to woo female swing voters, from affluent SUV moms to the waitress moms made famous by pollsters.

In this context, Sonya Michel's historical exploration of how political actors have constructed children's interests and mothers' social rights of participation is a timely and thought-provoking work. The volume, more broadly, speaks to the historical forces that shape the formation of public policy and how contests from Washington to city governments are energized by public agencies' own desire to legitimate their presence in the contentious field of who and how young children can best be raised. Because the child-care sector is so localized and illegitimate, she enters new theoretical ground in thinking about policy formulation.

Pushing the analysis deeper, Michel argues that the competing ideas around child care are embedded in how the state constrains or advances women's access to jobs and a wider range of social roles. The civil rights of mothers—

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politically constructed in quite different ways across historical eras—drive the extent to which child care and early education are seen as a public or private responsibility.

The illuminating tension throughout the book turns on the relative force of ideas and raw interests as motivators of policy formulation. Some progressives in the 1920s, including Dorothy Day, favored widowers' pensions over public investment in child care, given the dominant idea that single mothers should focus first on child rearing, not work. Even though female employment grew from 1.9 to 4.6 million in the three decades prior to World War II, the ideal of the maternal role remained dominant, dividing feminists when it came to how best to aid the working poor. Some groups, including key actors in the Roosevelt administration, opposed building child-care centers for women working in the defense industry, despite the rising need for female manufacturing workers. The author delves deeply into such shades of political gray.

Like any fine historian, Michel chronicles how major issues keep cycling in and out of the political discourse over child care, starting in the 1850s and closing the story just prior to President Bill Clinton's approval of the 1996 welfare reforms. We see how the rise in mothers' labor force participation, shared across social classes, over almost a century and a half has placed pressure on state actors to define some degree of public responsibility for child care. The author reports on the long-running tension between those who want to finance custodial day-care versus advocates who talk of early education and developmental practices. And as long as the quality of child care remains so uneven, to this day we see some interest groups arguing that mothers should stay at home within their singular maternal role. The author's panoramic grasp of these historical threads and cycles helps the contemporary analysts place child-care issues in a refreshing context.

Michel makes a strong case for the "multiple origins of American child care" (p.11), from competing ideals of women's roles to how best to raise children to which levels of government hold the legitimacy to socialize the cost and distribution of child-care programs. This eye-opening thesis is in sharp contrast to how she closes the book. After empirically delineating the social and economic forces that have shaped America's contradictory swirl of child-care policies, Michel normatively argues that a French-style, centralized program is the optimal remedy.

Most fundamentally, the negotiated border of public and private—the shifting policy sands that elevate or bury women's economic and social roles, and thus who cares for young children—is drawn by many actors and interest groups. Michel has convinced her reader of this intriguing historical fact. Now perhaps it's hopeful to argue that the savior (central) state will deliver optimal rights for women and define a uniform set of rights for America's children. But in a democratic and increasingly multicultural democracy, it remains unclear how this holy grail can be legislated from inside the Beltway.

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We have inherited a vastly decentralized, mixed-market arrangement of child-care services stemming from these democratic roots. This has created a political economy of schools, churches, nongovernment organizations, and private franchises that run child-care centers. The highly localized interests and constructed ideals that this reinforces mitigates against a Parisian solution to a uniquely American political question. In the meantime, children's interests and women's rights will be the tandem subjects of strident debate, led by presidents and mayors alike. Michel's book helps us understand the historical resilience and depth of this political contest—one which affects the lives of working mothers and their toddlers each day.

BRUCE FULLER
*University of California, Berkeley*

**True Security: Rethinking American Social Insurance** *by Michael J. Graetz and Jerry L. Mashaw. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999. 368 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $16.95.*

The Social Security Act of 1935 was omnibus legislation whose host of programs was supposed to provide economic security for American citizens without interfering unduly with the market. Old-age insurance and unemployment compensation would protect workers from the vagaries of the labor market, and their insurance mechanisms would not weaken the work incentive. The public assistance titles—aid to the blind, old-age assistance, and aid to dependent children—would protect those people who were not expected to work. Other lesser known programs, including child welfare grants, would help the states provide services to raise the next generation of citizens and workers.

That we now think of social security as referring only to the old-age insurance title of the 1935 Act is symbolic evidence of the failure to provide security for all American citizens through these programs. In *True Security*, Michael J. Graetz and Jerry L. Mashaw offer extensive empirical evidence that these 1935 programs plus others, such as workers compensation and health insurance, have not expanded sufficiently or adapted enough to a changing labor market to offer acceptable protection from income loss and inadequacy. For example, they demonstrate that more than 90 percent of workers are nominally covered by unemployment insurance, but in 1995 only 38 percent of the unemployed actually received benefits through this program. Their chapters detailing these failures are cogent, readable, and persuasive, a considerable accomplishment in light of the complexity and breadth of the programs they discuss.

Graetz and Mashaw propose to attack these problems through policies grounded in the concept of social insurance. They want to extend the insurance metaphor beyond the notion of protecting against income loss due to such things as disability or retirement to include guarding against income inade-

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quacy. This leads them to suggest new ways to look at problems. For example, they argue that we should conceive of poverty among children as the child's risk of living in a family with inadequate income at a time when the minor is not in the workforce. In the case of health care, they argue that reform efforts should cease to emphasize the goal of equal access to health care and instead concentrate on protecting people from large and unpredictable medical expenses.

Although Graetz and Mashaw want to use the metaphor of insurance to understand problems, such as a child's risk of having parents with low earnings, they want to move away from a narrow definition of insurance when composing solutions. They propose an array of policy tools, including tax credits, subsidies, and mandates, that go beyond the notion of benefits as annuities paid out when a risk is realized to those who made contributions to a fund. They argue that such tools can be more appropriately tailored to protect against moral hazards, which they see as severe in certain instances, such as insuring children. While they are careful to contemplate certain political exigencies, they do not adequately address the very real possibility that concerns about these moral hazards would overwhelm and eventually defeat efforts to protect against income inadequacy. This possibility—one easily illustrated by welfare reform's emphasis on work requirements, time limits, and caseload reduction even though these may lower considerably the resources available to children—raises questions about the value of pursuing an insurance metaphor as a device to promote security for all American citizens.

CATHY MARIE JOHNSON
*Williams College*

**City Schools and City Politics: Institutions and Leadership in Pittsburgh, Boston, and St. Louis** *by John Portz, Lana Stein, and Robin R. Jones. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1999. 200 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $16.95.*

This interesting and ambitious book seeks to explain why during the 1990s urban school reform largely succeeded in Pittsburgh and Boston but failed miserably in St. Louis. The authors conclude somewhat expansively that race, leadership, resources, community involvement, and politics all significantly influenced the outcomes in these three cases. To initiate and sustain urban school reform, leaders need to use political skills to build a civic interest in reform and the institutional capacity to make it stick. The authors draw upon James MacGregor Burns's classic definition of leadership as "'inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations—the wants and the needs, the aspirations and expectations—of both leaders and followers"' (p.

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31). Leadership needs to come from both elected and nonelected public officials in order for urban school reform to succeed, the authors argue convincingly; and, even appointed school superintendents need to possess and employ political skills in order to succeed.

A central question in both this study and the extensive literature on leadership is the matter of whether leaders control or are controlled by their environments. On this critical question, the authors equivocate. At times they appear to view leaders as titans that can and should transform the environments and institutions surrounding them. In other places, the authors emphasize the power of constraints that limit what leaders can realistically achieve. Some of these contrasting views of the power of leaders appear nearly cheek to jowl. The authors claim: "The expectations and constituencies are many, requiring a balancing act between internal and external forces over which [superintendents have] little control" (p. 35). Two pages later they write: "Leaders are architects in the urban setting; they serve as catalysts for creating and recreating the major institutions of the city" (p. 37). The authors' ultimate position on the constrained-versus-catalyst question seems to be that effective leaders catalyze situational constraints into opportunities. However, much of the content of their cases, particularly the example of abject failure in St. Louis, suggests that it is easier said than done.

The rich case study material in the book, chock full of interesting observations about such matters as the downside of organizational autonomy and *de jure* versus *de facto* racial integration in public schools, strongly suggests that political environments virtually determine the success or failure of school reform in major cities, although the authors do not explicitly make that claim. A parade of different school superintendents with distinct leadership styles passed through the benign political environment of Pittsburgh in the 1990s and all of them were judged to be successful. In contrast, a number of apparently committed reformers broke their lances trying unsuccessfully to turn around the failing public school system in politically contentious St. Louis. Reform efforts only succeeded in Boston after the political environment was transformed by the shift from an elected to an appointed school board, thereby consolidating mayoral power over the schools. This reader was left with the strong impression that, when it comes to successful urban school reform, one should manage the politics and positive results will likely follow.

The above shortcomings notwithstanding, this book is important and should be read by scholars who are concerned about questions of leadership within political contexts and school reformers who wish to learn from the generally checkered history of urban school reform.

PATRICK J. WOLF
*Georgetown University*

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**An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War** *by Janne E. Nolan. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 140 pp. Cloth, $36.95; paper, $14.95.*

Generals constantly refight the last war, even if that war was a cold one. The forces, structures, and strategies that they believe would have helped in the past are applied to new situations, no matter how inappropriate, costly, or counterproductive. Janne Nolan's purpose here is to discover why the expert "consensus" that supported United States cold war strategic nuclear weapons policy for forty years hasn't yet reconstituted around the recognition of a critical new reality: the entity that was to be deterred or contained no longer exists. Her disturbing report is that generals, strategists, and policy makers have found it easier to ignore the end of the cold war or alternatively to construct a patchwork of threats that somehow justify the same set of policies that a monolithic global communist threat did. Planners found—and continue to find—regional instabilities and insurgent new big powers that need to be deterred, oddly enough, with a strategic nuclear triad.

This slim volume examines what the author clearly views as deficits of both democracy and rationality in half-hearted attempts to rethink and remake U.S. strategic policies. After a concise introduction that sets out the problem, and a review of nuclear weapons policy during the cold war, Janne Nolan offers two case studies of failed policy reviews during the Clinton administration: the nuclear posture review of 1993–1994, the nonevolution of deterrence thinking about Africa and the Third World and the resultant failure of a nuclear weapons-free zone treaty. She concludes with an analysis of the failures and several principles for reforming policy.

The critical problem, the author emphasizes, is that President Bill Clinton never emphasized strategic policy and never utilized the constitutionally-guaranteed civilian controls on the military in making foreign and military policies. The administration never dedicated concentrated high-level attention to nuclear weapons issues, delegating reviews to mid-level professional staff, in and outside the military, ill-positioned or disposed to advocate change. The persistence of policies poorly suited for the current world will plague the United States until a president makes nuclear weapons policy a high priority and gives it appropriate attention.

Nolan's cases, buttressed by extensive interviews with current and former policy makers, substantiate her claims and particularly her charges against the Clinton administration. What's missing, however, is a sense of the domestic political realities to which Clinton and his successors respond. Strategic nuclear policy is rarely a high profile issue that offers domestic political payoffs, even though substantial initiatives at reform appear only at those odd times when the public is engaged. In truth, the old consensus about policy reflected stalemate more than agreement. The balance of power between advocates of competing postures, including minimum deterrence and war-winning, fluctuated over the

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cold-war period, but was largely invisible to the broader public. When a president has shifted that balance toward either a more bellicose or more constrained posture, the losers inside the administration have sought—and found—other ways to mobilize domestic political pressure to restore the stalemate.

Thus, the Committee on the Present Danger and its allies during the 1970s helped scuttle détente, and the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s helped restore an arms control regime that made the end of the cold war possible. The engaged executive that Janne Nolan rightly identifies as necessary for substantial reform is unlikely to appear without significant political pressure within the United States. The awful paradox, however, is that political movements on national security don't emerge at the times when they are most likely to get what they want.

DAVID S. MEYER
*University of California–Irvine*

**Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands** *by Yossi Shain. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 300 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $17.95.*

Those who fret that the proliferation of immigrant minorities in the United States since the 1965 Immigration Act makes it more difficult to pursue foreign policies in the national interest should relax. America's diasporas do not constitute a fifth column in American politics; nor does their undeniable preoccupation with homeland politics create divisive or harmful schisms over U.S. policy. Although there is a strong pattern of diaspora intervention in foreign policy disputes involving homelands, these are often ineffective. Even when they are not, the result is more likely to encourage the United States to live up to its principles than to lead to policies inimical to the national interest. To be influential in U.S. politics, ethnic minorities must demonstrate that they are part of the American mainstream. The good news is that the goal of diasporas is to use foreign policy to promote the American creed of democracy, human rights, free-market economics, and religious pluralism. With the end of the cold war, U.S. policy has entered a period of confusion; into this void, ethnic minorities are stepping to lead the way in spreading U.S. values around the world.

This is a rosy and provocative thesis. Is it supported by the evidence? Yossi Shain offers a wealth of information and a spirited exposition, but evidentiary and interpretive weaknesses undermine his argument. He demonstrates that diasporas seek to influence U.S. policy toward homeland governments, but the consequences for the United States or the homelands remain unclear, and his interpretation at critical points is equivocal.

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The author concedes that "diasporas are . . . not always committed to goals compatible with the values mentioned here," but holds that dissident views are found only among some elites whose ability "to manipulate decision makers inside the United States . . . is not clear" (p. 50). He notes that when the United States was hostile to independence for Croatia in the early 1990s, Croatian-Americans "downplayed the rhetoric of self-determination . . . [stressing] the symmetry between cherished American values and their homeland's commitment to democracy" (p. 66). This raises the question, which the author neither poses nor answers, of whether the rhetorical support for democracy was sincere. At another point he admits that "matters concerning the integrity and sovereignty of the ancestral homeland or the safety of the scattered nation are likely to trigger a more intense diaspora involvement than matters concerning the homeland's domestic political struggles" (p. 66), suggesting but not pursuing the possibility that democratic change may be a secondary priority.

With respect to Haiti, he claims that "to a large extent, the Clinton administration was compelled by a successfully mobilized diaspora and its allies to act on the U.S. government's own stated principle of spreading democracy, when the president's own foreign and defense policy experts advocated restraint and an avoidance of direct commitments" (p. 73). He implies but does not show that this was a desirable outcome. As for Cuba, he concedes that the exile community has forced decisions not necessarily in the U.S. interest, but assures us that "the Cuban community centered in Miami is not the same as it was thirty-five years ago." They are "new and more Americanized" and see their identity like other immigrants, "rather than clinging to the exile as the defining characteristic of their existence" (p. 76). Attorney General Janet Reno will be relieved to hear this.

Shain devotes individual chapters to Arab Americans, African-American/Jewish relations, and Mexican Americans, although he does not defend his choices. Surely, Jewish-American influence on U.S. foreign policy would have been as fascinating as their troubled relations with African Americans. Nevertheless, the diasporas he treats raise issues troubling enough for his thesis. His detailed survey of Arab-American politics is filled with worrisome observations that seem inconsistent with the book's optimistic conclusions. He tells us, for example, that leading Palestinian-American scholars deliberately overlooked PLO corruption and authoritarianism while urging U.S. support. Although Muslim orthodoxy poses severe problems for integration in a democratic state that is secular or Christian, he dismisses any concern because the orthodox are a small (though growing) minority. However, he cites a single source to back his claim that the majority is secularist and none at all for the size of the radical component. An epilogue notes a recent renewal of a "conflictual posture" by Arab Americans (p. 129) that belies the sunny trajectory toward assimilationist views central to his argument. With respect to African Americans, Shain's claim that "more and more African-American intellectuals disassociated themselves from the Afrocentric romanticization of Africa and disputed the notion

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of a generic kinship among blacks in America and Africa" is backed only by a self-citation (p. 148). Whether the Mexican diaspora exercises more influence on Mexico than the other way around, as he asserts, I do not know, but he provides no compelling evidence one way or the other. The answer is critical to his thesis, since he documents the growing efforts of the Mexican government to coopt its expatriate community for national purposes.

Yossi Shain stakes out an extreme position on a topic of increasing seriousness: diasporas advocate policies that are truer to the national interests of the United States than those likely to be adopted by the remnants of the traditional Anglo-Saxon foreign policy elite. Implausible on its face, the argument is not satisfactorily supported by the evidence. He tries to show that with the end of the cold war promoting democracy is in the U.S. national interest, but he does not discuss when, how, and where the American creed may best be marketed abroad. In the absence of a general strategy, the efforts of diaspora groups to hold policy hostage in particular instances remain deeply troubling.

GARY P. FREEMAN
*University of Texas at Austin*

**Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy** *by Douglas C. Foyle. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. 385 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $20.50.*

How, when, and to what extent does public opinion influence the president's foreign-policy decision making? These questions have been contemplated by scholars for decades. In *Counting the Public In*, Douglas C. Foyle breaks new ground by developing a theory of how individual presidents approach public opinion. He builds a theory to show that individual presidents can have different beliefs about public opinion and foreign policy. With the archival support generated, the theory suggests that studies which generalize across presidents should reconsider and respecify their theories to include the differences Foyle shows to exist between presidents.

Foyle argues that two factors must be considered when approaching how public opinion affects foreign-policy making: the international context and the president's beliefs about the role of public opinion in foreign policy making. The international context is defined by whether the president was surprised by the event and how much time (short or long) is available to make the decision. The president's beliefs are also broken down into four types as determined by whether the president believes public opinion should play a role in foreign policy creation and public support is necessary for a successful foreign policy.

Foyle uses extensive case studies of Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, as well as shorter cases from the Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton

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administrations to assess his beliefs theory. Overall, the theory is supported, and Foyle reveals several nonintuitive findings along the way.

Most interesting is how the amount of decision time affects the public's influence. Past theories have suggested that the greater the decision time allowed for making a decision, the more influence public opinion would have, because the president would have more time to read the public's mood and incorporate it into the decision. Conversely, decisions requiring almost immediate decisions leave the president no time to read or react to public opinion; thus, the decision can be expected to be made without regard to the public. Instead, Foyle finds the opposite. The greater the decision time, the more the president tries to lead public opinion to support his decision. When there is little time, the president does not have the luxury of leading or educating the public to his policy preference and instead incorporates what he anticipates the public's opinion will be into the decision.

The timing of a decision does raise a question. In the extensive analysis of Eisenhower's handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954, Foyle categorizes the decision time as short. However, Eisenhower had several months to develop his policy. Several months is a significant amount of time. While I do not dispute that this case was a crisis, I do think that perhaps a fifth type of case should be examined that has an extremely short decision time, perhaps one in which the president only has a couple of weeks. In light of Foyle's findings, it seems possible that even in such an extreme case, public opinion would still affect the decision process.

Each of the cases tends to overemphasize the importance of public opinion, sometimes downplaying the gravity of the national security issue. However, in the conclusion, Foyle is very clear: national security concerns play the biggest role, but domestic conditions have a significant effect on the decision making. *Counting the Public In* adds to our current understanding of how public opinion affects foreign-policy decision making. Foyle has done an excellent job of incorporating individual presidential beliefs into a general theory of foreign policy formation. This book is important reading for not only foreign-policy scholars but also the presidential scholars in general.

A. COOPER DRURY
*Southern Methodist University*

**States, Firms and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign Policy** *by George E. Shambaugh. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999. 264 pp. Cloth, $65.50; paper, $21.95.*

Shambaugh's book, focusing on what he calls secondary sanctions, is timely. Despite heated political and academic controversy about their effectiveness, economic sanctions are frequently used by the United States as a foreign policy

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tool. Secondary sanctions (and incentives) are not focused directly on the target, but rather on third parties, assuming that their cooperation is necessary for sanctions against a primary target to succeed. Third parties could be states, firms, or individuals; and Shambaugh has done a service by highlighting the role of firms, whose failure to go along with sanctions may harm the likelihood of overall policy success. A famous example is the U.S. Helms-Burton Act of 1996, which targets some foreign firms doing business in Cuba.

The book has several strengths. First, Shambaugh points scholars of economic statecraft to a phenomenon that has generally been understudied, given the frequent use of secondary sanctions. In the introduction, the problem is well framed within the broader sanctions literature. Second, Shambaugh clearly presents his hypotheses about trade dominance and dependence. In the sixty-six cases that Shambaugh analyzes, the United States succeeded "about fifty percent of the time" in stopping foreign firms from exporting strategic goods. He argues that success in those cases was more likely under what he calls appropriate conditions, which include the trade dominance of the sender, the target's dependence on the sender, the sender's dependence on the target, and the opportunity costs associated with sending and responding to sanctions. Third, Shambaugh's strategy of using case analysis against the background of quantitative analysis is appropriate, and his discussion of cases is the strongest element of the book.

But there are also problems with *States, Firms and Power*, some of which may have been introduced by the editorial and type-setting process. First, the book was poorly copy edited. There were numerous typos, missing words, and in one case an entire footnote (#4) was repeated verbatim (as footnote #26) in chapter one. Such errors are usually not worth mentioning; but I also found what appeared to be typos in a table reporting quantitative results. After finding so many errors, I had little confidence in the presentation of the quantitative data. Second, whether the author chose to do so, or the editors wanted to streamline the manuscript for some reason, the book was missing significant elements. For instance, the sixty-six cases should have been listed in the chapter reporting the quantitative analysis, along with sample coding decisions. These sorts of editorial choices and problems are obviously a disservice to both authors and readers.

The major analytical weakness of the book, however, was Shambaugh's implicit assumption that getting secondary sanctions to work would increase the likelihood of success against primary targets. Shambaugh is certainly not alone in this regard: many assume that broad compliance is necessary for the success of sanctions as a tool of statecraft. The appeal of a focus on secondary sanctions rests on this belief. However, absent clear analysis of the actual effects of sanctions on primary targets, one cannot be certain whether and how sanctions influence targets to change their behavior. Shambaugh raises this controversy but does not—it was not his brief—address the effects of sanctions on primary targets. However, until we have a better understanding of how sanctions affect

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targets, the utility of secondary sanctions and Shambaugh's important analysis of them will be underappreciated.

NETA C. CRAWFORD
*University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

**Empire** *by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2000. 478 pp. $35.00.*

The theme of *Empire* is not imperialism, but an "imperial postmodernity" (globalization) in which, the authors argue, capitalism has succeeded in producing "a fundamentally new form of rule." In this new world order, industrial modernization, which was based on sovereign nation states in the political sphere and on external forms of discipline in the social, has been supplanted by a postmodern form of capitalism so all-embracing that "capitalism has become a world" (p. 386).

Rather than rely upon force or external authority, this global empire governs itself through "biopower," which is defined as "a control that extends through the depths of the consciousness and the bodies of the population—and at the same time across the entirety of social relations" (p. 24). Contemporary capitalism thus needs to be conceived as a system geared to the "production of life" above and beyond the mere production of goods; indeed, the system's "primary task is to administer life."

Leading the way to globalism was the United States, whose eighteenth-century constitution was a revolutionary document that anticipated global capitalism's need to assimilate without limit new frontier spaces and hybrid populations. According to the authors, the turning point in the transition to empire came in the 1960s and 1970s when, in response to a global crisis provoked by a widespread refusal to work, capitalism veered in a postmodern direction by appropriating much of the sensibility of its radical critics. As capitalism abandoned "disciplinary modernization" and entered a postmodern phase, the USSR, which was deeply committed to a fading disciplinary model, was unable to keep pace with the West.

Writing from a postmodern Marxist perspective that only occasionally lapses into obscure jargon, the authors argue that conditions are finally becoming ripe for a world revolution. They press beyond the Leninist view of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism and argue instead that empire marks its historical terminus, to be succeeded by "counter-globalization" or "counter empire." The villain in their account is not capitalism but sovereignty, a repressive solution for the centuries-long crisis of modernity. Because they see "the people" as "a biopolitical displacement of sovereignty," they prefer to cast their lot with a less docile "multitude," whose primary weapons for destroying the rule of capital are nomadism and migration. In a recasting of the famous proph-

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ecy of *The Communist Manifesto*, they announce that "a specter haunts the world . . . the specter of migration" (p. 213).

This sprawling book is filled with original ideas and analyses, including some well-aimed critiques of postmodernism, dependency theory, world systems theory, anti-imperialism, and localism—and there is much more besides to stimulate the reader. Yet there is also much to question. To some observers, globalization is less deeply rooted than the firmly established and triumphant process one finds depicted in this book. And its collapse, should it occur, seems more likely to bring a reversion to command systems of governance than a passage to a global version of communism. One also wonders about the shape of the utopia now supposedly taking form inside the womb of global capitalism. Apart from some quite sketchy suggestions, the authors fail to provide a revolutionary road map; nor do they venture to describe the ways in which such a society would be practically governed and administered.

But one need not agree with its theoretical or practical arguments to acknowledge that this is an exciting and provocative book whose depth and richness can only be hinted at in so brief a review. Whatever its shortcomings as a revolutionary manifesto, its intellectual vitality suggests that the reports of Marxism's death have been greatly exaggerated.

FRANK NINKOVICH
*St. John's University*

**Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation** *by Francis E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999. 310 pp. Cloth, $48.00; paper, $17.00.*

The Senate of the United States is a peculiar institution in a representative democracy. As a result of a political deal at the constitutional convention of 1787, part of the Great Compromise, each state was guaranteed equal Senate representation—two senators—regardless of state population. Despite the enormous state-population disparities that have developed since the country's founding, the Senate remains today the only U.S. legislative body in which representation is not required to be based upon the principle of one person, one vote. Fourteen of the one hundred senators, for example, now represent constituencies no more populous than a House district.

We all basically know these things. We know representation in each of the two houses of Congress is differently based. But most of us have not stopped to ask, "So what?" In their highly worthwhile book, *Sizing Up the Senate*, Francis E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer have now asked that question, and they have given us some important answers to it, too.

In a very careful and groundbreaking study, Lee and Oppenheimer demonstrate how equal state representation in the Senate "affects four central aspects

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of the institution: representation, election, strategic behavior, and policymaking" (p. 224). Small-state constituents have "unfair advantages in greater voting power, access, and distribution of federal funds. . . ." (p. 228). They have disproportionate influence on the party composition of the Senate, as well as on its policy-making output.

The authors acknowledge that the constitutional guarantee of two senators per state is not going to be changed. The Constitution itself says that no state's equal representation in the Senate can be reduced without that state's consent—making this, incidentally, the only part of the organic document that cannot be amended in the regular way. But Lee and Oppenheimer argue that "recognizing the effects of equal representation of states is necessary for a complete understanding of the Senate as a representative and legislative institution" (p. 230). They are correct in this. They are right, too, in urging that future analyses of the body take its apportionment scheme fully into account. And they suggest additional directions for useful future research on the subject. This is a book that any student of the Senate and how it works will want to have and consult.

FRED R. HARRIS
*University of New Mexico*

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## Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

Unemployment in Southern Europe: Coping with the Consequences *edited by Nancy G. Bermeo. Portland, OR, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. 304 pp. Cloth, $57.50; paper, $24.50.*

Civil Rights since 1787: A Reader on the Black Struggle *edited by Jonathan Birnbaum and Clarence Taylor. New York, New York University Press, 2000. 936 pp. Cloth, $85.00; paper, $29.95.*

Italian Politics: The Return of Politics *edited by David Hine and Salvatore Vassallo. New York, Berghahn Books, 2000. 278 pp. $59.95.*

World Refugee Survey 2000: An Annual Assessment of Conditions Affecting Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons *compiled by the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Washington, DC, Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 2000. 328 pp. Paper, $10.50.*

The U.S. House of Representatives: Reform or Rebuild? *edited by Joseph F. Zimmerman and Wilma Rule. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2000. 248 pp. Cloth, $69.50; paper, $19.95.*



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


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


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


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


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


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





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


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


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


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


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


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



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